1. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 1 Are we prepared for biological terror? Nature and Duality

2. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 2 Since 11 September 2001, 5 persons are thought to have died from deliberate contamination with Anthrax - none in Europe. In the same period over 20 million people died from AIDS, TB and Malaria. Altogether natural infections probably killed over 100 million world-wide. Many diseases are unrecognised infections - cancers caused by viruses, heart disease caused by Chlamydia pneumoniae etc. Let us look at biological threats

3. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 3 Toxins apart, BW are not battlefield weapons. Living pathogens take time to incubate, but in the period before engagement, can eliminate combat readiness, destroy public morale and harm economies. The “Spanish Influenza” of 1918-19, which killed perhaps 50 million, probably did more damage to the global economy than the First World War! For economic aggression - food supplies or strategic capabilities may be targeted. For example a bacterium might be developed specifically to attack the lubricating oil used in a weapons platform. What use for biological weapons?

4. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 4 The desirable biodegradation of petrochemical spills might lead directly to an agent destroying a weapons platform lubricant. Should we ban research into oil-eating microbes? Duality is fundamental

5. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 5 Council of European Union 10 December 2003 The European Union and dual use: 1

6. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 6 The European Union and dual use: 2

7. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 7 The European Union and dual use: 3 30. A) 3)

8. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 8 The European Union and dual use: 4 30. A) 5)

9. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 9 Traditional vaccine technologies frequently use live attenuated microbes grown in fermenters. These same fermenters can be used for producing fully active offensive agents (such as anthrax or smallpox). Should dual use worries add another layer of difficulty for vaccine producers? This will hurt children and developing nations most. Is this what we want? Vaccine development and weapon development - one technology

10. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 10 Technology moves fast - can we follow?

11. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 11 In the First World War the British planned to use anthrax to damage the German army’s transport capability - then still dependent on horses. The 1969-71 Southern Corn Blight outbreak destroyed 15% of the USA’s maize crop. The post-reunification German government supported research to biodegrade the plastic body of East German Trabant motor vehicles which constituted a stock of ecologically undesirable organic material. Biological weapons affect animals, plants and biodegradable materials

12. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 12 Fear of deliberately aimed biological weapons arguably is creating a useful capacity to react to “The Next Virus”. New R&D into pathogens, new vaccine production capability and reinforced epidemiological surveillance targeted at biological weapons use, have a direct and positive effect on civil and military readiness for Bioterror or Mother Nature’s next aberration. Concerns about biological weapons - the up-side of dual use

13. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 13 In the opening years of the 21st century crop losses from diseases and parasites cost the USA up to $5 billion per annum. This loss is to the benefit of foreign competitors. When does economic competition step over the line into economic warfare? Costs of biological agents - plants

14. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 14 In Europe of the 25 EU members health delivery is about 12% of GDP or about €800 billion. Total cost of health delivery in the USA is about 15% of GDP, $4,000 per person or over $1 trillion! About 15% of this gigantic total, about €300 billion will represent the overall costs of fighting infection. How much do we spend on preparedness? Costs of biological agents - human

15. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 15 Man-made or natural infectious outbreaks could decimate the global economy. Randomly taking 20 million workers out of the EU economy would have catastrophic consequences. Treating 20 million sick, and perhaps dying, would be an enormous (insurmountable?) logistical challenge. Infectious agents can ruin the EU economy

16. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 16 Most have honoured this commitment, but the USSR and now Russia have been conspicuously in breach. The USA has been accused. All G7 nations have the capacity (i.e. dual-use potential) to move from vaccine production to weapons production in days. Since 1972 signatories to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) have renounced weapons development

17. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 17 Restricting access to scientific data for certain categories of person Classification of certain areas of biological research Restricting access to the tools for genetic manipulation New initiatives to prevent weapons proliferation - are they realistic?

18. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 18 Responsible editorial practice has until now limited the untoward use of potentially harmful scientific information. Change is unnecessary. The new biology has great potential to do good in the world, yet unfounded scare campaigns in the rich nations are preventing poor nations’ access to essential technologies. Look at the EU’s ridiculous stance on food produced from gene modified organisms. In my view - NO!

19. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 19 And NO again! Why should the rich world have a say in how Iran or Egypt develop vaccines? Our record is not good. Where are the vaccines for malaria, AIDS, or TB? Where are the plans for generating economic growth in the most needy of nations? It is easy to recruit poor individuals in poor societies by telling them that the rich western world is responsible. Are we supporting terrorists by failing to address global health and economic issues?

20. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 20 We create enemies! Is the theoretical possession, or capability of deployment, of "weapons of mass destruction" (and the resulting isolation and sanctions) itself used as an economic weapon against those developing nations which dare to defy the economic hegemony of the rich? Will dual-use potential be used as an argument to prevent access to essential technologies?

21. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 21 Together with the USA, Europe is a major contributor to the growth of knowledge in life science. Overall Europe’s (EU plus Switzerland) public sector probably spends about €10 billion on life science research. Europe’s private sector spends about €28 billion on life science research (mostly in the pharmaceutical sector). How is Europe preparing?

22. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 22 What basic research has relevance to defence and preparedness for infectious or toxin agents? Epidemiology looks at disease in populations Microbiology looks at infectious agents Immunology natural response to infection Vaccinology vaccine surrogates for agents Human, animal and plant biology cover the range of human health and economic consequences of attacking animal and plant food sources. Biological research and defence

23. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 23 The tools of modern biology are susceptible to mis- use. This is also true for motor vehicles, screwdrivers or kitchen knives. Any heavy object can be used as a weapon. So with modern biology a RISK of abuse exists. But is it true to suggest that this risk translates into THREAT that is to say a “real and present danger”. Preparedness should seek to identify the translation of risk into threat. When does a kitchen knife become a weapon? When does a fermenter become a weapon producing tool? Risk and Threat

24. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 24 European and US industry lead the world in vaccine development capability, fermentation technologies and fast response to challenges. Together with public health laboratories and academic research, industry can act quickly to respond or to anticipate an epidemic disease manifestation. Government must catalyse the relevant dialogue through structured initiatives that offer sensible incentives to industrial and public sector partners. Government/Industrial collaboration

25. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 25 Dual use potential is everywhere However, the risk in the area of modern biology is - I believe - exaggerated The naturally emerging Next Virus may be deadly Industry has capability but little incentive to be prepared - dual-use issues are a constraint! Sensible application of a BTWC protocol, coupled with minor reinforcement of existing regulatory regimes could avoid dual-abuse. Conclusions

26. © Karl Simpson 2006 Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 26 Karl Simpson Bénézech - Simpson Hameau de Bobon 07610 VION France Tel: +33-4-75 06 86 30 E-Mail: karl@simpson.nom.fr http://www.simpson.nom.fr