1. ASYMMETRIC THREATS, TERRORISM AND THE CHANGING FACE OF WARFARE By Professor Richard Shultz Director, International Security Studies Program The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Tufts University

2. ASSESSING TERRORISM BEFORE 9/11—KEY QUESTIONS –What is terrorism? Is it war or violence or crime? –What are the trends, targets, and types of operations? –Who are the terrorists and what are their objectives? –How do terrorists organizations function? –Do terrorist groups cooperate? Are there linkages among them? –Do states sponsor terrorism? –How important is sanctuary?

3. TERRORISM IN THE 1990s—KEY CONCLUSIONS –Terrorism was not a category one national security issue and it was not a form of warfare. –Terrorism did not fit the war paradigm but the judicial/legal/ criminal paradigm. –Trend lines—terrorist incidents were down, lethality was up and the U.S. was the target. –Terrorist use of WMD was low probability. –The ideology of terrorist organizations was increasingly religious based. This made terrorist operations more violent and indiscriminant.

4. (con’t) –Organizationally, terrorist groups were changing from hierarchical and professional to less cohesive and more amorphous (1993 WTC as an example). –The ranks of the professional terrorist were joined by the amateur. –There was no meaningful international terrorist linkages because of splits along national, ethnic, and religious fault lines. –State support was down. Non-state assistance was emerging but the extent of it was unclear.

5. –Martin van Creveld argued in the early 1990s that war was entering a post-modern phase. He asserted: “As war between states exits through one side of history’s revolving door, low intensity conflict among different organizations will enter through the other…National sovereignties are being undermined by organizations [non-state actors] that refuse to recognize the states monopoly over armed violence.” –Some analysts who agreed proposed that war in the post- modern era would take pre-modern forms. –Others wanted to know how non-state actors, who were in the midst of their own transformation, thought about transnational globalism, asymmetrical and unconventional operations, network-based organization, and information technology. 4th GENERATION WARFARE: AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE

6. ELEMENTS OF 4 th GENERATION WARFARE –Warfare will be highly irregular, unconventional, and decentralized in approach. –Unconventional operations will be employed to bypass the superior military power of nation-states to attack and exploit political, economic, population, and symbolic targets. –Both the organization and operations of 4th generation warriors will be masked by deception, denial, stealth, and related techniques of intelligence tradecraft. –Terrorist organizations and operations will be profoundly affected by information age technologies which will provide these non-state actors with global reach.

7. (con’t) –Modern communications and transportation technologies will have a profound impact on this new battlefield. There will be no fronts and no distinctions between civilian and military targets. –Laws and conventions of war will not constrain terrorists and their state sponsors from seeking innovative means, to include WMD, to attack nonmilitary targets and inflict terrible carnage. –4th generation warriors, frequently in the name of religion, will be remorseless enemies for the states they challenge. Their operations will be marked by unlimited violence, unencumbered by compassion.

8. Al AQAEDA: WHAT WE NOW KNOW A.A Globally Networked Organization –Ideology –Structure –Linkages –Supporting States –Financial Base –Sanctuary

9. (con’t) B. Operational Profile –Targeting –Weapons –Technology –Weapons of Mass Destruction –Strategy C. The Quintessential Practitioner of 4th Generation Warfare

10. A. Remarks by the President at the 2002 USMA Graduation –Theme—“You graduate from the academy in a time of war…Our war on terror has only begun.” –Nature of that War—“We face a threat with no precedent…The gravest danger lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology.” –Describes the enemy in 4th Generation terms. IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

11. (con’t) –Cold War Strategic Concepts—Deterrence and Containment are necessary but not sufficient. “New threats require new thinking.” –Deterrence and Containment are inherently defensive. “The war will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy.” –Transformation is essential—“Our security will require transforming the military.” It must “be ready for preemptive action.”

12. (con’t) B. The Bush Doctrine: Premised on Preemption –An actual armed attack is not a necessary precondition for using force. –Will use force to preempt terrorists and “states that harbor, finance, train or equip the agents of terror.” –21 st Century security requirements are different from those during the Cold War. –Here is what’s new: 1) Self-help is the only realistic alternative; 2) Intelligence can provide evidence of a state or group’s hostile intentions; 3) WMD availability to terrorists and hostile regimes; 4) the global reach and networks of terrorism and their state supporters.

13. (con’t) –Criteria for preemption: 1) An adversary has attacked the U.S. in the past and/or has a manifest intent to do so in the future; 2) Is actively planning operations to attack; 3) Seeks to magnify the lethality of the attack. C.The National Security Strategy of the United States— September 2002 D. The Rumsfeld Rules for the Use of Force E.Military Transformation