1. SOLAS requirements Jan Tore Grimsrud February 2009 DNV interpretations

2. SOLAS calls for several different interpretations in many regulations- From SOLAS V safety of navigation

3. © Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 316 November 2015 Why SOLAS interpretations ? SOLAS calls for several different interpretations in many regulations. This may cause many different discussions and solutions DNV found it necessary/practical to clarify some of the requirements in SOLAS (the ones subject for discussions during plan approval /installation)

4. Statutory Interpretations This has lead to a official document call Statutory Interpretations and this is maintained/updated in the same way as our DNV rules

5. SOLAS reg. 19.6 SOLAS text “Integrated bridge systems* shall be so arranged that failure of one sub- system is brought to immediate attention of the officer in charge of the navigational watch by audible and visual alarms, and does not cause failure to any other sub ‑ system. In case of failure in one part of an integrated navigational system,** it shall be possible to operate each other individual item of equipment or part of the system separately”*** ** Refer to resolution MSC.64(67), annex 1 - Performance standard for Integrated bridge systems. **** Refer to resolution MSC.86(70), annex 3 - Performance standard for Integrated navigational systems.

6. SOLAS reg. 19.6 DNV interpretation For ships constructed on or after 2002-07-01: In case of failure in any part of the integrated navigation system all other parts of the integrated system shall maintain normal operation, except parts being directly dependant of the failing part (e.g. a heading control system is directly dependant on data from the heading sensor). Likewise, a failure in one navigation equipment or system shall not render any other navigation equipment or systems inoperable, except equipment or systems being \directly dependant of the failing equipment/ system. Navigational equipment and systems only interfaced through networks (two or more networks) shall have a fail-safe-mode*. Subsequent to failure of both (all) networks the fall-back topology shall at least provide the following functionality:

7. SOLAS reg. 19.6 DNV interpretation continue For ships constructed on or after 2002-07-01: - Ships of more than 10 000 gross tonnage shall have one operational ARPA radar provided with data from heading and speed data. - Ships of more than 3 000 but less than 10 000 gross tonnage shall have one operational ATA or ARPA radar provided with data from heading and speed data. - Ships of more than 300 but less than 3 000 gross tonnage shall have one operational EPA, ATA or ARPA radar. - Unless paper navigational charts are carried and used, the ECDIS or the ECDIS back-up shall be operational with data from a GNSS receiver. * If the manufacturer can document that the network systems used are fully independent (e.g different make/type of hardware/software platform), this requirement does not apply.

8. Network solution Network solution may include several Multi Function Displays (MFD)

9. Network solution Direct input of minimum GPS to ECDIS, and Gyro compass+ speedlog to Radar

10. Why this interpretation. Redundancy -is in most cases achieved by double or more installations Independency -will require independent operation from other equipment -DNV had a project regarding network and use of Local Area Network (LAN) in ship systems. This is the conclusion.

11. © Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 1116 November 2015 Network solution

12. © Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 1216 November 2015 Network solution

15. DNV rules DNV rules for additional class notations will address the use of LAN and integration of equipment

16. © Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 1616 November 2015