1. Reforming the Legislature: The Commons and the Lords

2. Bicameralism vs Unicameralism
Unicameralism – single legislative chamber
Strength of legislature vis-à-vis executive depends on nature of party system
Bicameralism – two legislative chambers
Weak vs strong bicameralism
Strong: 2 chambers have equal power (symmetrical)
Weak: lower chamber dominant (asymmetrical)
2 chambers can be (s)elected on different basis
Strong bicameralism in federal states
Weak bicameralism or unicameralism in unitary states
The stronger the bicameralism, the stronger the legislature vis-à-vis executive in parl’mentary systems

3. House of Lords & Executive (1)
Lords once more powerful than Commons
Representation of different social classes
Composition: mainly hereditary peers (& Law Lords, bishops)
Once had unlimited power to veto legislation
Parliament Act 1911 – weakened Lords
Bill could become law without Lords’ consent after 2 years, money bills after 1 month; aspired to remove hereditaries
Parliament Act 1949 – 2 yrs delay cut to 1 year
Attlee Govt worried Lords would block radical policies
Salisbury Convention emerged
UK: weak bicameralism

4. Uses of the Parliament Acts
Welsh Church Act 1914
Disestablished Welsh part of Church of England
Home Rule Act 1914
Home Rule for Ireland (never implemented)
Parliament Act 1949
Amended Parliament Act 1911
War Crimes Act 1991
Enabled UK to prosecute Nazi war criminals for activities outside UK
Only time Parliament Acts used by a Conservative Govt
European Parliamentary Elections Act 1999
Changed voting system for Euro elections
Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000
Lowered age of consent for homosexuals from 18 to 16
Hunting Act 2004
Banned fox-hunting and hare coursing

5. House of Lords & Executive (2)
1958 – Life Peerages Act
Enable prominent experts/public figures to enter Lords
Appointed by PM
Title dies with holder
1968 – Wilson: stop hereditaries voting: defeated
Powers and functions
Legislation
Deliberation
Scrutiny – important committees
Previously Supreme Court of Appeal (Law Lords)
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 created new Supreme Court –opened in October 2009

6. New Labour – Reforming the Lords
Hereditary peers – conservative block on New Labour’s aspirations
Two-stage reforms – (1) remove hereditaries; (2) construct newly-composed chamber
Tories opposed removing hereditaries
‘Cranbourne compromise’ – keep 92 hereditaries
Interim House – politically rebalanced: no party had majority
Govt established Royal Commission to look into Stage 2 – composition, functions, powers

7. Composition of House of Lords 2009
Life Peers
Hereditaries
Lords Spiritual
TOTAL
Labour
210 4 -
214
Conservative
148 48
196
Liberal Dems 66 5 71
Crossbenchers
169 32
201
Bishops 26
Others 15 2 17
608 91
725

8. Stage 2 – Still Incomplete
Royal Commission (Wakeham) 2000
550 members: 67, 87 or 195 elected
White Paper, consultation, joint-committee
2003: Lords voted for 100% appointment; Commons rejected all proposals!
Dept of Const Affairs Sept 2003 – all-appointed
White Paper 2007
Remove hereditaries
Part-appointed, part-elected: 15-year terms, 1/3 elected every five years by regional list PR
March 2007: Commons voted for 100% elected; Lords voted for 100% appointed!

9. Future of the Lords (1) Debate: composition > powers
Power underlies debate: election  greater legitimacy
Interim Lords flexing muscles
Salisbury Convention obsolete?
PM – too much patronage power?
Is an elected chamber a good thing?
Replicate party system in Lords
Unsuitable for scrutiny role?

10. Future of the Lords (2)
What is the purpose of a second chamber in a non-federal state?
Function > election?
Democracy less important because Lords doesn’t choose, maintain or remove Govt & not involved in finance?
Dual democratic legitimacies?
Deadlock vs rubberstamp?
Does present Lords show election unnecessary for upper chamber to check Govt and have legitimacy?

11. Parliamentary Scrutiny
Broader question: how effective are parliamentary checks on the executive?
Debates on Lords reform: praise for Lords’ scrutinising role
Strengthen Commons select committees?
But major barrier to parliamentary scrutiny = whipping system and party loyalty
Some evidence of greater willingness of backbench MPs to rebel against Govt

12. Electoral Reform for Commons
Parliament weak because 2-party system
… which derives from FPTP electoral system
PR  Coalition Govts
Scotland/Wales
Executive more answerable to legislature
Problem for reformers: Labour & Tories not (usually) interested in PR – prefer single-party majority Govts

13. Seat-Vote Differentials in UK General Elections, 1964-2005
Note: Vertical axis measures (% seats won) minus (% votes won). Figures above zero indicate ‘unearned’ seats in parliament; figures below zero indicate ‘deprivation’ of seats; zero indicates perfect proportionality.

14. Jenkins Report 1998 Labour manifesto 1997 – electoral reform
Terms of Reference of Jenkins Committee
Keep constituency link
Strong Govt
Broad proportionality
Extend voter choice
Recommended AV+
Voters have 2 votes
AV in constituencies – MPs win 50% + 1 votes
Top-up MPs elected on regional lists (list PR element)
Top-up MPs = 15-20% (bit more proportional than FPTP)
Illegitimate? – Lab-Lib Dem stitch-up?
Never implemented

15. Conclusion
Major check on executive would be electoral reform – referendum promised in Labour’s next manifesto
Lords reform is secondary by comparison…
… but still important
UK’s bicameralism strong in 1900, weak in 1980s, but somewhat stronger in 2009 – Lords enjoys greater legitimacy today