1. 1 Improving the Risk Management Capability of the Reliability and Maintainability Program An introduction to the philosophy behind the AIAA S-102 Performance-Based R&M Program Standards Tyrone Jackson; The Aerospace Corporation David Oberhettinger, Northrop Grumman © 2004 Northrop Grumman and The Aerospace Corporation 20 February 2004

2. 2 Topics Proposed Hypothesis Conventional Risk Management Versus Design Reliability Risk Avoidance S-102 Standards Establish FMECA Process as Focal Point of R&M Program Distinguishing Characteristics of S-102 FMECA Process Standard S-102 FMECA Process Standard Outline Case Study Application of S-102 FMECA Process Evaluation Criteria Differences between Project “A” and Project “B” Satellites and FMECA Processes Project “A” & “B” Test Anomaly Event and Cost Summary Conclusions

3. 3 Proposed Hypothesis Cost of Failure Reporting, Analysis, and Corrective Action System (FRACAS) decreases in accordance with increases in capability of Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality (FMECA) process to eliminate latent design concerns early Or stated another way, contractors can significantly reduce incidence of test anomalies by providing designers with tools that identify latent design concerns TEST ANOMALIES 1 2 3 4 5 S-102 FMECA PROCESS CAPABILITY LEVEL

4. 4 Example Latent Design Concern Transistor Reverse Current Path

5. 5 Benefit of Integrating Risk and Issue Item Management A risk is a potential problem An issue is an existing problem Sometimes same risk/problem items are worked in parallel by different 3-Letters Mission impact of some “likely” risk items is more severe than some issue items Limited SPO manpower and management reserve can be better used to assure Mission Success by racking and stacking all risk and issue items together Integrating risk and issue item management across all 3-Letters will minimize duplication in effort and maximize use of Management Reserve Integrating risk and issue item management across all 3-Letters will minimize duplication in effort and maximize use of Management Reserve SPO Risk Board Racked and Stacked Risk/Issue Items Issue Items Risk Items SPO and Contractor Program Concerns

6. 6 There are 40 standards in AIAA S-102 Performance-Based R&M Program document tree Most tasks in S-102 R&M Program schema are impacted by Product FMECA Process or supply data to it Depending on how Product FMECA is performed in terms of quality and completeness could be difference between a FRACAS that stays within its budget and one that over-runs its budget S-102 FMECA Process Standard requires that an implementation plan be developed and integrated with in conjunction with R&M Program Plan Desired FMECA process capability level is to be specified in contract as defined in S-102 FMECA Process Standard S-102 Standards Establish FMECA Process as Focal Point of R&M Program

7. 7 Distinguishing Characteristics of S-102 FMECA Process Standard It calls for use of knowledge-based approaches to identify, analyze, and manage design weaknesses It provides consistent criteria for rating “capability” of an FMECA process –Defines a five-level capability rating for each R&M task –Capability level ratings can help an organization plan systems engineering process improvement strategies by determining current capability levels of their R&M practices and most critical areas for improvement It provides consistent criteria for rating “maturity” of key FMECA data products It calls for use of predefined FMECA data parameters to facilitate the interchange of FMECA data products with computer aided tools and other project databases

8. 8 S-102 FMECA Process Standard Outline 1.System Design Data Collection 2.Failure Modes And Effects Analysis 3.Criticality Analysis 4.Failure Detection Analysis 5.Failure Isolation Analysis 6.Detection and Isolation Risk Priority Analyses 7.Reliability, System Safety, and Maintainability Critical Item Analyses 8.Failure Compensation Analysis 9.Product FMECA Database 10.Data Interchange Between Product FMECA Process And Other Activities 11.FMECA Data Product Residual Risk Assessment

9. 9 Case Study Application of S-102 FMECA Process Evaluation Criteria FMECA processes for two space vehicle acquisition projects were evaluated in 2003 using S-102 FMECA Process evaluation criteria Project “A” implemented an FMECA process that was tailored down from Task 204 in MIL-STD-1543B Project “B” implemented an FMECA process that was “tailored down” from Task 101 in MIL-STD-1629A Used S-102 FMECA Process Capability Level criteria to rate FMECA processes implemented in Project “A” and Project “B” Evaluated FRACAS history of Project “A” and Project “B” to determine number of test anomalies caused by design concerns

10. 10 Project “A” and Project “B” FMECA Processes were Tailored Down from Military Standards Root causes were missing in Project “A” FMECA Failure mechanisms were missing in both Project “A” and Project “B” FMECA Sneak circuit conditions were missing in both Project “A” and Project “B” FMECA Physical design failure modes were missing in Project “A” FMECA Software design failure modes were missing in both Project “A” and Project “B” FMECA Cascading and multiple failure modes were missing in both Project “A” and Project “B” FMECA Human errors were missing in both Project “A” and Project “B” FMECA

11. 11 Differences Between Project “A” and Project “B” Satellites and FMECA Processes Project “A” satellite is a payload only Project “B” satellite is a full space vehicle Project “A” used 4 engineering man-years to complete FMECA Project “B” used 12 engineering man-years to complete FMECA Project “A” FMECA process is approximately equivalent to a Capability Level 1 S-102 FMECA Process Project “B” FMECA process is approximately equivalent to a Capability Level 2 S-102 FMECA Process Project “B” satellite is 19 times heavier than Project “A” satellite

12. 12 Project “A” Test Anomaly Event Summary

13. 13 Project “A” Test Anomaly Cost Summary

14. 14 Project “B” Test Anomaly Event Summary

15. 15 Project “B” Test Anomaly Cost Summary

16. 16 Summary of Case Study Findings There were 55 test anomalies caused by design concerns in Project “A” versus 17 test anomalies caused by design concerns in Project “B” Ratio of satellite weight versus number of design concern initiated test anomalies is 9.6 lbs/anomaly for Project “A” and 588 lbs/anomaly for Project “B” Estimated cost impact on Project “A” and Project “B” was $2,915,000 and $901,000, respectively, based on an average cost of $53,000 per anomaly analysis

17. 17 Conclusions Case study shows that incidence of test anomalies caused by design concerns may possibly be significantly decreased by implementing a Capability Level 2 S-102 Product FMECA Process Validation of proposed hypothesis would require analyzing production FRACAS data of several more satellite projects If hypothesis proves valid, then application of S-102 would save millions of dollars and thousands of labor hours in typical satellite development project