1. Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated Cooperation to the Out-group in Intergroup Conflict

2. Parochial Cooperation The tendency to make self-costly contributions to one’s in-group

3. Examples parochial cooperation

8. Parochial Cooperation The tendency to make self-costly contributions to one’s in-group Can be, but does not have to be, harmful to the other party

9. Universal cooperation

13. Parochial cooperation is pervasive!

15. Parochial cooperation How can potentially negative parochial cooperation be shifted towards mutually beneficial universal cooperation? What is the role of intergroup competition in the display of parochial cooperation? What is the role of individuals’ predisposition towards cooperation?

16. Cooperation and social value orientation Svo: ‘General preference for distribution of outcomes between oneself and interdependent others’  To prefer good outcomes for oneself (pro-self) or for both oneself and others (pro-social) Pro-socials compared to pro-selves:  Value equality, reciprocity, fairness, cooperation  More willing to self-sacrifice for collective (in social dilemmas)  More generous in negotiation settings  Expect others to cooperate more Pro-socials are cooperators!

17. Pro-socials are cooperative! But to whom? What is cooperation in an intergroupconflict?  Parochial?  Universal?

18. Pro-socials’ cooperation dilemma in intergroup conflict Cooperation with own group may hurt other group Cooperation with other group may hurt own group (or be perceived as disloyal) Research found pro-socials to be parochial cooperators: Sacrifice themselves for their own group, sometimes at the expense of the other group (Aaldering et al., 2013; Abbink et al., 2012; De Dreu, 2010; De Dreu et al., 2010) What about decades of research suggesting that pro-socials care about collective welfare? (Au & Kwon, 2004; Balliet et al., 2009; Bogaert et al., 2008; Van Lange et al., 2007)

19. Possible solution? Research showing pro-socials to be parochial and competitive did no include option for universal cooperation (Abbink et al., 2012; De Dreu, 2010) Research showing pro-socials to be universal cooperation did not investigate an intergroup setting We integrate these by investigating an cooperation in an intergroup setting where  i) A mutually beneficial (universal) cooperation option is available  ii) Competition is either present or absent

20. Nested Social Dilemma

21. Three levels: Individual, group, collective

22. Game Instructions NSD 10 euro endowment. Investment in ingroup pool (A):  Each invested euro multiplied by two and then divided by four (equally among team members) Thus: 1 in, 0.5 return. Investment in collective pool (B):  Each invested euro multiplied by two and then divided by eight (equally among members of both teams) Thus: 1 in, 0.25 return. Personal pool:  Euros kept to self. Competitive NSD (NSD IPD)  Each invested euro multiplied by two and then divided by four (equally among team members) Thus: 1 in, 0.5 return plus subtracts 1 from out-group (0.25 per out-group member).

23. Hypotheses 1Individuals will display more parochial than universal cooperation 2ab. Pro-socials will invest more in the in-group and in the collective than pro-selves ( De Pauw et al., 2014; Polzer, 2004) When there is competition between the groups….. 3a. Parochialism will be fueled: Even more investments in in- group, especially by pro-socials 3b. Parochialism will shift to universal cooperation: Especially pro-socials are reluctant to harm out-group when there is a mutually beneficial alternative available

24. Method 98 classifiable undergraduate students 2 X 2 design (Svo: Pro-social or pro-self and Task: competitive or normal NSD) Start with decomposed game measure to assess svo Decision task: Member of Team Triangle (four members) Other group: Team Square Instructions for Game Comprehension check Play the Game Manipulation check

25. Main effects H1: Overall, more investmenst in in-group than in collective (= parochialism): M subgroup = 3.21, SD = 2.22 vs M collective = 2.03, SD = 2.42, F [1, 97] = 14.95, p <.001, η 2 =.13

26. Main effects H1: Overall, more investmenst in in-group than in collective (= parochialism): M subgroup = 3.21, SD = 2.22 vs M collective = 2.03, SD = 2.42, F [1, 97] = 14.95, p <.001, η 2 =.13 H2a: No effect svo on investments in-group F (1, 97) < 1, ns H2b: Pro-socials invest more in collective than pro-selves M pro-social = 2.99, SD = 2.79, M pro-self = 0.92, SD = 1.19, F [1, 97] = 21.50, p <.001, η 2 =.18

27. Main effects H1: Overall, more investmenst in in-group than in collective (= parochialism): M subgroup = 3.21, SD = 2.22 vs M collective = 2.03, SD = 2.42, F [1, 97] = 14.95, p <.001, η 2 =.13 H2a: No effect svo on investments in-group F (1, 97) < 1, ns H2b: Pro-socials invest more in collective than pro-selves M pro-social = 2.99, SD = 2.79, M pro-self = 0.92, SD = 1.19, F [1, 97] = 21.50, p <.001, η 2 =.18

28. Results In-group Pool Pro-social: F [1, 97] = 11.26, p =.001, η 2 =.10

29. Results In-group Pool Collective Pool Pro-social: F [1, 97] = 11.26, p =.001, η 2 =.10 F [1, 97] = 8.910, p =.004, η 2 =.08

30. Hypotheses When there is competition between the groups… 3a. Parochialism will be fueled: Even more investments in in- group by pro-socials 3b. Parochialism will shift to collective cooperation: Pro- socials reluctant to harm out-group when there is an alternative available

31. Conclusion Humans are parochial cooperators (more than universal) Pro-socials are parochial, but They shift to universal cooperation under competition!  They do not want to harm the other group if there is another option to benefit the own group (collective benefit) Intergroup competition is not necessary for parochial cooperation!

32. Study 2: Depletion Hampers self-control Universal cooperation should decrease if it is a calculated strategy  Due to not being able to compute maximizing parochial outcomes  Due to harm aversion

33. Study 2 Replicate study 1 If pro-socials are parochialists reluctant to harm out-group rather than intuitive universal cooperators: Hypothesis 4: Collective investments in NSD IPD should decrease under cognitive load (compared to no cognitive load)

34. Method 174 classifiable undergraduate students 2 X 2 x 2design (Svo: Pro-social or pro-self, Task: competitive or normal NSD, ego depletion: High or low) Start with decomposed game measure to assess svo Decision task: Member of Team Triangle (four members) Other group: Team Square Instructions for Game Comprehension check Ego depletion manipulation Play the Game Manipulation check

35. Ego depletion manipulation Stroop task: Indicate the colour of the word: Depletion: BLUE No depletion: RED Procedure otherwise exactly equal to Study 1

36. Main effects (replication) H1: Overall, more investments in in-group than in collective (= parochialism): M subgroup = 3.02, SD = 2.25 vs M collective = 1.94, SD = 2.46, F [1, 166] = 14.95, p <.001, η 2 =.08

37. Main effects (replication) H1: Overall, more investments in in-group than in collective (= parochialism): M subgroup = 3.02, SD = 2.25 vs M collective = 1.94, SD = 2.46, F [1, 166] = 14.95, p <.001, η 2 =.08 Pro-socials invest more in in-group than pro-selves F [1, 166] = 24.18, p =.237, η 2 =.008 Pro-socials invest more in collective than pro-selves M pro-social = 3.56, SD = 2.26, M pro-self = 2.73, SD = 2.17, F [1, 166] = 4.92, p =.028, η 2 =.029

38. Main effects (replication) H1: Overall, more investments in in-group than in collective (= parochialism): M subgroup = 3.02, SD = 2.25 vs M collective = 1.94, SD = 2.46, F [1, 166] = 14.95, p <.001, η 2 =.08 H2a: Pro-socials invest more in in-group than pro-selves F [1, 166] = 24.18, p =.237, η 2 =.008 H2b: Pro-socials invest more in collective than pro-selves M pro-social = 3.56, SD = 2.26, M pro-self = 2.73, SD = 2.17, F [1, 166] = 4.92, p =.028, η 2 =.029

39. For pro-socials (Replication) IngroupCollective F [1, 166] = 9.61, p =.002, η 2 =.055F [1, 166] = 3.98, p =.048, η 2 =.023

40. Including ego depletion Collective Ingroup Only without depletion did No effect depletion on invest- pro-socials invest more in the ments in-group collective after NSD IPD F [1, 166] = 3.85, p =.051

41. However…. Self Under depletion, pro-socials keep more to self after NSD IPD

42. Results When there is competition between the groups… H3. Parochialism will shift to collective cooperation: Pro- socials reluctant to harm out-group when there is an alternative H4: Universal cooperation decreases under cognitive load: Not intuitive

43. Conclusion Pro-socials are parochial, but not at all costs! When this self-sacrificing may hurt the other group and there is an option to benefit both groups, pro-socials become universally cooperative (invest in the collective) This is a calculated tendency: When their cognitive resources are depleted, pro-socials refrain from collective cooperation and instead become more pro-self (NOT more parochial! Their inequality aversion and reluctance to harm the other group seems to be a primary mechanism)

44. But…. In NSD, maximal profit is equal on in-group and collective level In NSD IPD, maximal profit is highest on collective level Maybe, pro-socials are social welfare maximizers and choose the option that maximizes outcomes for both parties in general  Which in the NSD could also be in-group investments; equal gain and smaller risk Pro-socials: Parochial or social welfare maximizers?

45. Experiment 3 Include outgroup hate pool IPDC: IPD MD plus collective option IPDC+: IPDC with maximal collective outcomes higher than ingroup outcomes If pro-socials are social welfare maximizers, they should invest more in the collective pool after playing this game compared to the IPDC If pro-socials are parochial, they should not be affected by the increase in possible collective outcomes

46. Game Instructions IPDC 10 euro endowment. Investment in ingroup pool (A):  Each invested euro multiplied by two and then divided by four (equally among team members) Thus: 1 in, 0.5 return. Investment in in-group love/ out-group hate pool (B)  Each invested euro multiplied by two and then divided by four (equally among team members) Thus: 1 in, 0.5 return plus subtracts 1 from out-group (0.25 per out-group member). Investment in collective pool (C):  Each invested euro multiplied by two and then divided by eight (equally among members of both teams) Thus: 1 in, 0.25 return. Personal pool: (D)  Euros kept to self.

47. Game Instructions IPDC+ 10 euro endowment. Investment in ingroup pool (A):  Each invested euro multiplied by two and then divided by four (equally among team members) Thus: 1 in, 0.5 return. Investment in in-group love/ out-group hate pool (B)  Each invested euro multiplied by two and then divided by four (equally among team members) Thus: 1 in, 0.5 return plus subtracts 1 from out-group (0.25 per out-group member). Investment in collective pool (C):  Each invested euro multiplied by 3.2 and then divided by eight (equally among members of both teams) Thus: 1 in, 0.40 return. Personal pool:  Euros kept to self.

48. Method 170 undergraduate students 2 X 2 x 2design (Svo: Pro-social or pro-self, Task: NSD or NSDC, ego depletion: High or low) Start with svo slider measure Decision task: Member of Team Circle (four members) Other group: Team Square Instructions for Game Comprehension check Ego depletion manipulation Play the Game Manipulation check

49. Main effects (replication) H1: Overall, more investments in in-group (Pool A) than in collective (= parochialism): M subgroup = 3.02, SD = 2.25 vs M collective = 1.94, SD = 2.46, F [1, 166] = 7.25, p =.008, η 2 =.08 Even stronger when investments ingroup include outgroup hate (combination of Pool A and B): M subgroup = 3.02, SD = 2.25 vs M collective = 1.94, SD = 2.46, F [1, 161] = 57.29, p <.001, η 2 =.04

50. Main effects (replication) H2A Pro-socials invest more in in-group than pro-selves F [1, 161] = 5.38, p =.022, η 2 =.032 H2B Pro-socials invest more in collective than pro-selves F [1, 161] = 8.57, p =.004, η 2 =.05 No effect svo on outgroup hate (F [1,161] = 1.74, p =.19)

51. Interactions No interaction Svo * Game on investments in-group (F (1, 161) =.128) or collective (F (1,161) =.72. No interaction Svo* Game * depletion on investments in-group (F (1, 161) =.002) or collective (F (1, 161) =.290).

52. Conclusion Pro-socials do not invest differently in the in-group depending on game structure and/or mental depletion Pro-socials’ parochialism is real rather than a way to maximize social welfare Role mental depletion unclear  Increases cooperation in general? (Rand et al., 2012) Or specifically parochial? (De Dreu et al., 2015) Decreases calculated cooperation? (Exp 2)  No reliable effects?

53. Discussion Parochialism is default cooperation strategy but can harm intergroup relations Intergroup competition decreases occurrence of parochial cooperation- especially among pro-socials Inconsistency about nature of pro-socials seems (partially) solved: Depends on accessibility of collectively beneficial option and on presence of competition Social welfare maximization does not explain pro-socials pro- sociality

54. Thank you! Contact Information: Hillie Aaldering H.Aaldering@uva.nl