1. David Frost

2. FREE WILL AND CAUSAL DETERMINISM

3. 1)Are free will and causal determinism incompatible? FREE WILL AND CAUSAL DETERMINISM

4. 1)Are free will and causal determinism incompatible? 2)If yes, which obtains? FREE WILL AND CAUSAL DETERMINISM

5. 1)Are free will and causal determinism incompatible? 2)If yes, which obtains? Libertarianism: Free will obtains; causal determinism does not. FREE WILL AND CAUSAL DETERMINISM

6. 1)Are free will and causal determinism incompatible? 2)If yes, which obtains? Libertarianism: Free will obtains; causal determinism does not. Hard Determinism: Causal determinism obtains; free will does not. FREE WILL AND CAUSAL DETERMINISM

7. 1)Are free will and causal determinism incompatible? 2)If yes, which obtains? Libertarianism: Free will obtains; causal determinism does not. Hard Determinism: Causal determinism obtains; free will does not. Compatibilism: Free will and causal determinism both obtain. FREE WILL AND CAUSAL DETERMINISM

8. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

9. AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

10. For Ayer: –It is a mistake to contrast freedom with causation. AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

11. For Ayer: –It is a mistake to contrast freedom with causation. –Freedom is properly contrasted with constraint. AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

12. For Ayer: –It is a mistake to contrast freedom with causation. –Freedom is properly contrasted with constraint. –Every event is caused. Free events are caused in a special way. AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

13. A Free ActionAn Unfree Action AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

14. is caused A Free ActionAn Unfree Action AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

15. is caused is caused A Free ActionAn Unfree Action AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

16. is caused in a special way is caused A Free ActionAn Unfree Action AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

17. is caused in a special way is caused in a different special way A Free ActionAn Unfree Action AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

18. is caused in a special way i.e., in an “unconstraining” way is caused in a different special way A Free ActionAn Unfree Action AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

19. is caused in a special way i.e., in an “unconstraining” way is caused in a different special way i.e., in a constraining way A Free ActionAn Unfree Action AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

20. is caused in a special way i.e., in an “unconstraining” way e.g., by my own desire is caused in a different special way i.e., in a constraining way A Free ActionAn Unfree Action AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

21. is caused in a special way i.e., in an “unconstraining” way e.g., by my own desire is caused in a different special way i.e., in a constraining way e.g., by some one else A Free ActionAn Unfree Action AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

22. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY Part II: Early Paragraphs

23. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

24. Notes on reading Ayer: it might be difficult to follow him since he doesn’t come right out and say what he believes. Instead he follows a common philosopher’s style of proceeding through a network or series of ideas – making each seem as plausible as possible. Some will seem plausibly to be counterexamples to the idea that came before, until Ayer argues just as plausibly or even more so that it is no counterexample at all and is even irrelevant. You may bristle after that – if it’s irrelevant, then why have we been talking about it? But it is a way of pro-actively undermining an opponent’s potential counterexample. Someone might be tempted, for instance, to argue that humans are free because science can’t always show that what they did was causally determined or lawfully predictable. Ayer maps out this trajectory of thought only to reject it. “But this does not give the moralist what he wants.” AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

25. The problem of free will is the conflict between

26. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY The problem of free will is the conflict between –our sense that every event has a cause and

27. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY The problem of free will is the conflict between –our sense that every event has a cause and –our sense that we possess freedom of the will.

28. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY Every event has a cause

29. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY Every event has a cause –Or, at least, in principle, everything is explainable (paragraphs 3-4)

30. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY In principle, everything is explainable.

31. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY In principle, everything is explainable. Deny the “in principle.”

32. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY In principle, everything is explainable. Deny the “in principle.” –Perhaps freedom exists where explanation ends (paragraph 5)

33. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY In principle, everything is explainable. Deny the “in principle.” –Perhaps freedom exists where explanation ends (paragraph 5) “But that does not give the moralist what he wants,” (paragraph 6).

34. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY In principle, everything is explainable. Deny the “in principle.” –Perhaps freedom exists where explanation ends (paragraph 5) “But that does not give the moralist what he wants,” (paragraph 6). –i.e., it doesn’t give the possibility of moral responsibility

35. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY In principle, everything is explainable. Deny the “in principle.” –Perhaps freedom exists where explanation ends (paragraph 5) “But that does not give the moralist what he wants,” (paragraph 6). –i.e., it doesn’t give the possibility of moral responsibility –“he’s free because there is no explanation of what he does,” doesn’t sound free

36. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

37. The moralist doesn’t want actions to come from randomness

38. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY The moralist doesn’t want actions to come from randomness The moralist wants actions to come from choices

39. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY The moralist doesn’t want actions to come from randomness The moralist wants actions to come from choices –“For when he makes it a condition of my being morally responsible that I should act freely…. What he wishes to imply is that my actions are the result of my own free choice: and it is because they are the result of my own free choice that I am held morally responsible for them,” (Ayer, pp. 112-113).

40. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

41. But what about the causal history of that choice?

42. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY But what about the causal history of that choice? Ayer says that the choice is either an accident or it is not.

43. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY But what about the causal history of that choice? Ayer says that the choice is either an accident or it is not. –If it is an accident, then the moralist does not get the freedom he’s looking for.

44. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY But what about the causal history of that choice? Ayer says that the choice is either an accident or it is not. –If it is an accident, then the moralist does not get the freedom he’s looking for. –If it is not an accident, then it has a cause and we are back to the Hard Determinist line.

45. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

46. But: –“Again, the objection may be raised that we are not doing justice to the moralist’s case. His view is not that it is a matter of chance that I choose to act as I do, but rather that my choice depends upon my character,” (Ayer, p. 113, paragraph 9).

47. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY But: –“Again, the objection may be raised that we are not doing justice to the moralist’s case. His view is not that it is a matter of chance that I choose to act as I do, but rather that my choice depends upon my character,” (Ayer, p. 113, paragraph 9). But in what way am I responsible for my character?

48. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY But: –“Again, the objection may be raised that we are not doing justice to the moralist’s case. His view is not that it is a matter of chance that I choose to act as I do, but rather that my choice depends upon my character,” (Ayer, p. 113, paragraph 9). But in what way am I responsible for my character? –“Only, surely, in the sense that there is a causal connection between what I do now and what I have done in the past…” (p. 113, paragraph 9).

49. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY But: –“Again, the objection may be raised that we are not doing justice to the moralist’s case. His view is not that it is a matter of chance that I choose to act as I do, but rather that my choice depends upon my character,” (Ayer, p. 113, paragraph 9). But in what way am I responsible for my character? –“Only, surely, in the sense that there is a causal connection between what I do now and what I have done in the past…” (p. 113, paragraph 9). –If I have “made myself what I am,” then I caused my character.

50. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY But: –“Again, the objection may be raised that we are not doing justice to the moralist’s case. His view is not that it is a matter of chance that I choose to act as I do, but rather that my choice depends upon my character,” (Ayer, p. 113, paragraph 9). But in what way am I responsible for my character? –“Only, surely, in the sense that there is a causal connection between what I do now and what I have done in the past…” (p. 113, paragraph 9). –If I have “made myself what I am,” then I caused my character. But there’s causation again.

51. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY But: –“Again, the objection may be raised that we are not doing justice to the moralist’s case. His view is not that it is a matter of chance that I choose to act as I do, but rather that my choice depends upon my character,” (Ayer, p. 113, paragraph 9). But in what way am I responsible for my character? –“Only, surely, in the sense that there is a causal connection between what I do now and what I have done in the past…” (p. 113, paragraph 9). –If I have “made myself what I am,” then I caused my character. But there’s causation again. –“Once more, either it is an accident or it is not.”

52. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

53. So, Ayer considers a final attempt to create an account satisfying what the moralist wants.

54. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY So, Ayer considers a final attempt to create an account satisfying what the moralist wants. Consciousness of necessity.

55. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

56. Constraining

57. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY Constraining Non-constraining

58. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY Constraining –Another person compels you Non-constraining

59. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY Constraining –Another person compels you –Hypnosis Non-constraining

60. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY Constraining –Another person compels you –Hypnosis –Pistol to the head Non-constraining

61. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY Constraining –Another person compels you –Hypnosis –Pistol to the head –Kleptomania Non-constraining

62. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY Constraining –Another person compels you –Hypnosis –Pistol to the head –Kleptomania Non-constraining –Deliberative process of deciding

63. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY Constraining –Another person compels you –Hypnosis –Pistol to the head –Kleptomania Non-constraining –Deliberative process of deciding –Myself, not another person

64. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY Constraining –Another person compels you –Hypnosis –Pistol to the head –Kleptomania Non-constraining –Deliberative process of deciding –Myself, not another person –Unlike the kleptomaniac

65. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY Constraining –Another person compels you –Hypnosis –Pistol to the head –Kleptomania Non-constraining –Deliberative process of deciding –Myself, not another person –Unlike the kleptomaniac –Could have done otherwise

66. AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

67. is caused in a special way i.e., in an “unconstraining” way e.g., by my own desire is caused in a different special way i.e., in a constraining way e.g., by some one else A Free ActionAn Unfree Action AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

68. is caused in a special way i.e., in an “unconstraining” way e.g., by my own desire better, by a desire I identify with is caused in a different special way i.e., in a constraining way e.g., by some one else A Free ActionAn Unfree Action AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

69. is caused in a special way i.e., in an “unconstraining” way e.g., by my own desire better, by a desire I identify with is caused in a different special way i.e., in a constraining way e.g., by some one else possibly, by a desire I don’t identify with A Free ActionAn Unfree Action AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

70. FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM

71. Consider the addicted smoker example.

72. FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM Consider the addicted smoker example. –The addiction is a desire within him

73. FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM Consider the addicted smoker example. –The addiction is a desire within him –But he wants to quit, which is also a desire within him

74. FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM Consider the addicted smoker example. –The addiction is a desire within him –But he wants to quit, which is also a desire within him We might say that he does not identify with his addiction

75. FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM

76. First order desire: a want to do something

77. FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM First order desire: a want to do something First order volition: an effective first order desire, my will

78. FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM First order desire: a want to do something First order volition: an effective first order desire, my will Second order desire: a want to have a certain want (rare)

79. FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM First order desire: a want to do something First order volition: an effective first order desire, my will Second order desire: a want to have a certain want (rare) Second order volition: a want that a certain first order desire be effective

80. FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM

81. Consider, again, the addicted smoker

82. FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM Consider, again, the addicted smoker –He has two conflicting FODs: he wants to smoke and he wants not to smoke

83. FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM Consider, again, the addicted smoker –He has two conflicting FODs: he wants to smoke and he wants not to smoke –But he also has a second order volition or an attitude towards which of these wants he prefers or identifies with

84. FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM Consider, again, the addicted smoker –He has two conflicting FODs: he wants to smoke and he wants not to smoke –But he also has a second order volition or an attitude towards which of these wants he prefers or identifies with He has a SOV that his want to not smoke be his will

85. FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM Consider, again, the addicted smoker –He has two conflicting FODs: he wants to smoke and he wants not to smoke –But he also has a second order volition or an attitude towards which of these wants he prefers or identifies with He has a SOV that his want to not smoke be his will Frankfurt says that you are free when your SOV is satisfied

86. FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM Consider, again, the addicted smoker –He has two conflicting FODs: he wants to smoke and he wants not to smoke –But he also has a second order volition or an attitude towards which of these wants he prefers or identifies with He has a SOV that his want to not smoke be his will Frankfurt says that you are free when your SOV is satisfied –i.e., when the FOD you second-order wanted to be your will becomes your will

87. FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM

88. LECTURE ON AYER AND FRANKFURT THE END