1. ISLAND-HOPPING TOWARDS JAPAN, 1942-44

2.  AUG., 1942- FEB., 1943: ◦ U.S. ASSAULTS / RETAKES GUADALCANAL  NOV.,1942- JAN.,1943: ◦ ALLIED CAMPAIGN / CONQUEST OF NEW GUINEA  APRIL, 1943 – JUNE, 1944: ◦ OPERATION CARTWHEEL  NOV., 1943: BATTLE OF TARAWA  JUNE,1944: ◦ THE BATTLE OF SAIPAN ◦ BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA ◦ “THE GREAT MARIANAS TURKEY SHOOT”

3.  ADMIRAL CHESTER H. NIMITZ  GENERAL DOUGLAS MacARTHUR  ADMIRAL WILLIAM F. HALSEY  THE SOLOMON ISLANDS  GUADALCANAL  “THE TOKYO EXPRESS”  NEW GUINEA  “ISLAND –HOPPING”  OPERATION CARTWHEEL  TARAWA  “THE GREAT MARIANAS TURKEY SHOOT”

5.  JUNE, 1942: BATTLE OF MIDWAY: ◦ IJN IS DEALT 1 ST MAJOR LOSS OF WWII ◦ U.S. NAVY ACHIEVES 1 ST MAJOR VICTORY IN PACIFIC ◦ JAPANESE ADVANCE IN PACIFIC IS STOPPED  PROBLEM: ◦ JAPANESE EMPIRE IS STILL AT IT’S GREATEST EXTENT ◦ JAPAN STILL CONTROLS MOST MAJOR ISLANDS IN PACIFIC ◦ AUSTRALIA IS STILL THREATENED BY JAPANESE ◦ JAPAN HAS EXTENSIVE NETWORK OF FORTIFIED ISLAND CHAINS THAT MUST BE TAKEN  WHY?  NO INVASION OF JAPAN IS POSSIBLE UNTIL ISLANDS ARE TAKEN  ISLANDS CAN BE USED AS NAVAL AND AIR BASES  RESULT? ALLIES MUST FORM PLAN TO… ◦ ASSAULT / SEIZE JAPANESE-CONTROLLED ISLANDS ◦ ASSAULT & POSSIBLY INVADE JAPAN

6.  PROBLEM: ◦ WHAT WAS THE BEST WAY TO DEFEAT JAPAN? ◦ WHAT ROUTE SHOULD THE ALLIES TAKE TO ADVANCE TOWARDS JAPAN?  NORTHERN ROUTE VIA N. PACIFIC ISLANDS?  SOUTHERN ROUTE THROUGH LARGER S.PACIFIC ISLANDS? ◦ DECISION: THE SOUTHERN ROUTE ◦ WHY?  MORE ISLANDS THERE  ISLANDS WERE CLOSER TO EACH OTHER  MANY S. PACIFIC ISLANDS WERE LARGER  SO…ISLANDS COULD BE BETTER USED FOR NAVAL / AIR BASES  SOUTHERN ROUTE WAS CLOSER TO AUSTRALIA  SO WHAT? ◦ AUSTRALIA WAS ALLIED W/ U.S. ◦ AUSSIE MILITARY WAS VITAL TO VICTORY ◦ MANY U.S. TROOPS WERE BEING TRAINED/SUPPLIED THERE

11.  U.S. / ALLIED PLAN TAKES SHAPE: ◦ ALLIED FORCES WILL ADVANCE TOWARD JAPAN ON TWO PARALLEL ROUTES ◦ SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC ROUTE:  SOLOMON ISLANDS – NEW GUINEA – PHILIPPINES ◦ CENTRAL PACIFIC ROUTE:  GILBERT ISLANDS – MARSHALL ISLANDS – MARIANA ISLANDS  WHAT FORCES WILL BE USED?: ◦ S.W. PACIFIC ROUTE: U.S. ARMY, USMC, USN, AUST. ◦ C. PACIFIC ROUTE: USN, USMC  WHO’S IN COMMAND?: ◦ S.W. PACIFIC: DOUGLAS MacARTHUR ◦ C. PACIFIC: CHESTER NIMITZ

13.  ALLIED OFFENSIVE BEGINS THERE: WHY? ◦ GUADALCANAL IS @ SOUTHERN END OF JAPANESE EMPIRE ◦ ISLAND HAS AIRFIELD ALLIES NEED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS ◦ ISLAND CONTROLS SEA LANES TO AUSTRALIA  BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZE IT’S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE ◦ SO…ALLIES WANT IT / JAPANESE WANT TO KEEP IT  USMC GIVEN INITIAL TASK OF TAKING ISLAND (U.S.ARMY INVOLVED LATER ON)  AUG. ’42-FEB.,’43: VICIOUS FIGHTING ON ISLAND ◦ JAPANESE DESPERATE TO HOLD ISLAND ◦ THE “TOKYO EXPRESS” REINFORCES JAPANESE ◦ U.S. NAVY DISRUPTS “TOKYO EXPRESS”  OTHER PROBLEMS: ◦ TROPICAL CLIMATE ◦ TROPICAL DISEASE (EX. MALARIA) ◦ JUNGLE TERRAIN MAKES MOVEMENT DIFFICULT  FINAL RESULT: ◦ JAPANESE CAN’T MAINTAIN TROOPS / SUPPLIES ◦ CASUALTIES GROW (EX. 22,000 KIA/MIA) ◦ JAPANESE WITHDRAW FROM ISLAND / U.S. CONTROLS ISLAND

28.  NEW GUINEA: WHY IMPORTANT? ◦ LOCATION  CLOSE TO AUSTRALIA  LOCATED ON IMPORTANT SEA ROUTES TO JAPAN  WAS USED AS A BASE FOR SUPPORTING SMALLER ISLAND GARRISONS ◦ JAPANESE OCCUPIED NORTHERN HALF OF ISLAND  HAD FAILED TO OCCUPY SOUTHERN HALF  WHY? JUNGLE & MOUNTAIN TERRAIN MADE MOVEMENT DIFFICULT ◦ 1942-43: U.S. / AUSSIES DECIDE TO PUSH JAPANESE OFF ISLAND ◦ PROBLEM?  TERRAIN – OWEN STANLEY MTS. ARE DIFFICULT TO PASS  JUNGLE TERRAIN  CLIMATE  DISEASE ◦ SOLUTION? MacARTHUR DECIDES ON SIMPLE PLAN: “OPERATION CARTWHEEL”  BYPASS JAPANESE STRONGHOLDS  USE ARMY & NAVY TO CUT OFF JAPANESE SUPPLIES  STARVE JAPANESE  ONLY ATTACK AREAS THAT ARE VITAL TO ALLIED MOVEMENT ◦ RESULT?  JAPANESE SUFFER MASSIVE LOSSES – 150,000 KIA / MIA  ALLIES SEIZE NEW GUINEA

45.  WHEN? NOVEMBER, 1943  WHERE? TARAWA ATOLL, GILBERT ISLANDS, CENTRAL PACIFIC  WHAT? JAPANESE-HELD ATOLL W/ AIRFIELD  WHY? ◦ TARAWA WAS THE EASTERNMOST USEABLE AIRSTRIP INSIDE JAPANESE- HELD TERRITORY ◦ CAPTURE WAS VITAL TO ADVANCE TOWARDS JAPAN  ATOLL WAS DEFENDED BY IJN NAVAL INFANTRY W/OUT FLEET SUPPORT  USMC & USN ARE ORDERED TO SEIZE TARAWA & BEGIN USING AIRSTRIP  IJN FORCE: 5000 (approx.) IJN INFANTRY W/ WELL- CONSTRUCTED DEFENSIVE POSITIONS  U.S. FORCE: ◦ USMC 2 nd MARINE DIVISION (& ELEMENTS OF USA 27 TH INFANTRY DIVISION) ◦ USN – TASK FORCE 30 ◦ TOTAL: APPROX. 35,000 MEN

62.  PROBLEMS: ◦ JAPANESE DEFENSIVE POSITIONS ARE STRONGER THAN ANTICIPATED ◦ NAVAL GUNFIRE IS LESS EFFECTIVE THAN HOPED FOR ◦ AMPHIBIOUS LANDING CRAFT ARE CAUGHT ON CORAL REEF ◦ MARINES ARE FORCED TO WADE ASHORE ◦ CASUALITES ARE VERY HIGH  FINAL CASUALTIES: ◦ IJN: 4900 KIA, APPROX. 200 SURVIVORS ◦ USMC: 3000, APPROX., 900-1000 KIA  SO WHAT? ◦ USN & USMC HAVE TO RE-EVALUATE THEIR AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT TACTICS  EX.:  HOW CAN NAVAL ARTILLERY BE MADE MORE EFFICIENT DURING THE NEXT ASSAULT?  WHAT ARE THE BEST TACTICS / METHODS TO USE AGAINST JAPANESE POSITIONS? ◦ USN & USMC BEGIN NEW TRAINING METHODS FOR MARINES & NAVAL CREWS

66.  WHEN? JUNE 19-20, 1944  WHERE? THE PHILIPPINE SEA (east of the Philippine Islands)  WHO? ◦ IJN – ADM. JISABURO OZAWA ◦ USN – ADM. RAYMOND SPRUANCE  FORCES: ◦ IJN:  5 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS  5 BATTLESHIPS  750 PLANES ◦ USN:  7 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS  7 BATTLESHIPS  956 PLANES  WHY? ◦ U.S. FORCES ARE “ISLAND-HOPPING” WESTWARD TOWARD PHILIPPINES & JAPAN ◦ IJN BELIEVES IT HAS TO LAUNCH A MAJOR OFFENSIVE TO SLOW U.S. PROGRESS ◦ U.S. 5 TH FLEET, MOVING TOWARDS JAPAN, SEEMS LIKE A GOOD TARGET

67.  JUNE 17: IJN TARGETS U.S. 5 TH FLEET FOR ATTACK  JUNE 18 th : ◦ U.S. 5 TH FLEET DISCOVERS IJN TO WEST OF U.S. POSITION ◦ SPRUANCE IS CAUTIOUS NOT TO PURSUE IJN W/OUT PROPER INTELLIEGENCE  JUNE 19 TH: BATTLE BEGINS  BATTLE TRAITS: ◦ MOSTLY AERIAL RAIDS ON ENEMY FLEETS ◦ U.S. HAS ADVANTAGES:  MORE CARRIERS (7)  MORE EXPERIENCED PILOTS  BETTER RADAR CAPABILITY FOR PLANES  BETTER PLANES

83.  JUNE 19 th : ◦ IJN LAUNCHES 4 AERIAL ASSAULTS ON U.S. 5 TH FLEET ◦ IJN PLANES ARE REPEATEDLY INTERCEPTED BY U.S PLANES ◦ IJN AIR LOSSES ARE HEAVY ◦ AIR BATTLE IS KNOWN AS “THE MARIANAS TURKEY SHOOT” ◦ U.S. FLEET LOSSES ARE LIGHT  JAPANESE AIR LOSSES – WHY SO HEAVY? ◦ U.S. PILOTS ARE NOW MORE EXPERIENCED ◦ U.S. PLANES ARE NOW AS GOOD (and often better) THAN THE JAPANESE ZERO FIGHTER ◦ MOST / BEST JAPANESE PILOTS WERE KILLED EARLIER IN WAR ◦ SO…JAPANESE PILOTS ARE LESS EXPERIENCED

84.  JUNE 20 TH : U.S. COUNTERATTACKS  U.S. FLEET DOESN’T DISCOVER IJN UNTIL LATE AFTERNOON / EALRY EVENING  PROBLEM? ◦ IF U.S. LAUNCHES LATE-DAY ATTACK, PLANES MAY NOT BE ABLE TO RETURN UNTIL AFTER DARK ◦ RESULT…U.S. PLANES MAY BE LOST DUE TO DARKNESS  U.S. ATTACKS @ 6:00pm (approx. time)  550 U.S. PLANES ATTACK IJN  IJN SHIP LOSSES ARE HEAVY  U.S. PLANES SUFFER LOSSES ON RETURN TRIP DUE TO DARKNESS & FUEL DEPLETION

85.  HEAVY IJN LOSSES: ◦ 3 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS SUNK ◦ 2 OIL TANKERS SUNK ◦ 6 SHIPS HEAVILY DAMAGED ◦ 600 PLANES (approx. #) DESTROYED (INJ & LAND-BASED PLANES) ◦ PILOT LOSSES ARE IRREPLACEABLE  U.S. LOSSES: ◦ 123 PLANES DESTROYED ◦ SOME DAMAGE TO U.S. SHIPS  EFFECT? ◦ U.S. “ISLAND-HOPPING” CONTINUES ◦ U.S. IS NOW PREPARED TO INVADE PHILIPPINES ◦ IJN AIRCREWS ARE DECIMATED ◦ IJN NOW MUST RELY ON BATTLESHIPS TO STOP U.S. NAVAL ADVANCE