1. Memory Wars in Divided Societies: The Political Uses of the Past in Contemporary Ukraine Saskia Brechenmacher Political Science Honors Thesis Adviser: Linda Cook Second Reader: Omer Bartov Saskia Brechenmacher Political Science Honors Thesis Adviser: Linda Cook Second Reader: Omer Bartov

2. Memorial for the Famine of 1932-33 (Holodomor), Kiev

3. Overview  Research Question:  Why have political conflicts over divisive and difficult periods in the nation’s past become more salient in the second decade after Ukrainian independence  Why and to what extent do the uses of collective memory vary in Ukrainian politics? >>What is the role of collective memory in Ukrainian post-Soviet politics?  Research Question:  Why have political conflicts over divisive and difficult periods in the nation’s past become more salient in the second decade after Ukrainian independence  Why and to what extent do the uses of collective memory vary in Ukrainian politics? >>What is the role of collective memory in Ukrainian post-Soviet politics?

4. Overview  Theoretical frameworks  Collective Memory  Nationalism/Nation-building  Politics of Transition/Transitional Justice  Memory as a tool for political competition  2 Case Studies  The Holodomor in 1932-33  The Second World War, in particular the role of Ukrainian nationalists (OUN/UPA), the Soviet “Victory Myth” and the Holocaust.  Theoretical frameworks  Collective Memory  Nationalism/Nation-building  Politics of Transition/Transitional Justice  Memory as a tool for political competition  2 Case Studies  The Holodomor in 1932-33  The Second World War, in particular the role of Ukrainian nationalists (OUN/UPA), the Soviet “Victory Myth” and the Holocaust.

5. Ukraine (until 1939)

6. Ukraine (since 1991)

7. Memory Politics in the1990s  1. Lack of institutional break with the past prevents implementation of transitional justice policies  2. Fragility of the new state constrains the use of memory as a nation-building tool  3. Kravchuk and Kuchma use history for instrumentalist purposes  1. Lack of institutional break with the past prevents implementation of transitional justice policies  2. Fragility of the new state constrains the use of memory as a nation-building tool  3. Kravchuk and Kuchma use history for instrumentalist purposes

8. Political polarization: 2004 elections Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ukraine/election-2004.htm

9. Yushchenko: A New Nation-Building Approach (2004-2010)  Yushchenko + Orange Revolution: promise of reform, reaction against Soviet legacies  Ukrainian victimhood and glorification of OUN- UPA, erasure of guilt and collaboration?  Ideology: National interpretation of the past = democratization, Westernization  Pragmatism: Political stalemate and government incompetence focus on symbolic politics  Yushchenko + Orange Revolution: promise of reform, reaction against Soviet legacies  Ukrainian victimhood and glorification of OUN- UPA, erasure of guilt and collaboration?  Ideology: National interpretation of the past = democratization, Westernization  Pragmatism: Political stalemate and government incompetence focus on symbolic politics

10.  “[The commemoration of the Holodomor] is the manifesto of our invincibility, the manifesto of the truth of the Ukrainian people. The answer to all Ukrainophobes, to the hatred of our spirit.” (Yushchenko, 2008)  “[The commemoration of the Holodomor] is the manifesto of our invincibility, the manifesto of the truth of the Ukrainian people. The answer to all Ukrainophobes, to the hatred of our spirit.” (Yushchenko, 2008)

11. Yanukovych: “De-politicizing the past” (2010 - now)  Electoral support base in the East and South  Debates about the past represented as polarizing, nationalist, politicized  Instrumentalization of Soviet narratives and stereotypes  Radicalization of opposition: “the Russian threat”  Electoral support base in the East and South  Debates about the past represented as polarizing, nationalist, politicized  Instrumentalization of Soviet narratives and stereotypes  Radicalization of opposition: “the Russian threat”

12.  “The substitution of real politics with primitive populism, ideological shamanism, and leader cults [have] destabilized the situation [...]. Just like in the first years of independence, the society was once against artificially plunged into discussions about history that provoked new conflicts and misunderstandings.” (Yanukovych, 2011)

13. Conclusions  Substantial continuity in the political instrumentalization of history  Gradual radicalization of political rhetoric  History as a battleground for competing visions of Ukrainian national identity: perpetuating Soviet traditions or imposing a new nationalist myth  Substantial continuity in the political instrumentalization of history  Gradual radicalization of political rhetoric  History as a battleground for competing visions of Ukrainian national identity: perpetuating Soviet traditions or imposing a new nationalist myth

14. Implications  No critical engagement with Soviet past on an official level  Silencing of historical narratives that contradict political agendas, top-down processes  Obstructs democratization of memory, historical scholarship and open societal discourse  Distracts from socio-economic woes  Encourages public disengagement and extremism  No critical engagement with Soviet past on an official level  Silencing of historical narratives that contradict political agendas, top-down processes  Obstructs democratization of memory, historical scholarship and open societal discourse  Distracts from socio-economic woes  Encourages public disengagement and extremism

15. Thank you!