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February 11, 2003John Roberts1 Stanford GSB Sloan Program Strategic Management 11: Demand-Side Increasing Returns Sony Corporation.

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Presentation on theme: "February 11, 2003John Roberts1 Stanford GSB Sloan Program Strategic Management 11: Demand-Side Increasing Returns Sony Corporation."— Presentation transcript:

1 February 11, 2003John Roberts1 Stanford GSB Sloan Program Strategic Management 11: Demand-Side Increasing Returns Sony Corporation

2 February 11, 2003John Roberts2 DSIR-- the positive spin: –The benefits to any user (consumer or firm) from a product depend on the number of others using“related” technologies/products. DSIR-- the negative spin: –The pressure on any user (consumer or firm) to use a product depends on the number of others using“related” technologies/products.

3 February 11, 2003John Roberts3 Two drivers of DSIR: –Network effects: the value of the item to a user depends positively on the number of other users (first-order network effects) –Compatible complement effects: the user (implicitly) values compatibility of the item with complements, the value or supply of which depends on the number of users (second order network effects).

4 February 11, 2003John Roberts4 Strategic challenge/opportunity in markets with network externalities: –Expectations are crucial: adoption depends on how many others are expected to adopt the (compatible) item.  This chicken and egg/coordination problem means that many such items never get adopted.  However, it also means that, once adopted, there tends to be strong ‘lock-in’. - Key importance of switching costs

5 February 11, 2003John Roberts5 Controversy: do DSIR mean that mediocre technologies win? –Mixed evidence QWERTY VHS DOS/Windows –Item’s quality must remain high enough to overcome costs of adopting rival item –Disproportionate success due to tipping

6 February 11, 2003John Roberts6 Factors swaying adoption Reputations Number of existing platforms Cost of adoption (e.g., software) Influential buyers (e.g., Safeway with UPCs) ‘Open’ Standards –Trade-off with monopoly position Availability of complements

7 February 11, 2003John Roberts7 Strategic Tools in Markets with DSIR Provide or subsidize complements to ensure availability (ownership?) Exaggerated Claims Advance sign-ups Give-aways and bargain prices –Product to get buyers –Technology to get suppliers and set standard Upgrade pricing “Winks” at pirates

8 February 11, 2003John Roberts8 Leveraging positional advantage –A firm that controls the prior standard may be able to steer technological change in a preferred direction. –Examples from Microsoft: Using its dominance with MS-DOS to gain acceptance for Windows and the consequent takeover of the applications layer. Various strategies to make web-users use IE and make the latter dependent on the Windows OS (e.g., deal with OEMs, deals with ISPs, melding IE with the OS)


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