1. EMIST DDoS Experimental Methodology Alefiya Hussain January 31, 2006

2. Outline Sparta effort on methodology Xiaowei Yang at UCI Tool Internals – Brett Wilson Purdue – Sonia Fahmy

3. SPARTA Team Participants DETER – Steve Schwab, Ron Ostrenga, Brad Harris, David Balenson EMIST DDoS – Steve Schwab, Brett Wilson, Ron Ostrenga, Alefiya Hussain, Calvin Ko, Roshan Thomas, Brad Harris

4. Objectives A methodology should provide a sequence of well-defined steps which can guide an experimenter in defining and conducting their evaluation Define a canonical DDoS experiment Provide a set of resources Detail the process of conducting comparable DDoS experiments Make it relatively easy to create a DDoS experiment scenario Create a notational short-hand for describing and comparing experiments Archive several experiment descriptions along with data and results to seed the process Identify limitations of simulation and emulation, and the effect of scale on experimental results

5. Canonical Experiment Setup Attack Traffic: FLOOD | STARVATION | EXPLOITS | ROUTING | FUTURE Background Traffic: REPLAY | HARPOON | DRIVE HARPOON WITH REAL TRACES Topology: CANONICAL | INTERNET SCALE Defense Mechanisms: FLOODWATCH | DWARD | COSSACK | PUSHBACK | RED-PD Devices: CLOUDSHIELD | JUNIPER ROUTERS Measurements: HOST STATISTICS | PACKET TRACES Metrics & Visualization: EXTRINSIC NETWORK STATE | INTRINSIC DEFENSE STATE

6. Defense Mechanisms Floodwatch Router based detection of anomalies DWARD Source-end detection of abnormal TCP behavior COSSACK Collaborative detection of volume anomalies Pushback Router based detection of congestion CloudShield RED-PD

7. CloudShield IXP2800 Appliance – Available on DETER as an experimental device Emulate a router line-card – RED Queue Implementation – 4 ports x 1 Gigabit Ethernet Augment with RED-PD DDoS Defense – Identify misbehaving TCP flows or aggregates – Create building blocks suitable for exploring design space of DDoS defenses augmenting line-cards RED-PD DDoS Defense CloudShield Implementation Pre-filter RED Queue Attack Detector Attack Identifier Classifier OUTOUT IN From On the Robustness Of Router Based DDoS Defense Xu and Guerin, Computer CommunicationsReview, July 2005

8. Measurements and Metrics Goodput Ratio of attack to background traffic Link utilization A ttack rate Victim/ Server Average server response time Average server-side application throughput Connection completion time Rate of failed connections Throughput per flow loss per flow TCP Flow -decrease in goodput - increased aggregate attack rate - degraded server response time - decreased server-side application throughput - increased connection completion time - increased rate of failed connections - increased loss per flow

9. Topology Scaling Evaluate defense systems in larger, realistic network topologies AS level topologies consist of 300+ nodes Prune dormant nodes to create smaller topology Size of topology determined by density of attackers and background traffic sources A d1 d2 s1 V s2 A

10. Xiaowei Yang UCI

11. Overview of the Traffic Validation Architecture 1.Source requests permission to send. 2.Destination authorizes source for limited transfer, e.g, 32KB in 10 secs A capability is the proof of a destination’s authorization. 3.Source places capabilities on packets and sends them. 4.Network filters packets based on capabilities. cap

12. Deter Test Plan Implement TVA on the click router platform Router implemented as a collection of elements Test on Deter TVA router graph

13. Tool Internals