1. Assessing the Military Benefits of NEC Using a Generic Kill-Chain Approach David Nevell QinetiQ Malvern 21 ISMOR September 2004

2. Context Providing a quantified example of the benefits that Network Enabled Capability (NEC) will bring to Network Enabled Fires (NEF) by: Analysing a specific NEF kill chain Conducting a more general analysis using multiple generic NEF kill chains A secondary aim is to develop an approach that could be used more generally to address benefits that NEC may bring to military missions. For the purposes of this work Network Enabled Fires is defined as: "The exploitation of network enabled capability to flexibly utilise ISR, C2 and effectors from land, sea and air to synchronise fires in time, space and purpose".

3. Approach Develop NEF Architectures Initial Transitional Mature Benefits Analysis (single Kill Chain) Qualitative benefits System Performance & Military Effectiveness Develop Dynamic & Benefits Models Dynamic Analysis (single & multiple KCs) Quantitative analysis Identify Metrics Understand NEC & NEF Concepts

4. Requirements of Single Kill Chain The kill chain was created to ensure that it satisfied the following requirements: Tactical participation by multiple components Effect against time sensitive target Involvement of UK only assets High degree of mission complexity High degree of communications complexity

5. AWACS IDM Div HQ Phoenix Harrier GR7/9 Enemy FARP MLRS CVS SAM Launchers Formation Recce Phoenix BCP Phoenix GCS MLRS DFDC JFAC HQ Formation Recce RHQ Satellite Elements of Single Kill Chain

6. Need for a Multiple Kill Chain model Output from single Kill Chain model was restricted to: –overall process times –slack times –critical paths The multiple Kill Chain model provides a richer environment in which; –a wider range of dynamic metrics can be analysed (e.g. concurrent Kill Chains allow aspects of co-ordination, synchronisation and competition) –resources can be limited to more realistically reflect the context of a wider battlespace (variable battlespace activity) –longer simulations allow a representative steady state to be reached which is not dependent on specific starting conditions –more complex event-based rules can be used to better model aspects of subjective decision making

7. Modelling Issues Lack of credible or verifiable data for medium/far term –Develop generic approach that is not dependent on precise data –Make comparative rather than absolute evaluations –Present results in terms of trade-offs (assuming x --> implies y) –Use consistent and generic assumptions across epochs Difficulty in measuring costs and benefits –Need to find measurable outputs that best capture the key metrics (timeliness, utilisation, flexibility, synchronisation) –Metrics will be based in the “modelling world” Difficulty in representing decision making processes –Need to use simple rules and be consistent

8. Generic Breakdown of Functions Inform Gain Analyse Exploit Disseminate Maintain Networked Fires Functions Inform Command Operate Gain Exploit Collection Assets Secure Data Disseminate Data

9. information Deconfliction of Battlespace Collate BDA Data Secure BDA Data Disseminate BDA Data Preparation of attack asset Preparation of attack asset Confirm decision to engage target Secure BDA Data Disseminate BDA Data Deconfliction of Battlespace Detailed planning Disseminate planning & deconfliction information Collate BDA Data © copyright QinetiQ Ltd 2003 QinetiQ in Confidence Generic NEF Kill-Chain

10. Transistion to target Engage target to achieve desired effects Disseminate engagement information Preparation of attack asset Attack Decide appropriate ISTAR asset Request deconfliction Task ISTAR asset Transit to target Deconfliction of Battlespace ISTAR Planning Access relevant information Analyse and develop options Choose COA (1) Co-ordinate Resources to achieve desired effects Task attack asset Analysis and choice of COA Choose COA (2) Deconfliction of Battlespace Detailed planning Disseminate planning & deconfliction information Planning and deconfliction Collate BDA Data Secure BDA Data Disseminate BDA Data BDA ISTAR Execution and Exploitation Secure Data Collate DataDisseminate Data Create Information Create intelligence products Disseminate intelligence products Elements of the Generic Kill-Chain The kill-chain is constructed from generic elements The elements can be used to construct other kill-chains

11. Generic Kill Chain - factors (1) Driven by changes to NEC across epochs ISR assets and effectors –types, resource levels Targets –types, generation rates Suitability of ISR assets and effectors against targets. A function of: –resource capability –target behaviour (e.g. self defence) –terrain –depth –mobility –proximity of sensitive targets –existing ISR information

12. Generic Kill Chain - factors (2) Process times –minima –maxima –distribution type Background battlespace activity C2 structure –number of components –connectivity Quality of SA –access to correct information during simulation

13. Multiple kill chain model - detail Component 1 ISR ASSETS Component 1 EFFECTOR S Component 1 2 CELL Component 2 3 CELL Component 1 3 CELL Component 2 2 CELL Component 3 2 CELL Component 3 3 CELL Component 2 ISR ASSETS Component 3 ISR ASSETS Component 2 EFFECTOR S Component 3 EFFECTOR S Other battlespace activity INTERACT COMMAND & CONTROL MISSIONS

14. Multiple Kill Chain model - metrics Distributions of process and overall Kill Chain times (TIME) Synchronisation between engaging related and primary targets (CO-ORDINATION) Degree of choice available when choosing assets (FLEXIBILITY) Utilisation/loading of resources (OPTIMALITY) –ISR assets, effectors –Cells Suitability of assets used against targets (ISR and effector) (MISSION SUCCESS)

15. Presentation of Results Number of first choices of assets Utilisation Time between engaging targets Choice of asset type 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 Percentage Improvement (%) Diagrammatic only Time Mission Success Flexibility Co-ordination Optimality

16. Summary Single kill chain provided necessary context for addressing problem and eliciting baseline information Extension to multiple kill chain model was necessitated by need to address more complex issues (e.g. concurrency) Lack of detailed information about future epochs led to adoption of generic kill chain approach Generic kill chain made up of re-usable sub-chains which are functionally (not organisationally) based Analyses comparative, not absolute Results presented in terms of high level metrics and their trade- offs

17. Questions?

18. Transitional NEC Improvements