1. After Iran: More Proliferation in the Middle East Oded Brosh Institute for Policy and Strategy Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya Ninth Herzliya Conference February 2009

2. 2 Background – the threat to the international non-proliferation regime The concept: since 1964, 45 years of general success of the international non- proliferation regime The concept: since 1964, 45 years of general success of the international non- proliferation regime Fear of collapse of non-proliferation “ firebreaks ” in Far East and Mid-East Fear of collapse of non-proliferation “ firebreaks ” in Far East and Mid-East

3. 3 Impact of Iranian nuclearization on adversaries in Mid-East Due to the ideological content: concern about Iranian attempts to advance revolutionary / radical agenda; attempts / actions designed to undermine ( “ moderate ” ) regimes in region Due to the ideological content: concern about Iranian attempts to advance revolutionary / radical agenda; attempts / actions designed to undermine ( “ moderate ” ) regimes in region Concern regarding attempts to gain control of strategic / economic assets of region Concern regarding attempts to gain control of strategic / economic assets of region Danger of conventional altercations with escalatory potential; creation of confrontational atmosphere / “ escalation dominance ” Danger of conventional altercations with escalatory potential; creation of confrontational atmosphere / “ escalation dominance ”

4. 4 After Iran: added motives There were strong motives before too; after Iran, new motives are added to those existing before There were strong motives before too; after Iran, new motives are added to those existing before In most cases, the lead motive is regional dominance in a M.E. saturated with subjective values In most cases, the lead motive is regional dominance in a M.E. saturated with subjective values In other cases, the lead motive is compensation for weaknesses In other cases, the lead motive is compensation for weaknesses WMD previously viewed by regional players as a strategic asset: Libyan case reversed the trend, temporarily WMD previously viewed by regional players as a strategic asset: Libyan case reversed the trend, temporarily

5. 5 Saudi Arabia In the past: involvement in Pakistani program in return for “ umbrella ” ? In the past: involvement in Pakistani program in return for “ umbrella ” ? Acquisition of Chinese strategic SSM brokered by Pakistan Acquisition of Chinese strategic SSM brokered by Pakistan Lack of appropriate infrastructure – needs to acquire from outside ( “ turnkey ” ?), if still possible Lack of appropriate infrastructure – needs to acquire from outside ( “ turnkey ” ?), if still possible The how not yet clear, but the motive exists The how not yet clear, but the motive exists + Dangers of internal political frictions + Dangers of internal political frictions

6. 6 Egypt Desires for an extensive nuclear program ongoing since 1960 ’ s Desires for an extensive nuclear program ongoing since 1960 ’ s Lead motives have bee prestige (Arab lead, Indian example), int ’ l and regional standing, strategic considerations Lead motives have bee prestige (Arab lead, Indian example), int ’ l and regional standing, strategic considerations Ambitious nuclear program frustrated by persistent financing difficulties Ambitious nuclear program frustrated by persistent financing difficulties Scientific, technological, industrial infrastructure available Scientific, technological, industrial infrastructure available Since 2006: increased renewed interest Since 2006: increased renewed interest March 2007: statement regarding intent to establish network of 10 nuclear power stations March 2007: statement regarding intent to establish network of 10 nuclear power stations

7. 7 Libya Breakout potential, in view of disappointment with benefits of 2003 deal Breakout potential, in view of disappointment with benefits of 2003 deal Danger of attempt to test a more “ forgiving ” atmosphere than in 2003 Danger of attempt to test a more “ forgiving ” atmosphere than in 2003 Difficulty in resurrection of A.Q. Khan elements today; alternative Iranian option? Difficulty in resurrection of A.Q. Khan elements today; alternative Iranian option?

8. 8 Algeria Until 1993 – probable weapons oriented program with Chinese HWRR Until 1993 – probable weapons oriented program with Chinese HWRR 1993 – NPT pledge (deposit 1995) under int ’ l pressure, abandoning weapons oriented program? 1993 – NPT pledge (deposit 1995) under int ’ l pressure, abandoning weapons oriented program? Potential for renewal if non-proliferation regime collapses Potential for renewal if non-proliferation regime collapses

9. 9 Iraq In the past – Arab leadership motive, “ Babel ”, domestic prestige, strategic considerations (Iran before and after Islamic revolution) In the past – Arab leadership motive, “ Babel ”, domestic prestige, strategic considerations (Iran before and after Islamic revolution) Knowledge exists Knowledge exists At present, doesn ’ t appear imminently likely, but …. At present, doesn ’ t appear imminently likely, but …. After U.S. exit and internal reshuffle, Sunni-Shi ’ te rift, theoretically renewed quest for Arab leadership role? After U.S. exit and internal reshuffle, Sunni-Shi ’ te rift, theoretically renewed quest for Arab leadership role?

10. 10 Syria Domestic regime survival motives, alongside external ones – regional and security Domestic regime survival motives, alongside external ones – regional and security Instead of DPRK – Iranian option? Instead of DPRK – Iranian option?

11. 11 UAE and the rest UAE – interest and pursuit of nuclear power stations? UAE – interest and pursuit of nuclear power stations? Doesn ’ t look dangerous, but can never tell – in the past hub of A.Q. Khan network Doesn ’ t look dangerous, but can never tell – in the past hub of A.Q. Khan network Morocco, Jordan? Morocco, Jordan? Terror networks – Al-Qaeda, Hizbullah, “ proxies ” or not; legitimization? Terror networks – Al-Qaeda, Hizbullah, “ proxies ” or not; legitimization?

12. 12 Turkey Growing interest Growing interest End of January ’ 09: intentions to launch ambitious nuclear power station program, technical agreement with Russian supplier End of January ’ 09: intentions to launch ambitious nuclear power station program, technical agreement with Russian supplier

13. 13 Conclusion Iran ’ s nuclearization, apart from the danger of use of nuclear weapons, will initiate “ snowballing ” effect of regional and global escalation in a myriad of fields Iran ’ s nuclearization, apart from the danger of use of nuclear weapons, will initiate “ snowballing ” effect of regional and global escalation in a myriad of fields In the proliferation arena, could bring about collapse of non-proliferation regime with extensive regional ramifications In the proliferation arena, could bring about collapse of non-proliferation regime with extensive regional ramifications