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Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda.

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Presentation on theme: "Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda."— Presentation transcript:

1 Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

2 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review2 Scope  Cold smoke extraction  Flood detection/protection  High expansion foam system  Other fire extinction systems

3 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review3 acknowledgements  High expansion foam system  Courtesy S. Fratianni  Cold smoke extraction  Courtesy B. Pirollet

4 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review4  Concept  UX... experimental caverns.  US... protected areas - technical caverns Cold smoke extraction

5 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review5 Cold smoke extraction Detection All the air handling units of the area concerned are automatically stopped by TS/CV Smoke extraction mode activated by fire men (fire men cubicle) Fire men Air handling units in normal mode restarted by TS/CV End of fire men action During extraction mode extraction filters will be by-passed No action with RP Material designed to 400°C/2h

6 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review6 Cold smoke extraction  Controls status in TI room -start/ stop status of ventilation system controlled by fire men cubicles -status of each air handling unit ( on/off/fault). -status of each external components (dampers).

7 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review7 LHC experimental areas. Cold smoke extraction Experimental cavern; 2 separate & independent areas:  Experimental caverns (UX pts 1/2/8 or UXC55 pt5)  Protected areas- technical caverns (USA 15 pt1 UX 85 pt8 USC55 pt5)

8 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review8 Pt1 Ventilation Principle

9 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review9 Experimental cavern – Pt2 Concrete cap open

10 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review10 Experimental cavern – Pt2 Concrete cap closed

11 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review11 US... - technical caverns. Ventilation Extraction Supply

12 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review12 US...technical caverns. Cold smoke extraction

13 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review13 UAEX 892 UAEX 893 UAPE831 UAPE832 Wall UX85 experimental area UX85 protected area - technical caverns. Cold smoke extraction

14 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review14 Smoke Extraction Capacity PointAreaModePulsionExtraction 1UX 15Normal2x 30 000 Smoke extraction (*)2x 60 000 USA 15Normal1x 25 0001x 15 000 Smoke extraction1x 25 0001x 10 000 2UX 25Normal1x 45 000 Smoke extraction (*)2x 45 000 5UXC 55Normal1x 45 000 Smoke extraction (*)2x 45 000 USC 55Normal1x 12 000 Smoke extraction2x 10 000 8UX 85Normal1x 22 500 Smoke extraction (*)1x 45 000 UX 85 PANormal1x 22 500 Smoke extraction (*)1x 32 5001x 32 501 *Extraction gas = smoke extraction

15 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review15 Cold smoke extraction M & O  Included in TS-CV maintenance plan

16 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review16  Each experimental cavern equipped with a sump.  Leak detection sensors and sump pumps installed at low point.  Action:  L2 alarm to TCR @ 2 nd pump starts  L3 alarm to TCR @ both pumps at 100% and/or high water level Flood Detection/Protection

17 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review17 Water Evacuation System

18 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review18 Water Evacuation Schematics

19 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review19 Pumping Station Equipment

20 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review20 ATLAS/CMS Foam Injection  TWO main requirements:  1) passive; i.e. no pumps to pressurize the system at the working pressure, no electric components, everything should be manual  Point 1 water is provided by the pumps of the LHC ring, but even without them the 100m pressure head provides enough pressure to run the system  Point 5 equipped with 150 m3 pool for HP foam system & hydrants.  2) static foam blowers = very low maintenance !  no fan turning inside the blowers to generate the foam  Specification to code NFPA11  successfully demonstrated by the commissioning test of CMS UX55 Feb 2006

21 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review21 Foam injection Details  foam loss factor:1.2  foam shrinkage factor:1.4  foam destruction factor:1.2.  expansion rate:≥ 700:1  Fill time:2 + 5 mins.  Static foam generators  Delivery date:≤ Aug. 2003 Experimental CavernsFree Volume [m3] CMS (UXC5)16500 ATLAS (UX1)18100

22 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review22 Foam system M & O  Weekly inspection  Monthly inspection  Annual maintenance  Manually open/close all valves  Remove & clean filters of the system  Take foam sample and have it analyzed by authorized lab.

23 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review23 ATLAS schematics

24 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review24 CMS HE foam Test Feb 2006

25 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review25 Other fire extinguishing systems  N2+H2O mist high pressure (100 bar)  H2O mist high pressure (70 bar)  N2+H2O mist low pressure (10 bar)  N2 injection  CO2 injection (previous talk)

26 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review26 Other fire extinguishing systems (cnt’d)  CMS, LHCb high pressure N2+H2O mist @ control room, PC farms  CMS high pressure H2O mist @ counting room false floor, UXC trenches  ATLAS low pressure N2+H2O mist @ UG PC farms & false floors  ALICE, CMS N2 injection in detector  Min. 3 volume changes ≥ 5 – 10 mins (O2 ≤ 15 %)  ALICE  120 m3??  CMS  2 x 80 m3 @ 16 bar

27 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review27 N2-H2O systems operation  activation can be made by:  remote control with solenoid valve by DSS default operation mode  manually using the lever on the top of the gas actuator.  activation by remote control means a detection system sends an activation command to the solenoid valves (24VDC).  For each system both solenoid valves must be activated.  As soon as the solenoid valves are open, the N2 will pressurize the accumulator unit and the gas actuator valve on the other N2 cylinders.  The water mist – nitrogen mixture is discharge into the barrack by a network system.  The system discharge is divided into two phases by a change in the water-nitrogen ratio in the discharge mixture.  The initial phase has a high water-nitrogen ratio.  The second phase has a much lower water-nitrogen ratio and produce a finer airborne mist.  The two phases cannot be strictly separated.

28 14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review28 N2-H2O systems M & O  Semi-Annual Inspection  Carry out functional actuation checks.  Replace the actuator valves to the gas cylinder valves.  Visual check the DAU-R units  Re-commissioning the entire system in accordance with the system commissioning procedure.  Annual Inspection  Carry out all the procedure as for the semi-annual inspection.  Change the water inside the accumulator units. Follow the filling procedure. In case the client permit a real discharge test, the N2 cylinders must be also replaced.


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