1. An EDA-Friendly Protection Scheme against Side-Channel Attacks Ali Galip Bayrak 1 Nikola Velickovic 1, Francesco Regazzoni 2, David Novo 1, Philip Brisk 3 and Paolo Ienne 1

2. Side-Channel Attacks Cryptographic Processing Unit Cryptographic Processing Unit Secret Key Physical Device Plaintext Ciphertext Physical Observable (e.g., power consumption) f(plaintext, key) ~ power KNOWN RECOVER KNOWN 2

3. Protection Schemes Main Idea: f(plaintext, key) power How?Constant or random power consumption 3 Examples SoftwareHardware Constant- SABL (Tiri et al. 2002) MCML (Toprak et al. 2005) Random Dummy operation insertion Masking (Coron et al. 2000) MDPL (Popp et al. 2005) iMDPL (Popp et al. 2007) GALS (Gurkaynak et al. 2005) RCDD (Boey et al. 2010) SIRO (Zafar et al. 2010)

4. Motivation Area: 2X (SABL) – 20X (iMDPL) Energy: 3.5X (WDDL) – 18X (MDPL) Non-CMOS (SABL, MCML) Algorithm specific (GALS) Technology dependent (WDDL, MDPL) Fixed overhead (almost all) 4 Low cost Fully automated Tradeoff Security vs. Efficiency

5. Unprotected Circuit Combinatorial Circuit D D D D Q Q Q Q CLK Q all Input Output 5

6. Protected Circuit Combinatorial Circuit D D D D Q Q Q Q Input Output CLK Clock Randomization RCLK 0 RCLK 1 RCLK 2 RCLK 3 RCLK 0 Q all RCLK 1 RCLK 2 RCLK 3 6

7. Protected Circuit RCLK 0 Q all RCLK 1 RCLK 2 RCLK 3 T orig Δ T protected 7

8. Clock Randomization CLK 0 CLK 1 CLK 2 CLK N-1 δ 2δ (N-1)δ =Δ … … … Delayed Clocks MUX RCLK i Random Clocks Safe Clock Switching Zone RND 8

9. Protected Circuit Combinatorial Circuit D D D Q Q Q Input Output CLK Clock Randomization RCLK 0 RCLK 1 RCLK M-1 RCLK 0 Q all RCLK 1 RCLK 2 RCLK 3 9 … …

10. Automated Design Flow High-Level Description (VHDL/Verilog) clock renaming random clock generatio n code Code Modification Modified High-Level Description Logic Synthesis timing constraints Synthesized Circuit Place & Route Protected IC Layout RCLK(i) := MUX(CLK,RND,..) if (rising_edge(CLK)) if (rising_edge(RCLK(2))) create_clock … RCLK[0] set_clock_uncertainty … DELTA RCLK[0] 10

11. Experimental Setup FPGA experiments: Platform: SASEBO (Side-channel Attack Standard Evaluation Board) G-II. Two Xilinx FPGAs: Virtex-5 and Spartan- 3A. Toolchain: Xilinx ISE 14. ASIC experiments: Technology: 65nm STM CMOS standard cell library. Toolchain: Synopsys Design Compiler for synthesis, Cadence Encounter for placement and routing, Mentor Graphics Modelsim for simulations and Synopsys Nanosim for power estimation. 11

12. Experimental Setup AES-128 implementation Design parameters: N: number of delayed clocks. M: number of random clocks. Δ:total amount of delay. Performance parameters (normalized for unprotected): Security, Area, Speed and Energy 12

13. # Clocks vs. Security M (number of random clocks) = 8 ✔ [AES-specific] Bigger N (number of delayed clocks) ✔ >300X security improvement 13

14. Total Delay vs. Security Bigger Δ for a fixed N ✔ Bigger N for a fixed Δ ✔ ? 70X secure for N=Δ=16 300X secure for N=16, Δ=64 14

15. Total Delay vs. Area 8% overhead for 70X security point (Δ=16) 15% overhead for 300X security point (Δ=64) 15

16. Total Delay vs. Speed 2.3X slowdown for 70X security point (Δ=16) 7X slowdown for 300X security point (Δ=64) 16

17. Comparison 17 For the embedded systems subject to power analysis attacks, area and energy are much more important than speed!

18. Conclusions Fully automated design-flow. Platform and technology agnostic. Can be applied to any given implementation. Does not need security expertise. Less overhead than competing countermeasures. Area and energy efficient. Security increase is drastic. More than 300X with modest overhead. 18