1. The World Bank Group and the Global Food Crisis An Evaluation of the World Bank Group Response WBG Annual Meetings 2013 A Discussion with Civil Societies October 9, 2013 Ismail Arslan

2.  Overall Objective Mitigate the crisis impact and foster longer-term resilience to future crises through support for price policy and market stabilization, social protection, and domestic food production and marketing  Short-term Response Detailed policy advice to countries and staff Fast-track program of loans and grants − Global Food Crisis Response Program − aimed to alleviate short-term impacts of crisis IFC mainly supported agriculture trade credits  Medium-term Response Scaled-up lending in agriculture and social protection to support building medium-term resilience to future price shocks IFC support for expanding agriculture trade credit and working capital finance and enhanced advisory services 2 Evaluation Coverage and Bank Group Response

3. 3 Evaluation Building Blocks  Portfolio Review Short-term GFRP review (55 operations) Medium-term (FY06-11) agriculture and social protection reviews (Building on previous evaluations on agriculture and SSNs)  Country case studies (9 field and 11 desk)  Background papers (7 papers) Agriculture lending and AAA IFC program Social protection lending and AAA GFRP effectiveness Vulnerability analysis Trade and subsidy policies Partnership and coordination

4. 4 Country Case Studies by Region Evaluation Building Blocks

5. 5 Main Findings – Short Term  The Bank’s existing stock of analytic work was an important asset  Short-term support reached vulnerable countries  About 60 percent went to Sub-Saharan Africa, the region most affected, where food accounts for more than half of household spending and where about half of the rice and 85 percent of the wheat consumed is imported  Limited emphasis on nutritional aspects

6. 6 Main Findings – Short Term  GFRP operations were prepared and launched more rapidly than standard Bank operations  There was a trade-off between speed of preparation and quality at entry  There were particular shortcomings in the design and supervision of GFRP operations that took the form of additional and supplemental financing Project Preparation Time (Median Days) Project grouping Time between concept note and effectiveness (days) Social protectionAgriculture GFRP projects8396 World Bank portfolio288437

7. 7 Main Findings – Short Term  Pre-existing country-owned agendas and ongoing programs provided effective platforms for emergency operations, such as for SSN in the Philippines and Ethiopia  Implementation of the short-term program built experience for more permanent response mechanisms, such as the crisis response window, immediate response mechanism  The short-term program helped to reposition the Bank as a key player in agriculture and food security matters  The Bank built on the ongoing aid effectiveness agenda and coordination with other partners worked relatively well  Limited additional resources and pre-crisis IDA allocations constrained the Bank’s ability to respond to crisis in IDA-eligible countries

8. 8 Main Findings – Agriculture  Food price crisis mitigation policies that the Bank’s agricultural team elaborated as early as 2005 provided a basis for timely policy advice  The framework for the Bank Group’s policy advice to governments recognized that short-term political and operational constraints would necessitate adopting second-best policies in some cases  Agriculture programs were small and coverage of farmers was often constrained by limited funds  Most countries opted for subsidized input programs, but impact of those programs depended on availability of complementary factors  Thus, significant aggregate price effects were unlikely in most countries

9. 9 Main Findings – Agriculture  IFC’s short-term support focused on expanding agribusiness-related liquidity, particularly in IDA countries; advisory services were also expanded  IFC’s direct agribusiness investment strategy shifted toward food exporting countries and Sub-Saharan Africa  IFC introduced various agriculture risk management products  World Bank agricultural lending expanded significantly after the crisis and is now focused on support to productive agriculture Composition of Agricultural Lending in Pre- and Post-Crisis Periods Lending 2006-08Lending 2009-11 US$ billionShare (%) US$ billionShare (%) Agriculture productivity support6.57310.580 Other2.3272.520 Total8.810013100

10. 10 Main Findings – Agriculture  Volume of the Bank’s agricultural analytic and advisory activities has declined o Focus is more on nonlending technical assistance than on ESW o May have adverse implications for the quality of the lending program  Resilience may improve with the increased support to agriculture, but portfolio performance has been declining, in part due to staffing and skill mix inadequacies  The decline in technical specialist ranks continued past 2006, along with a decline in the number of agriculture staff  While the staff numbers were declining and skill composition worsening, the volume of lending was increasing World Bank Agriculture Staff GeneralistsTechnicalTotal FY0621495309 FY1119950249

11. 11 Main Findings – Social Safety Nets  Existing work on social safety nets became the basis for policy advice  This advice was mostly based on middle-income countries  Countries with limited safety net programs expanded in-kind transfers, especially school feeding and public works programs  Limited attention to the most vulnerable populations SSN Instruments (FY09-11) Number of Operations GFRP SSN FY09-FY11 Regular SSN FY09-FY11 Conditional cash transfer331 Unconditional cash transfer652 Public works1632 In-kind transfers1711 Health and education subsidies020 Water, energy and other subsidies016 Total # of projects33106

12. 12 Main Findings – Social Safety Nets  Most programs were small and had limited coverage  Rapid Social Response Program funds enabled work on social safety nets in low-income countries  The volume of analytical products, mainly nonlending technical assistance, increased considerably after the crisis period Social Safety Net Analytical Products AAA (number) Budget ($ million) FY06-08FY09-11FY06-08FY09-11 ESW86787.88.0 TA36892.67.7 Total12216710.415.7

13. 13 Main Findings – Social Safety Nets  MICs continued to receive the largest share of social safety net lending  SSN portfolio performance has deteriorated slightly  Country case studies indicate that the Bank should have been engaged in social safety nets earlier Regular Social Safety Net Lending Pre- and Post-Crisis by Country Income Level Country income level FY06-08FY09-11 US$ millionShare (%)US$ millionShare (%) LIC 297.522%776.58% MIC 1078.378%8198.789% Total 1375.8100%9228.8100% Note: Two operations with total commitment amounts $253.6 million were approved FY09-11 in High- income-countries.

14. Lessons ► A strategic framework is a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective crisis response ► Expanded programs and increased collaboration need to go hand-in-hand with increased capacity and resources ► Crisis response requires flexible resource allocation systems to shift resources to greatest needs ► Country-specific analytical work is essential to develop appropriate responses ► Ideally, safety nets should be developed in all countries and have stand-by capacity to deal with increased demand during crises 14

15. Recommendations & Responses IEG Recommendations 1. Ensure adequate resources are available to delivery programs in case of response to future crisis 2. Develop quality assurance program to balance the need for speed with the need for high quality 3. Assist countries in better targeting people most affected with adequate nutrition interventions 4. Work with client countries and partners to develop mechanisms for monitoring nutritional and welfare outcomes of food crisis and mitigation programs Management Responses 1. Management agrees with the notion that adequate resources are essential, albeit achieving this will remain challenging. 2. Management will consider optimizing ex-ante quality assurance and strive to include better M&E. 3. Management agrees to work with client countries in line with recommendation 3. 4. Management agrees to work with client countries who request Bank assistance to address the need for monitoring systems. 15

16. Thank you!