1. IP2: Social Regulation of Emotion and Conflict Resolution Klaus Scherer, Benoit Bediou Swiss Center for Affective Sciences

2. Motivation  Context ESF-ECRP Grant (IP2): Emotion regulation in conflict and conflict resolution  Aim Subjective perception of (in)justice and its role in conflict and conflict resolution  Study 1 Investigate the impact of entitlement on emotions and behavior in social interactions, focusing on negotiation

3. Literature review Study Perspectives 123123

4. Literature review Study Perspectives 123123 1.Justice / Fairness 2.Entitlement 3.Negotiation 1.Justice / Fairness 2.Entitlement 3.Negotiation

5. Literature review Study Perspectives 123123 1.Background & Aim 2.Paradigm & Design 3.Results & Discussion 1.Background & Aim 2.Paradigm & Design 3.Results & Discussion

6. Injustice as expectation violation  « People experience injustice when there is a discrepancy between what they expect based on salient or appropriate normative distribution rule and what they obtain” (Greenberg & Cohen, 1982). Valuenormexpectationemotionbehavior

7. Values & Norms in distributive justice  Different values & norms (distributive justice) e.g. equality, equity, need (Deutsch 1975)  Inter-individual differences e.g. egalitarian, meritocratic, libertarian (Frohlich et al. 2004; Cappelen et al. 2007) Valuenormexpectationemotionbehavior

8. Dicator Game with joint production Frohlich et al 2004  Equity (41%)  Equality (26%)  Selfish (19%) Productivity? Effort? Productivity?

9. Values & Norms in distributive justice  Intra-individual variability e.g. Rodriguez-Lara & Moreno-Garrido WP2010  Self-serving biases e.g. Messick & Sentis 1979  Bargaining impasses e.g. Thompson & Loewenstein 1992 Valuenormexpectationemotionbehavior

10. Summary of previous findings  Context  Framing as Buyer/Seller (Hoffman et al. 1994)  Initial Ownership (Leliveld et al. 1998)  Entitlement  Earning the position (Guth & Thietz 1986; Hoffman et al. 1994, 1996; Schotter et al 1996; Schurter & Wilson 2007)  Earning the pie (Ruffle, 1998; Cherry, 2001; Cherry et al. 2002; Oxoby & Spraggon 2008)

11. Dicator Game with joint production Frohlich et al 2004  Equity (41%)  Equality (26%)  Selfish (19%) Productivity? Effort? Productivity?

12. Paradigm & Design  Production: mental calculation (effort + skills)  Distribution: negotiation (Ultimatum Game)

13. 20 CHF Player APlayer B Production screen 4 + 8 + 2 + 9 23

14. 20 CHF Player APlayer B Production screen 4 + 8 + 2 + 9 23

15. 20 CHF AB Distribution – Proposer screen AB PRODUCTIONDISTRIBUTION X CHF20-X CHF

16. 20 CHF AB Distribution – Responder screen AB PRODUCTIONDISTRIBUTION 7 CHF13 CHF Accept 7/13 Reject 0/0

17. Paradigm & Design  2 x 4 design  Production: better, worse (than other player)  Distribution: proposer; equity, equality, unfair  Measures  Decisions: P’s offers and R’s decisions  R’s judgments of satisfaction (and fairness)

18. Experiment design & predictions DISTRIBUTION PRODUCTION N=33

19. Room ARoom B

20. Room ARoom B

21. Proposer – % Offered % OFFERED to Responder % PRODUCED by Responder

22. Proposer – % Offered % OFFERED to Responder % PRODUCED by Responder R=0.35; p<0.01

23. Equity?Equality? Proposer – % Offered OFFERED to Responder (% total) PRODUCED by Responder (% total) Equity Equality Selfish

24. Proposer – % Kept % PRODUCED by Proposer % KEPT by Proposer Equity Equality Equality?Equity? Selfish

25. Equality rule? <50%>50% % Kept % Produced Equality * NS

26. Equity rule? * * Equity % Produced <50%>50% % Kept - % Produced

27. Responder – Accept decision (188 obs) <50%>50% Offer: F(2,181)=109.88, p<0.001 % Produced Frequency

28. Responder – Satisfaction (N=27) Offer: F(2,16)=67.79, p<0.001 Production * Offer: F(2,32)=15.83, p<0.001 Satisfaction <50%>50% % Produced

29. Responder – Fairness (N=12) Fairness <50%>50% % Produced

30. Fairness vs Satisfaction (72 obs) Fairness Satisfaction Fairness

31. Conclusion  Individuals perceive and apply fairness norms flexibly depending on the context  Selfish bias due to biased entitlement/expectations?  Low production => equality  Own effort > Other productivity  High production => equity with generous adjustment to avoid rejection  Own productivity > other effort?  Strategic use of perspective taking to adapt offers to conflicting entitlement/expectations

32. Literature review Study Perspectives 123123 1.Background & Aim 2.Feedback & Discussion 1.Background & Aim 2.Feedback & Discussion

33. Social Regulation of Emotion?  Injustice and Emotions e.g. Mikula et al. 1998; Weiss & Cropanzano 1996 1. Impact of norms violations on emotions?

34. Social Regulation of Emotion?  Injustice and Emotions e.g. Mikula et al. 1998; Weiss & Cropanzano 1996 1. Impact of norms violations on emotions?  Injustice as expectation violation e.g. Bicchieri et al. 2008 2. Prediction error signal in the ACC?

35. Social Regulation of Emotion?  Injustice and Emotions e.g. Mikula et al. 1998; Weiss & Cropanzano 1996 1. Impact of norms violations on emotions?  Injustice as expectation violation e.g. Bicchieri et al. 2008 2. Prediction error signal in the ACC?  Impact of third-party ADR (e.g. mediation, arbitrage) e.g. Cason & Mui 1998; Yamamori et al. WP; Shram & Charness, ESA 2010 3. Can we modify expectation  emotion  behavior?

36. Changing expectations in the UG  Study 1 shows that people’s norms are flexible  Study 2 will seek to modify people’s norms  2 phases: 1. Induction a) Production (quiz) b) Distribution (3 rd -party UG - responder) 2. Measure c) Production (quiz) d) Distribution (2 nd -party UG - proposer)

37. PRODUCTION DISTRIBUTION (Responder) Accept/Reject + fairness ratings X3 low prod / X3 high prod  No Arb. (group IV) 2 (intra Low/High prod) * 4 (inter NoArb., Arb.Egalitarian, Arb.Meritocratic, Arb.Control) PRODUCTION DISTRIBUTION (proposer) Offer + self fairness ratings X1 low prod / X1 high prod X3 low prod/X3 high prod  Egalitarian (group I)  Meritocratic (group II) +CONTROL (group III)? PRODUCTION DISTRIBUTION (Responder) Accept/Reject + fairness ratings X1 low prod/X1 high prod PRODUCTION DISTRIBUTION (Proposer) Offer + self fairness ratings BASELINE. Offers made by 2 nd party (proposer) INDUCTION. Offers made by neutral 3 rd party 1 1 MEASURE. Offers made by neutral 3 rd party 2 2 1 1 2 2

38. Room ARoom B

39. Room ARoom B

40. The arbitration Control condition: Two of the participants will be randomly chosen and brought to another room to generate the offers [In fact, they will make ratings (emotions + fairness) of pre-determined offers] Options:  Other task? e.g. fake arbitration  Non social? e.g. a computer will randomly generate a proposal  No arbitration? e.g. use baseline (offers made by 2 nd party) as control  Other idea? e.g. 3rd party Dictator, passive viewing?

41. The arbitrator Third party: [One of the participants] is observing the production phase and will make a proposal to both agents about the [A fair?] division of the pie. You can Accept or Reject his offer and you will also rate their fairness of his offers. […] will be paid according to your ratings, so he has an incentive to make fair offers. Options:  Give him a form of power? (expertise? Legitimacy? Other types of power?) e.g : An highly skilled and experienced arbitrator or mediator  Give him a « norm compliance » function? e.g. [Player XXX] will ensure optimun fairness  Give him a personnal goal? e.g. the arbitrator’s goal is to ensure that both of you are satisfied  Give him a name and/or a face? : e.g. Picture or (fake) webcam recording…  Different (participant) arbitrator in each round? (greater social influence)

42. Predictions  Arbitration (attribution) R’s Fairness/Satisfaction should be higher for (unfair) offers made by 3 rd parties vs 2 nd parties? (e.g. Blount 1995)  Conformity with primed norm Participant should follow the norm of the arbitrator (e.g. Cason & Mui 1998; Yamamori et al. WP; Shram & Charness, ESA 2010)  Effects should be greater arbitrator’s whose proposals are rated high on fairness  P’s ratings of self-fairness should be greater if conformed with abitrator’s norm,

43. Predictions  Arbitration (attribution) R’s Fairness/Satisfaction should be higher for (unfair) offers made by 3 rd parties vs 2 nd parties? (e.g. Blount 1995)  Conformity with primed norm Participant should follow the norm of the arbitrator (e.g. Cason & Mui 1998; Yamamori et al. WP; Shram & Charness, ESA 2010)  Effects should be greater arbitrator’s whose proposals are rated high on fairness  P’s ratings of self-fairness should be greater if conformed with abitrator’s norm, Social modulation of appraisal Valuenormexpectationemotionbehavior

44. Methodological considerations 1. Type of third party?  One of the participants?  Power? Legitimacy? Expert or peer?  Same or different in each round?  Other ideas: passive viewer, dictator?

45. Methodological considerations 2. Type of induction task (induction, priming, anchoring, conformity?)  Control arbitration condition? e.g. random norm, social or computer, nonexpert?  No arbitration? (anchoring, reference)  Other idea: participants could be passively observing UG rounds in which one or different P’s would (in)consistently use the same norm while their emotions would be recorded?

46. Methodological considerations 3. Other questions and suggestions  Induction phase: Participant always Responder?  Test phase: Participant always Proposer?  Better (e.g. continuous) DV than R’s A/R decision?  Playing for a group? Inclusion/Exclusion?  Repeat interaction with same player?  3rd party could emphasize value vs norm?  Games on aggression?