1. FEBRUARY – MARCH, 1945

4.  IWO JIMA :  LOCATION: 750 mi. SOUTH OF TOKYO  CONSIDERED ONE OF JAPAN’S “HOME ISLANDS” (define)  USED BY JAPANESE AS PART OF “INNER” DEFENSE LINE (unlike Tarawa, Guadalcanal, etc.)  OCCUPIED & FORITFIED BY JAPANESE MILITARY SINCE 1930’s  AFTER THE BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA(1944) :  JAPAN REALIZES IWO JIMA GARRISON MUST BE STRENGTHENED  BECAUSE…A U.S. ATTACK ON HOME ISLANDS IS IMMINENT (define)  SO…  MORE TROOPS SENT  MORE EQUIPMENT SENT  FORTIFICATIONS STRENGTHENED  RESULT?  IJA/IJA TROOP STRENGTH (February,’45) = 22,800 (approx.)  MASSIVE UNDERGROUND TUNNEL/BUNKER NETWORK  JAPANESE DEFENSES: MIXTURE OF…  HEAVY ARTILLERY  LIGHT WEAPONS  MORTARS  CONCEALED BUNKERS / “MURDER HOLES”

5.  LATE ‘44/EARLY ‘45:  U.S. MILITARY INCREASES AERIAL BOMBING CAMPAIGN ON HOME ISLANDS  U.S. NEEDS TO CONTROL IWO JIMA (& other islands – ex. OKINAWA)  WHY?  IWO HAS LARGE AIRFIELD COMPLEX  AIRSTRIPS WOULD PROVIDE…  BASE FOR U.S. BOMBERS TARGETING JAPAN  SHORTEN AERIAL DISTANCE TO JAPAN  PROVIDE EMERGENCY LANDING STRIPS FOR DAMAGED U.S. AIRCRAFT  BASE FOR LONG-RANGE FIGHTER ESCORTS  JAPANESE WERE USING ISLAND FOR AERIAL ATTACKS ON U.S. FLEET  ISLAND WOULD BE USED AS A NAVAL / AIR / SUPPLY BASE FOR INVASION OF JAPAN

11.  IJA / IJN FORCES: 23,000 (approx.)  IWO GARRISON HAS NO NAVAL SUPPORT  VERY LITTLE / IRRELEVANT AIR FORCE  U.S.  70,000 – MOSTLY USMC & USN LANDING FORCES  U.S. HAS COMPLETE AIR & NAVAL SUPERIORITY  JAPANESE STRATEGY:  HOLD FIRE UNTIL SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF U.S. FORCES HAVE LANDED  INFLICT AS MANY CASUALTIES AS POSSIBLE  NO RELIEF FROM MAINLAND EXPECTED  NO SURRENDER

24.  BATTLE LASTS OVER 1 MONTH:  FEBRUARY 19 - MARCH 26, 1945  FEW JAPANESE REMAIN AFTER MARCH 11 th  Mt. SURIBACHI – TAKEN ON FEB. 23-24 TH  MADE FAMOUS FOR “FLAG RAISING”  FIGHTING: BATTLE DOESN’T HAVE SOME OF THE CHARACTERISTICS TYPICAL OF PACIFIC FIGHTING  EX. – FEW, IF ANY, ORGANIZED BANZAI CHARGES BY JAPANESE  JAPANESE OFTEN USE SMALL UNIT NIGHT ATTACKS  SMALL ARMS (rifles, etc.) INEFFECTIVE AGAINST JAPANESE BUNKERS/TUNNELS  USMC USES FLAMETHROWERS, EXPLOSIVES, GRENADES, ETC. EXTENSIVELY  AIRSTRIP(s) ARE USED BEFORE BATTLE IS OVER (unlike Tarawa)  FEW PRISONERS (ON EITHER SIDE) TAKEN

44.  CASUALTIES:  IJA / IJN:  KIA/MIA:22, 500 (APPROX.)  POW: 216 (APPROX.)  USMC / USN:  KIA: 6,812  WIA: 19, 217  IWO AIRSTRIPS ARE NOW OPEN FOR AERIAL SUPPORT  AERIAL BOMBING CAMPAIGN vs. JAPAN IS ACCELERATED  IWO IS ALSO USED FOR SUPPLY BASE & EMERGENCY LANDINGS