1. www.antolin-davies.com Find your role and sit at the indicated seat. Don’t disturb the materials.

2. www.antolin-davies.com The purpose of this simulation is to create a competitive market and to observe the market as it achieves equilibrium. In this simulation, you will experience real market forces. The same human traits and behaviors that govern real markets exist in the simulation. What are artificial are your surroundings. The market forces are real. 2

3. www.antolin-davies.com The Players and the Goals In this experiment, there are CONSUMERS and INSURERS. INSURERS sell INSURANCE. CONSUMERS buy FOOD and INSURANCE. 3

4. www.antolin-davies.com Consumers Each consumer has $20 to spend. A unit of food costs $1. 4 $20 The more food the consumer eats, the happier the consumer becomes.

5. www.antolin-davies.com Consumers: The Catch Each consumer faces some risk of badness. 5 vs. If badness befalls the consumer, the consumer loses all of the purchased food.

6. www.antolin-davies.com Consumers: The Insurance But, consumers can purchase insurance contracts from the insurance companies. 6 Each contract pays the consumer one unit of food if badness befalls that consumer.

7. www.antolin-davies.com Consumers: Example Suppose a consumer can purchase insurance contracts at a price of $0.50 each (the price of food is always $1 each). 7 $20 Suppose that the consumer spends $5 on insurance contracts. The remaining $15 is automatically spent on food. 10 insurance contracts 15 food

8. www.antolin-davies.com Consumers: Example If badness does not befall the consumer, the consumer eats 15 units of food and is very happy. 8 Very Happy !!

9. www.antolin-davies.com Consumers: Example If badness does befall the consumer, the 15 units of food disappear, each insurance contract pays $1.00 (which buys 1 unit of food), and the consumer is somewhat happy. 9 Somewhat Happy

10. www.antolin-davies.com Consumers Each consumer’s goal: Maximize happiness More insurance means  More food when badness befalls.  Less food when badness does not befall.  Too little insurance is bad. Too much insurance is also bad. 10

11. www.antolin-davies.com Insurers Each insurer can write as many insurance contracts as liked and charge any price. 11

12. www.antolin-davies.com Insurers If badness does not befall the consumer, the insurer walks away with the money the consumer paid for the contracts. 12 $$$ $$$

13. www.antolin-davies.com Insurers If badness does befall the consumer, the insurer pays the consumer $1.00 for each contract the insurer sold the consumer. 13

14. www.antolin-davies.com Insurers: Example Suppose an insurer sells Consumer A six contracts for $0.60 each, and sells Consumer B five contracts for $0.30 each. 14 The insurer collects $3.60 from Consumer A and $1.50 from Consumer B. $3.60 $1.50 $5.10 Revenue =

15. www.antolin-davies.com Insurers: Example Suppose badness befalls Consumer B but not Consumer A. 15 The insurer owes Consumer B $1.00 for each contract Consumer B purchased. $5.00 $5.10 Revenue = $5.00 Cost = $0.10 Profit =

16. www.antolin-davies.com Insurers: Example Suppose badness befalls Consumer A but not Consumer B. 16 The insurer owes Consumer A $1.00 for each contract Consumer A purchased. $6.00 $5.10 Revenue = $6.00 Cost = $0.90 Loss = (Insurers do not need cash reserves to cover policies.)

17. www.antolin-davies.com Insurers Each insurer’s goal: Maximize expected profit Insurers can ask whatever prices they like for contracts  Too low a price is bad. Too high a price is also bad. 17

18. www.antolin-davies.com 18 Type 1 10% Badness There are five types of consumer. Each faces a different probability of badness. Type 2 20% Type 3 30% Type 4 40% Type 5 50%

19. www.antolin-davies.com 19 Type ? ? Badness Each consumer knows which type he/she is, but insurers don’t. The average probability of badness is 30%.

20. www.antolin-davies.com The Objects 20 = insurance contract(s) = sales register

21. www.antolin-davies.com Contracts 21 12 6 $4.80 Customer 6 purchases 12 contracts from insurer for $0.40 each.

22. www.antolin-davies.com Register 22 12 6 $4.80 0.3 $3.60$1.20 The register is for your own use in tracking your expected costs. Feel free to cross out and re-enter information when your suspected risk for a consumer changes. 12 6 0.5 $4.80 $6.00-$1.20

23. www.antolin-davies.com The Mechanics 23 Agent InsurersConsumers Head Office $0.30 Yes

24. www.antolin-davies.com The Mechanics 24 Agent InsurersConsumers Head Office

25. www.antolin-davies.com The Mechanics 25 Agent InsurersConsumers Head Office Consumers: Keep track of how much you’ve spent. You only have $20! Head Office: Keep track of your expected profits.

26. www.antolin-davies.com Ready to begin… 26

27. www.antolin-davies.com Consumers:Buy some insurance. All remaining money goes to food. Insurers:Sell insurance to expected maximize profit. 27

28. www.antolin-davies.com Accounting Phase Consumers report: Contracts purchased, cost, and from which insurer(s) 28

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31. www.antolin-davies.com Mandated Insurance Concerned that some consumers do not have enough insurance coverage, the law stipulates that an insurer may not sell less than 50 contracts to a buyer unless the buyer has already purchased at least 50 contracts (from any insurer) this round. 31

32. www.antolin-davies.com Ready to begin… 32

33. www.antolin-davies.com Consumers:Buy some insurance. All remaining money goes to food. Insurers:Sell insurance to maximize profit. 33

34. www.antolin-davies.com 34 Accounting Phase Consumers report: Contracts purchased, cost, and from which insurer(s)

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37. www.antolin-davies.com Mandatory Insurance Concerned that some consumers do not have any insurance, the law requires that all consumers buy a total of no less than 50 contracts this round. 37

38. www.antolin-davies.com Ready to begin… 38

39. www.antolin-davies.com Consumers:Buy some insurance. All remaining money goes to food. Insurers:Sell insurance to maximize profit. 39

40. www.antolin-davies.com 40 Accounting Phase Consumers report: Contracts purchased, cost, and from which insurer(s)

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43. www.antolin-davies.com Results… 43

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55. www.antolin-davies.com Forces lower risk people to consume quantities of goods that they may not want to consume. End result is a transfer of wealth from low risk to high risk people. A better solution is simply to tax the low risk people, give the money to the high risk people and let them buy what they want. 55 What is the effect of insurance mandates?

56. www.antolin-davies.com But, we have to do something! Look at what has been happening to the cost of health care over time! 56

57. www.antolin-davies.com 57 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (www.economy.com) Price of medical care has increased 349% since 1980 versus 135% for other consumer prices.

58. www.antolin-davies.com 58 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (www.economy.com) Hospital services+ 576% Drugs and supplies+ 402% Physician services+ 282% Other consumer prices+ 135%

59. www.antolin-davies.com 59 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (www.economy.com)

60. www.antolin-davies.com But, the cost of health care is only half of the picture. What has been happening to the quality of health care? 60

61. www.antolin-davies.com How do we measure the quality of health care? 1.What is “quality?” 61 2.How do we account for health care that has become routine but didn’t exist in the past (e.g., pre-natal care)? 3.How do we weigh qualities across different types of care (e.g., glasses vs. heart transplant)?

62. www.antolin-davies.com How does one measure the quality of health care? An easy and composite measure of the effectiveness of health care is the mortality rate. 62 Some health care may have little or no impact on the mortality rate (e.g., orthodonture). But, it is not unreasonable to assume that the qualities of other types of health care grow at similar rates.

63. www.antolin-davies.com 63 Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2008, Table 77.

64. www.antolin-davies.com 64 Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2008, Table 77.

65. www.antolin-davies.com 65 Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2008, Table 110. Deaths by Influenza and Pneumonia (per 100,000 population)

66. www.antolin-davies.com 66 Source: Derived from Statistical Abstract of the United States, and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. What does increased cost of health care buy us? 400,000 lives saved annually

67. www.antolin-davies.com But, what about the uninsured? They aren’t sharing in this increased quality of health care. 67

68. www.antolin-davies.com 68 Source: Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the U.S.: 2006, US Census Bureau. The percentage of the population that is uninsured has remained stable over time.

69. www.antolin-davies.com 69 Source: Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the U.S.: 2006, US Census Bureau. Percentage of uninsured has remained relatively constant for the young and the old – the two groups for whom there is the least incentive to tradeoff health care for spending on other things.

70. www.antolin-davies.com 70 Source: Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the U.S.: 2006, US Census Bureau. Pattern of uninsured is commensurate with the hypothesis that, as the price of health care rises, the more healthy willingly choose not to be insured.

71. www.antolin-davies.com A free choice to purchase is a vote, but with three important differences. Political vote:One size fits all. Free market vote:Multiple sizes for multiple recipients. Political vote:Speed of change is driven by the election cycle. Free market vote:Speed of change is driven by the accounting cycle. Political vote:Signal is distorted because the vote is for a “bundle” of issues embodied by one candidate. Free market vote:Signal is clear because the vote is for a specific issue. 71 Voting for the “right” amount of insurance