1. Energy Sector - EU/UK Regulatory and Legal framework, Safety Cases
Kevin Myers
Director General Regulation
Health and Safety Executive, UK
EU-US Joint Conference on OSH
Fort Worth, Texas September 2015

2. Background principles
28 Member States in EU
Each has its own history and OSH legal framework
EU OSH Legislation is largely expressed through “Directives”…….
Developed from experience of incidents eg Seveso, Deepwater Horizon
Which are transcribed into National legislation………
And in doing so inevitably reflect history, legal system, philosophy………
So I will cover this through the UK perspective

3. Fundamentals of UK’s OSH system
A (largely) goal-setting regulatory framework
The business/employer is responsible for identifying and managing risk and establishing the appropriate control measures - not the Regulator
This outcome-focused approach is underpinned by risk assessment to determine the appropriate controls
But the important thing is delivery of the controls – not the piece(s) of paper!

4. Energy Sector
Traditional OSH activities – working with electricity, falls from height etc
failures are comparably high frequency, but ‘low’ consequence
tend to regulate through core OSH regulations
“major hazard” activities - Oil and gas exploration, refining etc
failures are comparably low frequency but high consequence
tend to regulate through ‘safety case’ regimes
Emerging technologies
under development?!

5. ‘Traditional’ OSH risks I
Covered by a ‘Framework’ Directive setting out general principles of prevention:
hierarchy of risks – avoid, evaluate, control at source
adapt the work to the individual and prioritise collective over individual protective measures
adapt to technical progress
developing a coherent overall prevention policy
consult/engage with the workforce and provide adequate training
workers to co-operate, use machinery and ppe etc correctly and notify employer of shortcomings and /or danger

6. ‘Traditional’ OSH risks II
Framework Directive supported by over 20 “Daughter” Directives – either sector or cross-cutting hazard-based
ppe, manual handling, display screen equipment, vibration, noise, work equipment
chemical agents, carcinogens, asbestos, biological agents, explosive atmospheres
construction
oil and gas extraction
mining

7. Major Drivers for Change
Technology
Management Systems
Risk
Behavioural
Human Factors?
Accidents
At a basic level, changes in occupational health and safety performance are influenced by 3 main drivers: technology, management systems and human factors such as behaviour.
While technological controls and processes can minimise physical exposure to risk, health and safety is delivered by people on the ground. Human factors and behaviour are critical to success.
Safe systems of work may be technically robust, but they don’t work if people don’t follow them.
Technology and process can only take us so far without safe behaviours to back them up. The effectiveness of occupational risk control and management is for this reason heavily influenced by organisational culture.
Businesses or organisations that achieve and sustain excellent health and safety records successfully establish a safety culture that exerts a positive influence on attitudes and behaviours. When combined with appropriate technical controls and management systems, this can influence a positive change in performance.
That’s the theory, but how does it work in practice? What characteristics define a successful ‘safety culture’ and what are the organisational attributes that can generate it?
Time
Time

8. “Safety Case” Regime
Businesses need the regulator’s agreement or consent before they can start operation:
Safety Cases/Safety Reports /Licences
Often this includes the regulator’s agreement on aspects of the design, construction and commissioning of the plant as well
Dependant on the business/employer demonstrating that the risks are controlled ‘as low as is reasonably practicable’ - ALARP.
Regulator’s role is to assess and verify that the case for safety has been made and the risks effectively managed and controlled.

9. Inspection Risk based and targeted
Takes account of company performance
But also topic-based
Primary purpose is to verify that the control measures described in Safety Case/Report actually exist on the ground and are resilient

10. Investigation High public expectations
Hold accountable those responsible
Establish root causes:
Technical
Managerial
Cultural
Learn and share lessons

11. Hazard
Incident

12. Swiss Cheese Model of Defence
Hazard
Ideal
Reality
Incident

13. Swiss Cheese Model of Defence

14. Advantages/Disadvantages of Safety Case Regime
No prescription - so flexibility and alternative ways of reaching the desired outcome
Enables – indeed encourages - innovation
Need for good guidance, industry codes and standards to establish good practice in achieving compliance
Need for an on-going dialogue with industry and its involvement in developing and owning guidance and standards
The role of the regulator
The business value of the safety case
It is no guarantee of safe production/operation

15. Key Lessons from UK experience
It’s often the routine day to day tasks and activities that go wrong not the unusual/obscure
There are no new incidents just new people repeating the same mistakes
Tomorrow’s major accident is lurking in the organisation today. A seismic quake is always preceded by warning signs
Importance of leading indicators
No clear sense of vulnerability. Belief in the infallibility of control system
Regulatory Codes can at best only be a imperfect fit to risk management – not a guarantee of safety

16. HSE publication HSG254
What can go wrong?
Where within the facility will these challenges to integrity be most critical?
What systems are in place to manage those challenges?
What does success look like?
What are the critical activities which must work right to deliver the intended outcome?

17. Thank you for listening!