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Bart Miller – October 22 nd, 2012.  TCB & Threat Model  Xen Platform  Xoar Architecture Overview  Xoar Components  Design Goals  Results  Security.

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Presentation on theme: "Bart Miller – October 22 nd, 2012.  TCB & Threat Model  Xen Platform  Xoar Architecture Overview  Xoar Components  Design Goals  Results  Security."— Presentation transcript:

1 Bart Miller – October 22 nd, 2012

2  TCB & Threat Model  Xen Platform  Xoar Architecture Overview  Xoar Components  Design Goals  Results  Security  Vulnerability Mitigation  Performance

3  Trusted Computing Base is defined as “the totality of protection mechanisms within a computer system – including hardware, firmware, and software – the combination of which is responsible for enforcing a security policy.”  Xen, by virtue of privilege, is part of the TCB

4  In Xen, all components operate under a monolithic trust domain  Compromise of any component yields two benefits:  Gain privilege level of component  Access its interfaces to other components

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6  Assumption #1: Administrators are not a concern  Business imperative  Assumption #2: Malicious guest VM  Violate data integrity or confidentiality  Exploiting code  Assumption #3: The control VM will contain bugs

7  Device drivers  Virtualized, passed-through, or emulated  XenStore  Hierarchical key-value store  System-wide registry  Most critical component ▪ Vulnerable to DoS attacks ▪ Perform most administrative operations

8  Toolstack  Administrative functions  Create, destroy, managing resources and privilege for guest VMs  System Boot  Starts DomO process, initialize hardware

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11  Reduce privilege  Each component should only have the privileges essential to its purpose  Each component should only expose interfaces when necessary

12  Reduce sharing  Sharing components should be avoided wherever it is reasonable  Any sharing of components must be explicit  Allows for logging and auditing in the event of a compromise

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15  Reduce staleness  A component should only run for as long as it needs to perform its task.  It should be restored to a known, good state as frequently as practicable.

16  Reduced TCB  Bootstrapper, PCIBack, and Builder are most privileged components  Bootstrapper and PCIBack destroyed once initialized  TCB reduced ▪ Linux: 7.6M LoC ▪ Builder: 13,5k LoC (Builder)

17  Solved through isolation  Device Emulation  Virtualized Drivers  XenStore, re-written  Hypervisor vulnerabilities remain

18  Test system  Ca. 2011 server  Quad-core Xeon, 4Gb RAM  All virtualization features enabled  Memory overhead  512Mb – 896Mb in Xoar vs.  750Mb in XenServer

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21  Any questions?


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