1. The Many Dilemmas of Corruption: Building Trust, Guiding Reform Michael Johnston Colgate University Hamilton, New York mjohnston@colgate.edu 8 May 2013

2. Choosing targets, tracking reform Are we making progress, or doing harm? Are we making progress, or doing harm? Are we having any effect at all? Are we having any effect at all? What are the most critical targets? What are the most critical targets? Can we show citizens reform is real? Can we show citizens reform is real? All pose problems of measurement and assessment… All pose problems of measurement and assessment…

3. Behind the index numbers… What does “a high level of corruption” mean? What does “a high level of corruption” mean? The one-number problem The one-number problem Tracking change…? Tracking change…? Developing societies’ scores can suffer from corruption originating elsewhere Developing societies’ scores can suffer from corruption originating elsewhere Low-corruption societies: sustaining factors are not what got them there Low-corruption societies: sustaining factors are not what got them there One-dimensional indices treat corruption as the same thing everywhere… One-dimensional indices treat corruption as the same thing everywhere…

4. What indices do and don’t tell us…

5. Contrasting syndromes of corruption? Influence Markets strong institutions, mature markets and democracy Elite Cartels moderately strong institutions, gradually liberalizing markets and politics Oligarchs and Clans very weak institutions, rapidly liberalizing markets and politics Official Moguls very weak institutions, political power personalized, liberalizing markets

6. Influence markets…  Private interests buy influence within well-institutionalized public agencies; parties and politicians often are intermediaries trading in access  Examples: USA, Japan, Germany…

7. Elite Cartels…  Networks of elites in collusion, staving off rising political, economic competition  Examples: Italy, Botswana, Korea…

8. Oligarchs and Clans…  In a setting of insecurity and weak institutions, oligarchs and followers feed on both the public and private sectors, using violence to protect their gains  Examples: Russia, The Philippines, and (recently) Mexico

9. Official Moguls… Top figures, their power both personal and official, engage in corruption with impunity, channel benefits to selves and favorites Top figures, their power both personal and official, engage in corruption with impunity, channel benefits to selves and favorites Examples: China, Indonesia, Kenya… Examples: China, Indonesia, Kenya…

10. The evolving agenda of reform… Official moguls: increase pluralism, open up safe political, economic space Official moguls: increase pluralism, open up safe political, economic space Oligarchs and clans: open up safe space, supporting reform activism Oligarchs and clans: open up safe space, supporting reform activism Elite cartels: supporting reform activism, open up safe space Elite cartels: supporting reform activism, open up safe space Influence markets: maintaining accountability, supporting reform activism Influence markets: maintaining accountability, supporting reform activism

11. Ends versus means: Collective action problems are serious Collective action problems are serious Instead of devising grand strategies and seeking citizen support Instead of devising grand strategies and seeking citizen support Implement reforms helping citizens defend themselves by political means Implement reforms helping citizens defend themselves by political means Close the loop: show citizens that reforms build fairness, better quality of life Close the loop: show citizens that reforms build fairness, better quality of life

12. Indicators and benchmarks… How effectively does government perform basic tasks? How effectively does government perform basic tasks? Build public support, allow effective leaders to take credit Build public support, allow effective leaders to take credit Are easily understood, inexpensive to gather, and can be “actionable” Are easily understood, inexpensive to gather, and can be “actionable” Are institution-building in their own right Are institution-building in their own right Can squeeze out the scope for corruption Can squeeze out the scope for corruption But open to opposition, misuse… But open to opposition, misuse…

13. Broader issues to track: Expectations and trust Expectations and trust  Capital flight, levels of conflict/confidence Depth and breadth of economic development Depth and breadth of economic development Depth and breadth of citizen participation Depth and breadth of citizen participation Efficiency, credibility of anti-corruption agencies Efficiency, credibility of anti-corruption agencies Citizen “report cards” on government Citizen “report cards” on government  Civil society evaluates services, works with leaders, sees results  “Crowdsourcing” for data

14. Make haste slowly… First, do no harm; then, build trust First, do no harm; then, build trust Fight corruption indirectly, over long term Fight corruption indirectly, over long term Build institutions as a foundation for liberalization; build trust through services Build institutions as a foundation for liberalization; build trust through services Consider kinds of corruption – not just more/less Consider kinds of corruption – not just more/less Know what not to do Know what not to do Halfway measures can be valuable Halfway measures can be valuable Reform systems, not just cases, offenders Reform systems, not just cases, offenders