1. My battle with the Obsessive Categorizing Disorder Aristotle feat. Bijoy Raveendran July 2k13

2. Hi! My name is Aristotle I’m a Philosopher I love to categorize stuff (384-322 BC)

3. 3 parts Pre-Predicamenta – expressions, predicates, category Predicamenta - categories Post-Predicamenta – opposition, priority, simultaenity “Organon” A collection of six works of logic “Categories” Enumerates all possible things that can be a subject or predicate of a proposition or anything that can be expressed without composition or structure

4. A word of warning Aristotle rambles on and on about deep philosophical questions which he never answers quite comprehensively Any exposition he sets up in one paragraph is negated in the following paragraph His views are not consistent across his various works, and this is a raging debate within itself “

5. Categorizing objects of thought Divided into 10 1 primary category - Substance This is independent 9 secondary categories – Quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection These are accidental

6. Substances predicable Implied from or derived from

7. Substances “Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject.” “Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because they underlie and are the subjects of everything else.”

8. Substances “Both the name and the definition of the predicate must be predicable of the subject” Eg. ‘man’ is predicated of the ‘individual man’. Name and the definition of the species are predicable of the individual. “Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a primary substance or present in a primary substance.”

9. Substances (contd.) “With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present in a subject, it is generally the case that neither their name nor their definition is predicable of that in which they are present. Though, however, the definition is never predicable, there is nothing in certain cases to prevent the name being used.”’ Eg. ‘whiteness’ in a body

10. Substances (contd.) “Of primary substances, no one is more truly substance than another. We should not give a more appropriate account of the individual man by stating the species to which he belonged, than we should of an individual horse by adopting the same method of definition.”

11. Substances (contd.) “Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than the genus, being more nearly related to primary substance.” Secondary substances are described better through their species than their genus. Eg. ‘tree’ over ‘plant’, ‘individual man’ over ‘animal’

12. Substances (contd.) “Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary.” Eg. ‘the individual man’ or ‘individual horse’ has no contrary “The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities. “ Can a color be black and white at the same time?

13. Quantity “But one and the selfsame substance, while retaining its identity, is yet capable of admitting contrary qualities. The same individual person is at one time white, at another black, at one time warm, at another cold, at one time good, at another bad.” This is mostly applicable in case of statements or opinions, not because they themselves undergo modification, but because this modification occurs in the case of something else.

14. Substances (contd.) Black OR White

15. Black & White Substances (contd.)

16. Quantity Discrete – “Continuous with no common boundaries at which they join.” Eg. speech, number system Continuous – “Possible to find a common boundary at which its parts join.” Eg. Lines, solids, time, space

17. Quantity (contd.) Some continuous parts have a relative position with respect to each other. Eg. Line, plane Some don’t. Eg. numbers (these apparently have a relative order), speech (as syllables can’t be retained)

18. Quantity (contd.) “Anything else apart from above are not quantities - they are expressed in terms of quantities (quantities in a secondary sense).” Eg. an action is described in terms of its time. A white surface is described in terms of its length or extent.

19. Quantity (contd.) “Quantities have no contraries.” Eg. 50 feet, 2 individual horses “…but, great is the opposite of small - but this is relative, not quantitative - and in relation to similar of its kind. For how can there be a contrary of an attribute which is not to be apprehended in or by itself, but only by reference to something external?”

20. Quantity (contd.) “Quantity does not, it appears, admit of variation of degree. What is 'three' is not more truly three than what is 'five' is five; nor is one set of three more truly three than another set. Again, one period of time is not said to be more truly time than another.”

21. Quantity (contd.) “That which is not a quantity can by no means, it would seem, be termed equal or unequal to anything else.” Eg. whiteness

22. Relation “Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of something else or related to something else, are explained by reference to that other thing.” Eg. superior, double, habit, disposition, perception, knowledge, and attitude. The significance of all these is explained by a reference to something else and in no other way.

23. Relation (contd.) “It is possible for relatives to have contraries, but not all.” Eg. Virtue – vice, knowledge – ignorance But there are no contraries to ‘double’, ‘triple’, etc “It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degree, but not for all.” Eg. ‘more’ or ‘less’ can be applied to ‘like/unlike’ but not to ‘double/triple’

24. Relation (contd.) “All relatives, if properly defined, have co-relatives.” Eg. slave and master A slave is the slave of a master A master is the master of a slave Unless the master is a master, the slave doesn’t become a slave

25. Relation (contd.) “Sometimes, however, reciprocity of co-relation does not appear to exist. This comes about when a blunder is made, and that to which the relative is related is not accurately stated.” “For suppose the co-relative of 'the slave' should be said to be 'the man', if the attribute 'master' be withdrawn from' the man', the correlation between 'the man' and 'the slave' will cease to exist, for if the man is not a master, the slave is not a slave.”

26. Relation (contd.) “Co-relatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously. This is for the most part true, as in the case of the double and the half.”

27. Relation (contd.) “Yet it does not appear to be true in all cases that co-relatives come into existence simultaneously. The object of knowledge would appear to exist before knowledge itself, for it is usually the case that we acquire knowledge of objects already existing; it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a branch of knowledge the beginning of the existence of which was contemporaneous with that of its object.”

28. Relation (contd.) “From this it is plain that, if a man definitely apprehends a relative thing, he will also definitely apprehend that to which it is relative.” Eg. If a man knows double, he knows double of what If a man finds something more beautiful, he knows about the less beautiful reference as well

29. Relation (contd.) “No substance is relative in character.” Eg. Head, hand It’s not necessary that we know who’s head or hand “It is perhaps a difficult matter, in such cases, to make a positive statement without more exhaustive examination, but to have raised questions with regard to details is not without advantage.“

30. Qualities “By 'quality' I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be such and such.” 2 kinds of qualities – habits and dispositions While the latter in ephemeral, the former is permanent and difficult to alter.

31. Qualities (contd.) “Habit differs from disposition in being more lasting and more firmly established.” Eg. knowledge, virtues like justice, restraint, etc

32. Qualities (contd.) “By a disposition, on the other hand, we mean a condition that is easily changed and quickly gives place to its opposite.” Eg. heat, cold, disease, health

33. Qualities (contd.) “Habits are at the same time dispositions, but dispositions are not necessarily habits. For those who have some specific habit may be said also, in virtue of that habit, to be thus or thus disposed; but those who are disposed in some specific way have not in all cases the corresponding habit.”

34. Qualities (contd.) “Another sort of quality is that in virtue of which, for example, we call men good boxers or runners, or healthy or sickly: in fact it includes all those terms which refer to inborn capacity or incapacity.” Eg. Men are called healthy because of their capacity to resist disease. Unhealthy in terms of incapacity to do so. Hardness in an object is its capacity to withstand disintegration

35. Qualities (contd.) “A third class within this category is that of affective qualities and affections.” “It is evident that these are qualities, for those things that possess them are themselves said to be such and such by reason of their presence.” Eg. Honey is called sweet because it contains sweetness; the body is called white because it contains whiteness; and so in all other cases.

36. Qualities (contd.) “Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colors, are not said to be affective qualities in this sense, but -because they themselves are the results of an affection.” Eg. A man turns red when he blushes (when embarrasment is present within him). So, his complexion might be influenced by such bodily changes. The conditions responsible for the color change may be affective qualities, not the color change itself

37. Qualities (contd.) “Those conditions, however, which arise from causes which may easily be rendered ineffective or speedily removed, are called, not qualities, but affections: for we are not said to be such virtue of them.” Eg. Just because a man blushes in shame doesn’t mean he is a constitutional blusher. If he is irritable under stress, it doesn’t make it a quality. Rather than this being a quality, he has been affected

38. Qualities (contd.) “The fourth sort of quality is figure and the shape that belongs to a thing; and besides this, straightness and curvedness and any other qualities of this type; each of these defines a thing as being such and such.”

39. Qualities (contd.) “Rarity and density, roughness and smoothness seem to be different from quality triangular, or quadrangular as they are only an arrangement of constituents.”

40. Qualities (contd.) “These, then, are qualities, and the things that take their name from them as derivatives, or are in some other way dependent on them, are said to be qualified in some specific way.” Eg. ‘whiteness’, ‘justice’ give rise to ‘white’, ‘just’

41. Qualities (contd.) Sometimes, the name is derived from the science with which the subject is associated. Eg. A man who boxes is a ‘boxer’ “Sometimes, even though a name exists for the quality, that which takes its character from the quality has a name that is not a derivative.” Eg. A man of integrity is called ‘upright’, and not a word derived from ‘integrity’

42. Qualities (contd.) “Qualities admit of variation of degree.” Eg. Whiteness “There are some, indeed, who dispute the possibility of variation here. They maintain that justice and health cannot very well admit of variation of degree themselves, but that people vary in the degree in which they possess these qualities.”

43. That’s all folks! You can read more about my categories at the following links: http://www.classicallibrary.org/aristotle/categ ories/1.htm http://philofbeing.com/2009/07/aristotle%E2%80% 99s-ten-categories/ http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/aristotle/ section2.rhtml