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Ludger Wößmann Demand, Autonomy and Accountability: Lessons from International Analysis International Seminar “Demand, Autonomy and Accountability in Schooling”

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Presentation on theme: "Ludger Wößmann Demand, Autonomy and Accountability: Lessons from International Analysis International Seminar “Demand, Autonomy and Accountability in Schooling”"— Presentation transcript:

1 Ludger Wößmann Demand, Autonomy and Accountability: Lessons from International Analysis International Seminar “Demand, Autonomy and Accountability in Schooling” OECD and Department of Education and Training, Flemish Community of Belgium 15-16 May, 2006

2 “Empowering” the Demand Side Basically all countries: –Ultimate responsibility and supervision by the state But: public vs. private involvement in 2 broad tasks: –Operation of schools –Funding of schools Public-private partnership (PPP) = any collaboration between public and private entities  Two forms of PPP: 1.Public operation + private funding E.g., parents have to pay tuition fees for public schools 2.Private operation + public funding Private operation by business, church, … Public funding through base funding or vouchers

3 Public Funding and Public Operation of Schools

4 International Differences in Public Funding and Public Operation of Schools

5 Why Should It Matter?

6 Student Achievement in the Two Forms of PPPs

7 Public Operation/Funding and Math Performance across Countries

8 Public Operation/Funding and Reading/Science Performance across Countries

9 Interactions of Operation and Funding Effect of public funding depending on type of operation:

10 Autonomy and Accountability  Complementarity: school autonomy + external exams School autonomy allows: –Use of superior local knowledge (good for learning) –Opportunistic behaviour (bad for learning) = Decentralised decision-makers get away with behaving in ways that advance their own interest rather than the system’s interest If there is (a) asymmetric (decentralised) information = imperfect monitoring = limited accountability And (b) opposing interests  Autonomy may be good or bad for student performance –Depending on whether in a given decision-making area, there are local knowledge leads and/or incentives for opportunistic behaviour

11 External exams can ease asymmetric information –Provide information on how individual students perform relative to national (or regional) student population  Ease the monitoring problems inherent in education  Align incentives of local decision-makers with system goals  Make it more likely that schools act according to the goals of the system if they are given autonomy  By introducing accountability, external exams ease the “bad” effects of autonomy, ensuring a “good” net effect Autonomy and Accountability

12 Effects of Autonomy on Student Performance — With and Without External Exams —

13 Autonomy, External Exams and Student Performance – With Opportunism and With Local Knowledge Lead – TIMSS + TIMSS-R Math test score

14 PISA Math test score Autonomy, External Exams and Student Performance – With Opportunism and With Local Knowledge Lead –

15 TIMSS + TIMSS-R Math test score Autonomy, External Exams and Student Performance – With Opportunism and With Local Knowledge Lead –

16 PISA Math test score Autonomy, External Exams and Student Performance – With Opportunism and With Local Knowledge Lead –

17 Digression on Standardized Testing – With and Without Standards/Goals – PISA Math test score

18 TIMSS + TIMSS-R Math test score Autonomy, External Exams and Student Performance – With Opportunism and Without Local Knowledge Lead –

19 TIMSS + TIMSS-R Math test score Autonomy, External Exams and Student Performance – With Opportunism and Without Local Knowledge Lead –

20 TIMSS + TIMSS-R Math test score Autonomy, External Exams and Student Performance – Without Opportunism and With Local Knowledge Lead –

21 Demand, Autonomy and Accountability: Main Results from International Analyses Public-private partnerships: –Public school operation  student performance –Public school funding  student performance  Most effective school systems: PPP where the state finances the schools and contracts the private sector to run them Autonomy and external exams: –External exit exams  student performance –School autonomy  in systems with external exit exams  Complementarity: Decentralisation works – if combined with external examination. –Education policy should combine the two: Setting and testing standards externally but leaving it up to schools how to pursue them.

22 Demand, Autonomy and Accountability: Some Unresolved Issues Equity of student outcomes Non-cognitive skills as alternative outcome measures Interactions between choice, autonomy and accountability Additional measures of choice, autonomy and accountability PISA 2003 data

23 The EENEE Website – www.education-economics.org – www.education-economics.org as a forum to promote and disseminate research on the Economics of Education in Europe: www.education-economics.org Economics of Education EENEE Mapping of Researchers What’s New Symposia References


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