1. Andrew Garwood-Gowers (Queensland University of Technology) a.garwood-gowers@qut.edu.au

2.  Responsible Protection (RP) represents a more restrictive interpretation of R2P’s pillar III  Post-Libya controversy reflects deeper contestation over R2P’s content, scope and implications for international order  Global shifts in power point to the emergence of a more diverse, pluralistic international order - RP and Brazil’s RwP initiatives are examples of rising, non-Western powers asserting their own normative preferences on sovereignty, intervention and global governance 2

3.  Developed by Dr Ruan Zongze – China Institute of International Studies (CIIS)  RP proposes 6 elements which are intended to safeguard against the risk of abuse of pillar III  Resurrects decision-making criteria or guidelines from earlier R2P proposals (e.g. ICISS, High Level Panel Report)  Shifts the focus away from protection of individuals and back towards the responsibilities of intervening states  RP’s significance? - Deeper insights into Beijing’s current position on R2P - How China views itself and its role in the world 3

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5. Principle/ guideline ICISS 2001 R2P ReportBrazil’s RwPChina’s Responsible Protection (RP) 5

6.  Draws heavily on Brazil’s RwP, ICISS report  But a stricter, narrower conception of pillar III than those earlier initiatives  Reflects both principled and pragmatic concerns over R2P e.g. sovereignty, non-interference arguments plus fears about regime change and de-stabilisation  China prefers negotiation and dialogue over coercive measures (military and non-military)  RP shifts the focus back to a state-centric approach (versus a protection of individuals approach)  Consistent with China’s broader vision of global order based on strong, stable states 6

7.  RP may point to a general shift towards China adopting a more activist global stance: - “China must have the courage to speak out and contribute its ideas to the world even though it means China will face more difficult and complicated options”  China likely to remain sceptical about non- consensual pillar III measures  Recent practice points to consensual pillar II measures as the main form of international action 7