1. Failure Mode Assumptions and Assumption Coverage David Powell

2. Fault-Tolerance Key questions –How components may fail?  Prevention strategies –At what rate they may fail?  The Amount of redundancy needed –What are the important type of faults? Types of redundancy needed –The relation between dependability, redundancy and faults?  General FT design guidelines

3. An F-T Paradox/Dilemma More faulty  More redundancy  More redundancy  More possibility of faults  More possibility of faults???

4. Solution- Some Key Steps Classify, quantify and verify the assumptions

5. Type of Failures

6. Overview Single-user service –Service Model –Potential Errors Multiple-user service –Service Model –Potential Errors

7. Single-user Service Model Service items: s i, i=1,2,… Values of s i : vs i Observation time of s i : ts i Service Model: S i = S i = An omniscient observer

8. Correctness Model Service item s i is correct iff (vs i  SV i )  (ts i  ST i ) (vs i  SV i )  (ts i  ST i ) SV i and ST i are respectively the specified sets of values and times for service item s i

9. Potential Errors Arbitrary value error: s i : vs i  SV i Noncode error: s i : vs i  CV (CV defines a code) Arbitrary timing error: s i : ts i  ST i Early timing error: s i : ts i < min(ST i ) Late timing error: s i : ts i > max(ST i ) Omission error: s i : ts i =  Impromptu error: s i : (vs i =  )  (ts i =  )

10. Multi-user Service Model Service item s i ={s i (1), s i (2),…, s i (n),} Service model:, all i,u New issues: “consistency”

11. Correctness Model vs i (u)– the value of service item i on process u vs i -- the value of service item i SV i – the set of specified service item i ts i (u)– the observation time of service item i on process u ST i (u) – the range of specified observation time of service item i on process u uv -- the time bound of related occurrences uv -- the time bound of related occurrences

12. Examples of Potential Errors Consistent value error Consistent timing error Semi-consistent value error

13. Failure Mode Assumptions Attempt to formalize the concept of an assumed failure mode By assertions on the sequences of service items delivered by a component

14. Examples of Value Error Assertions No value errors occur (V none )  i, vs i  SV i  i, vs i  SV i The only value errors that occur are noncode value errors (V n )  i, (vs i  SV i )  (vs i  CV )  i, (vs i  SV i )  (vs i  CV ) Arbitrary value error can occur (V arb )  i, (vs i  SV i )  (vs i  SV i )  i, (vs i  SV i )  (vs i  SV i )

15. Examples of Timing Error Assertions No timing error occurs (T none ) The only timing errors are omission errors (T O ) The only timing errors are late timing errors (T L ) The only timing errors are early timing errors (T E ) Arbitrary timing error can occur (T arb ) Permanent omission/crash (T p ) Bounded omission degree (T Bk )

16. Timing Error Implications

17. Failure Mode Assertions(FMA) A complete FMA entails an assertion on errors occurring on both value and time domains By taking the Cartesian production of the two domains, we get a family of FMA

18. FMA Implication Graph

19. So what? The FMA classification and implication graph can serve as a guideline to design families of FT algorithms that can process errors in increasing severity!

20. Assumption Coverage Establishing a link between assumed component failure mode and system dependability (The design a FT system relies on the assumption they make) (The dependability of a FT system is related to the failure mode they assume)

21. Motivation Components may fail They may fail in a bad way  leads to a violation of assumptions of the system The system, in turn, can fail Question: to what degree can a component FMA prove to be true in the real system?

22. The Coverage of the Assumption Definition P(X) = Pr{ X= true | component failed} P(X) = Pr{ X= true | component failed} P(V arb  T arb ) = 1 P(V none  T none ) = 0

23. Coverage of an FT system PS(X) = PS(X) = Pr{ correct error processing |X= true} Pr{ correct error processing |X= true} *Pr{ X= true | component failed} *Pr{ X= true | component failed}

24. Influence of Assumption Coverage on System Dependability A Case Study

25. The System A system of n processors Connected via unidirectional message-passing bus Each processor carries out the same computation steps The result of each processing step is communicated to all other processors Each process has a decision function (DF) The DF is applied to the results received from other processors … Each processor and its associated bus is viewed as a single component

26. Fail-Silent Processor-bus A fail-silent processor –Only has semi-consistent value errors –Always produces message on time –Or ceases to produce messages forever –If a message is delivered to a processor, it is to be delivered to all processors with consistent fixed delay

27. Fail-Consistent Processor Bus Only semi-consistent value errors may occur Faulty processors may send erroneous values Consistent timing error may occur

28. Fail-uncontrolled Processor Bus Arbitrary timing error Arbitrary value error

29. Implications of Assumption Coverage Failure mode relations Coverage relations

30. Dependability Expressions From Markov Models r = e –λt λ = failure rate

31. A Life-critical Application System reliability objective: R > 1-10 -9 over 10 hours Single processor reliability: –r = e -λt –1/λ = 5 years

33. A Money-Critical Application It is about availability of the system rather than reliability of the system Please look at the paper for more details

34. Unavailability v.s. Coverage

35. Conclusion A formalism for describing component failure modes Multiplicity of value and timing errors The notion of assumption coverage The relation between dependability, availability and assumption coverage

36. Thank you