1. 1 John Kriendler Professor of NATO and European Security Issues George C. Marshall European Center for Security Issues NATO Wide Executive Development Program 14 January 2013 John Kriendler Professor of NATO and European Security Issues George C. Marshall European Center for Security Issues NATO Wide Executive Development Program 14 January 2013 NATO: Key Issues at Chicago and Beyond

2. 2 Overview Chicago Collective Defense Afghanistan Smart Defense Partnership Missile Defense NATO-Russia Nuclear Policy Enlargement US engagement Conclusions Chicago Collective Defense Afghanistan Smart Defense Partnership Missile Defense NATO-Russia Nuclear Policy Enlargement US engagement Conclusions “New Improved NATO”

3. 3 Chicago Summit

4. 4 ? Collective Defense ARTICLE 5 “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more... shall be considered an attack against them all and... each of them.. will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking... such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. ”

5. 5 Operations NATO Support to the African Union ISAF Support to EU Operation ALTHEA KFOR Balkans Defense Reform ACTIVE ENDEAVOR Air Policing NATO Training Mission - Iraq Ocean Shield CAUTION: CHART SHOULD NOT BE USED FOR NAVIGATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR

6. 6 Afghanistan Flight from Kabul to Jalalabad, 17 Dec. 2011

7. 7 2011 Defense budget as % of GDP Country% of GDP Albania1.5 Belgium1.1 Bulgaria1.4 Canada1.4 Croatia1.5 Czech Rep.1.1 Denmark1.4 Estonia1.7 France1.9 Germany1.4 Greece2.1 Hungary1.0 Italy1.4 Latvia1.0 Country% of GDP Lithuania0.8 Luxembourg0.5 Netherlands 1.3 Norway1.5 Poland1.7 Portugal1.5 Romania1.3 Slovakia1.1 Slovenia1.3 Spain0.9 Turkey1.9 UK2.6 US4.8 Source: NATO DPP Division Caveat: As allies include different items in their defense budgets, these figures are not strictly comparable.

8. 8 Smart Defense Consult Prioritize Cooperate Deepen connections Maintain strong defense industry, transatlantic cooperation NATO Forces 2020 o Retain capabilities for core tasks o Modern, tightly connected, equipped, trained, exercised and commanded to operate together Consult Prioritize Cooperate Deepen connections Maintain strong defense industry, transatlantic cooperation NATO Forces 2020 o Retain capabilities for core tasks o Modern, tightly connected, equipped, trained, exercised and commanded to operate together

9. 9 Partnership NATO - Ukraine (28+1) UKR BELBGRCAN LUX LVASVKROUPRTPOL LTU NLD NOR SVN ESP TUR GBR USA NATO - EU (34) AUT SWE CYP FIN IRL MLT ISR DZAEGY JOR MRT MAR TUN Mediterranean Dialogue (28+7) BHR AREKWT QAT Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (28+4) RUS NATO - Russia (29) CZEDNKEST FRA DEU GRC HUN ITA ICE FINSWE AUT MLT CHE ALB IRE BLR BIHKAZ MKD ARM KGZAZE GEO UZB MDAUKR RUS HRV TJKTKM MNE SRB EAPC (50) NATO (28) GEO NATO - Georgia (28+1) Global Partners

10. 10 Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Strategic Concept o Develop capability “to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defense.” o “actively seek cooperation on missile defense with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners.” Chicago o Interim BMD capability o If threat reduced, adapt o Remain committed to cooperation with Russia

11. 11 NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) 1997 NATO-Russia Council (NRC) 2002 Russo-Georgian War (2008) Strategic Concept o Strategic importance/partnership o Enhance cooperation on missile defence, counter- terrorism, counter- narcotics, counter-piracy and promotion of wider international security. Chicago o No Putin o “True strategic partnership” o Difference s and common interests Permanent Joint Council (PJC) 1997 NATO-Russia Council (NRC) 2002 Russo-Georgian War (2008) Strategic Concept o Strategic importance/partnership o Enhance cooperation on missile defence, counter- terrorism, counter- narcotics, counter-piracy and promotion of wider international security. Chicago o No Putin o “True strategic partnership” o Difference s and common interests The Russian cruiser “Moskva” (forefront) training with NATO ships in the Ionian Sea, 14 February 2006

12. 12 NATO nuclear policy: main elements o Strategic nuclear forces o Sub-strategic nuclear weapons o Burden sharing Debate o Global zero o US weapons in Europe: pros and cons o Russian “tactical” nuclear weapons o Declaratory policy Implementing Chicago decisions NATO nuclear policy: main elements o Strategic nuclear forces o Sub-strategic nuclear weapons o Burden sharing Debate o Global zero o US weapons in Europe: pros and cons o Russian “tactical” nuclear weapons o Declaratory policy Implementing Chicago decisions B 61, three views

13. 13 Theater Nuclear Weapons (TNW) Currently o 200 B61 gravity bombs o Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey o DCA: Tornados, F 16s Planned upgrade o B61-12 precision guided gravity bombs delivered by F-35’s

14. 14 ARTICLE 10:...by unanimous agreement, may invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area... Enlargement

15. 15 U.S. and NATO Center for European Reform: “All Alone? What US retrenchment means for Europe and NATO”

16. 16 Conclusions Progress Issues continue to evolve. Adaptability NATO’s future Progress Issues continue to evolve. Adaptability NATO’s future "It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent; it is the one that is most adaptable to change." Charles Robert Darwin (1809-82)

17. 17 Questions/Comments Smarter Defense Funding?

18. 18 Back Up slides

19. 19 Emerging Security Challenges Piracy Cyber WMD proliferation Terrorism Energy Environmental and resource constraints Ballistic missile proliferation Piracy Cyber WMD proliferation Terrorism Energy Environmental and resource constraints Ballistic missile proliferation

20. 20 NATO, ISAF: Public Support Public support Publics do not perceive security threats Strong support for NATO Support to maintain defense budgets ISAF: majorities want reduced troop levels or withdrawal Public support Publics do not perceive security threats Strong support for NATO Support to maintain defense budgets ISAF: majorities want reduced troop levels or withdrawal

21. 21 NATO’s Future “It depends” Exogenous and endogenous o Security environment o Global economy o Global governance o Climate change o Operational success o Solidarity/Commitment o Defense spending o TA relations “It depends” Exogenous and endogenous o Security environment o Global economy o Global governance o Climate change o Operational success o Solidarity/Commitment o Defense spending o TA relations