1. September 2009 1 CSA “Code Red” – Public Warning in Operation “Cast Lead” ISMOR 2009 Lt.Col. Ami Mizrahi, M.Sc. Center for System Analysis Planning Division IDF

2. September 2009 2 CSA Background  In operation “Cast Lead” Hamas fired rockets on civilians  Protection based on “Most Protected Room” Concrete room / Inner room / Lower floors / Staircases Alerting the population Sensor constellation / Sirens

3. September 2009 3 CSA The Dilemma  Increase alert probability Maximize P alert  Minimal distraction of civilian life under ongoing rocket attacks Minimize P unnecessary alert  Analogous to P fa and P d

4. September 2009 4 CSA P unnecessary alert (P d ) (P fa ) P alert Vector of launch Logic Change Hit area prediction Schematic Tradeoffs

5. September 2009 5 CSA Protection Policy Partial Alert “Stay in Shelters” Halt Civilian Routine Psychological Impact Alert Everyone The “Blitz” on London Yom Kippur War Focused Alert Desert Storm2 nd Lebanon War Cast Lead 19401973199120062009

6. September 2009 6 CSA Desert Storm 1991  39 Al-Hussein Missiles (SCUD) were launched at Israel  Israel was divided into 6 alert zones “Sealed Room” Gas Masks  Every missile caused ~1/3 of Israel’s population to be alerted (~2M)

7. September 2009 7 CSA 2 nd Lebanon War 2006  ~4,000 rockets were fired at Israel  Improved hit predictions New sensors  More Public Warning Zones On the average ~100K people were alerted

8. September 2009 8 CSA Prior to Operation “ Cast Lead ” 2001-2008  Experience gathered for 8 years 2001-2008 A few rockets per day - 4000 rockets over the years Order of magnitude increase in # of zones Order of magnitude decrease in # of people in a zone Improved hit prediction Implement relevant alerting logic

9. September 2009 9 CSA Logic for Improvised Rockets

10. September 2009 10 CSA Operation “ Cast Lead ” Dec. 27 th, 2008 - Jan. 17 th, 2009  During “Cast Lead” ~1000 Rockets and Mortars Fired New threats - longer range rockets  Alerting logic problematic for longer range rockets

11. September 2009 11 CSA Longer Threats -> more Unnecessary Alerts

12. September 2009 12 CSA Longer Threats -> more Unnecessary Alerts

13. September 2009 13 CSA Logic Change Vector of launch Hit Area Prediction

14. September 2009 14 CSA What was done?  Empirical estimation of hit prediction accuracy Why empirical? Non-standard rockets Adaptation to theater (sensor combination, specific locations…)  Define MOEs P alert Number of people affected by the Unnecessary Alerts  Define new logic  Calibrate parameters  Test new logic on new cases (Validation)  Test stability of new logic  “Go to the decision makers”

15. September 2009 15 CSA Research Timeline Identify Problem Collect Data ~ 3 Days~ 1 Week Change Code ~ 3 Days Test Stability & Validate ~ 1 Week Approval End of Operation

16. September 2009 16 CSA Research Difficulties  Data collection Vs. Real time crisis management Hard to get data from rescue personnel  Rocket location Low priority to locate rockets falling outside residential areas Possible sample skewing  Numerous authorities Military / Civilian - Police, Intel, Home Front Command, Our teams  Very Noisy Data Limited accuracy of data Cross-check the data. Go to the field.  Limited High Level Attention

17. September 2009 17 CSA Summary  Basic dilemma remains: P alert <> P unnecessary alerts  Requirement for flexibility for the alert system Alert Time <> Accuracy Local optimizations based on scenario Real time Alerting Zone Control Active Defense (intercept) poses more questions: Danger from Debris  OR During Hostilities Improved Data Collection During Hostilities Relevant research time