1. Government 1740 INTERNATIONAL LAW Summer 2008 Individual Human Rights: The Problem of Enforcement

2. OUTLINE I. Multilateral “enforcement” A. International human rights monitoring bodies 1. Duties of oversight committees 2. The individual complaints process B. The Human Rights Commission:1503 procedures C. General Assembly D. The security Council II.Litigation A. Domestic courts B. Foreign courts IV. Political mechanisms A. Hegemonic pressure B. Multilateral pressure C. The role of NGOs

3. I. MULTILATERAL “ENFORCEMENT” MECHANISMS

4. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING BODIES Charter based bodies: Commission on Human Rights Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities Treaty-based bodies: Committee against Torture Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Committee on the Rights of the Child Human Rights Committee*

5. Duties of the Treaty Oversight Committees receive reports receive individuals complaints issue general comments

6. The Individual Complaint Process (ICCPR) First Optional Protocol Patterns of individual complaints Findings Jamaica Finland

8. UN Human Rights Commission

9. The Torture Scale Source: Oona Hathaway, 2002

11. 1503 PROCEDURES ECOSOC Resolution 1503, (1970) Consistent pattern of gross violations Investigations can be initiated by the UN Human Rights Commission

12. 1503 PROCEDURES

14. States Investigated under 1503 Procedures by the Commission on Human Rights (through 2003) Afghanistan, 1981 - 1984 Albania, 1984 – 1988, 1995 Antigua & Barbuda, 1997 Argentina, 1980-1984 Armenia, 1994-1996 Azerbaijan, 1994 - 1996 Bahrain, 1991-1993 Benin, 1984-1985, 1988 Bolivia, 1977-1981 Botswana, 1977 Brazil, 1974-1976 Brunei, 1988-1990 Burma, 1979-1980, 1990-1992 Burundi, 1974-1975 Central African Rep., 1980-81 Chad, 2002-2003 Chile,1975-76, 1978-79, 1981, 2000

15. 1503 INVESTIGATIONS Czech Republic, 1997 Djibouti, 2003 El Salvador, 1981 Equatorial Guinea, 1976-79 Estonia, 1994, 1997 Ethiopia, 1978-1981 Gabon, 1986 Gambia, 1997-1999 German Dem. Rep., 1981-83 Germany, 1994 Grenada, 1988 Guatemala, 1981 Guyana, 1974-1975 Haiti, 1981-1987 Honduras, 1988-1989 Indonesia (and East Timor), 1978-81, 1983-85 Iran, 1974-1975, 1983 Iraq, 1988, 1989 Israel, 1975-1977 Japan, 1981, 1998 Cambodia, 1979 Kenya, 1993, 2000 Korea, Rep. of, 1977-1982 Kuwait, 1994 Kyrgyzstan, 1997-1998 Laos, 1995

16. 1503 INVESTIGATIONS Latvia, 1995, 1997, 2000 Lebanon, 1997 Liberia, 2002-2003 Lithuania, 1997 Malawi, 1977-1980 Malaysia, 1984 Maldives, 2001 Mali, 1996 Moldova, 1995 Mozambique, 1981 Nepal, 1996, 1999 Nigeria, 2002 Pakistan, 1984, 1985, 1988 Paraguay, 1978-90, 1998 Peru, 1998 Philippines, 1984-1986 Portugal, 1974-1975 Republic of the Congo, 2000, 2001 Rwanda, 1993-1995 Saudi Arabia, 1995-1999 Sierra Leone, 1996-1999 Slovenia, 1995, 1996 Somalia, 1989-1994 Sudan, 1991-1993 Syria,1989, 1992, 1997

17. 1503 INVESTIGATIONS Tanzania, 1974-1975, 1997 Thailand, 1995, 1996 Togo, 2001-2002 Turkey, 1983-1986 Uganda, 1975-81, 1995, 2000-01 United Arab Emirates, 2000 United Kingdom, 1974-1975 United States of America, 1997 Uruguay, 1978-1985 Uzbekistan, 1996-97, 2003 Venezuela, 1982 Viet Nam, 1994, 2000 Yemen, 1998-1999, 2000 Zaire (Dem. Rep. of the Congo) 1985-89, 1991-93 Zimbabwe, 2000 Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/8/stat1.htm

18. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY Condemnatory resolutions

21. THE SECURITY COUNCIL Human rights role is growing Chapter VIII enforcement power against threats to international peace and security Can refer cases to the International Criminal Court Darfur, Sudan

22. II. LEGAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

23. DOMESTIC COURTS Example: Israeli Supreme Court decision, 1999.

24. Pinochet Extradition, 1998

26. USE OF OTHER COUNTRIES’ LEGAL SYSTEMS

27. The Alien Tort Statute: FILARTIGA V. PENA-IRALA Background: foreign nationals, incident of torture on foreign soil Alien Tort Statute (ATS) Torture is a breach of customary international law, enforceable in US courts

28. THE CASE OF THE BURMA GAS PIPELINE

29. Source: USA*Engage – a pro-business NGO opposed to “unilateral sanctions” in US foreign policy. http://www.usaengage.org/legislative/2003/alientort/alientorttpcases.html

30. III. POLITICAL MECHANISMS Peer (state) pressure Bilateral multilateral Domestic (internal) pressure Transnational (NGO) pressure

32. HUMAN RIGHTS NGO GROWTH

34. NGOs: BOOMERANG EFFECT REPRESSIVE STATE XXXXXXXXXX domestic human rights demands Coalition with transnational NGOs Intergov. Organ. Foreign gov’t Multilateral or bilateral pressure

35. SUMMARY The international human rights regime is characterized by weak enforcement. Multilateral fora to hear individual complaints and render recommendations exist, but often have no teeth. Domestic enforcement is preferable in theory, but is the judiciary independent? The use of foreign courts is a theoretical possibility, but has been only rarely used. Bilateral political pressure usually takes a back seat to foreign policy goals. Treaty commitments can change domestic politics and empower demands of locals for rights realization. NGOs are a crucial form of external vigilance; especially important in extremely repressive political regimes.