1. Global Regimes and U.S-Latin American Relations: Rethinking the Post-Cold War Era

2. THE PROBLEM How to conceptualize the connection between the global arena and U.S.-Latin American relations in the wake of the Cold War? And then 9/11? Widespread view: little if any connection My contention: the connection exists but is complex and contradictory

3. READINGS Smith, Talons, chs. 9-11 DFC, Contemporary, chs. 1, 3

4. GUEST SPEAKERS Apr 23Adela Navarro (drugs in Mexico) May 07Jeffrey Davidow (impacts of 9/11) May 14David Shirk (drug violence) May 21Tom Wong & Kathy Kopineck (migration) May 28Charles Shapiro (Venezuela)

5. After the Cold War: The Global Arena 1. Collapse of the Soviet Union 2. U.S. military primacy: the “unipolar moment” 3. “The End of History”? 4. Transnationalization and non-state actors 5. Process of “globalization” 6. Shift from geo-politics to “geo-economics” 7. Economic multipolarity: Europe, Japan, others?

6. ON “GLOBALIZATION” Factors: – End of Cold War=reduction of political barriers – Communication technologies – Transnational enterprises: production chains and consumer markets – Movement of people and goods, legal and illegal Features: – Inexorability, inevitability – Politics the result of economics – Inclusion vs. exclusion? – Claim: no ideology

7. GEO-ECONOMICS: RULES OF THE GAME 1. Presumably “peaceful” competition 2. Positive-sum, not zero- or negative-sum 3. Goal: increase or guarantee share of economic benefits—without destroying (or even defeating) rivals 4. Strategy: Maintenance of global “stability” 5. Tactic: formation of “open” blocs

8. RULES OF THE GAME (cont.) Competitive arenas:  Consumer markets, natural resources (energy, water, etc.)  Technology  Financial markets State roles:  Direct participation  Shaping of incentives  Legitimacy on basis of “market discourse” Regional integration:  Strong seek to perpetuate primacy  Weak seek to avoid exclusion  Thus asymmetrical bargaining

9. North American Free Trade (NAFTA/1994) U.S. Perspectives:  Supplement to FTA with Canada  Support for neoliberal reforms in Mexico  Growing Mexican-American population within U.S. Incentives for Mexico:  Exhaustion of alternatives  Need to stimulate growth  Perpetuation of Salinista policies Key Characteristics:  Uneven levels of development  Cultural and political variation  Hub-and-spoke arrangements (with U.S. at center)  Absence of supranational authority (preservation of sovereignty)

10. Assessing Results: The Problem of Cause-and-Effect NAFTA in comparison with: Initial expectations (and political rhetoric) Liberalization (mid-1980s) Global and/or U.S. economic conditions Long-term economic and social trends Short-term shocks (e.g., Mexican peso crisis of 1994-95)

11. POLITICAL DIMENSIONS The Public Assertion: Free Trade = Democracy The Silent Bargain: International Dimensions Political stability and social peace Access to petroleum Leverage vis-à-vis economic rivals Compliance on foreign policy

13. The Procession of Free Trade 1. NAFTA (1994) 2. FTAA process (R.I.P.) 3. Bilaterals and minilaterals: U.S.-Chile (2004) U.S.-Central America + D.R. (2005) U.S.-Peru (2007) U.S.-Colombia (2011) U.S.-Panama (2011)

14. George W. Bush and the Global War on Terror

15. PHASE 1: BEFORE 9/11  High level of presidential interest  Relationship with Mexico  (and Vicente Fox)  Near-agreement on immigration reform (?)  Support for FTAA  Administrative team  Isolation of Cuba PHASE 2: AFTER 9/11  Change in regional priorities  Unilateralist impulses  End of wholesale immigration reform

16. GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR: THE RULES OF THE GAME 1. Nations can respond however they choose—including the use of indiscriminate force. 2. Preventive action is appropriate and acceptable. 3. There is no need to adhere to international treaties or conventions. 4. Alliances are formed around one central issue—the anti-terror campaign under U.S. leadership. Support is black-white. Democracy and human rights are secondary issues. 5. Spectator nations must tread cautiously.

18. U.S. LOSS OF “SOFT POWER”

19. U.S. PRESTIGE IN LATIN AMERICA

20. CHANGING VIEWS OF U.S. Distaste for Abu Ghraib, Haditha, “collateral damage” and loss of life Solidarity with innocent civilians, hidden admiration for Osama bin Laden Rejection of American society, not just U.S. foreign policy Resentment of unilateral approach Distrust of democratic crusade

21. TWO-LEVEL GAMES Geo-economic game + new geopolitical game, superimposed and simultaneous Geopolitics > geo-economics if necessary  Low priority for region  Benefits of inattention (benign neglect?) Examples:  FTAs on basis of geopolitics  Reluctance on immigration reform  Allies in wars on drugs Contradictions and trade-offs

22. …AND BARACK OBAMA? Redefinition of war against terror  Afghanistan > Iraq  Al Qaeda ≠ Taliban  Rules of game more subtly applied Re Latin America, changes in rhetoric and emphasis rather than substance  Immigration  Drugs and drug trafficking  FTAs  Lingering effects