1. The Rise of Détente and ‘Triangular Diplomacy’, 1963-72 Young & Kent: International Relations since 1945

2. 1963: in the wake of Cuba Signs of Détente? –Kennedy’s American University speech –‘Hot line’ agreement –Partial Test Ban Treaty Cold War goes on –Berlin tension –Multilateral Nuclear Force

3. Pressures for Détente in Europe Mutual fear of war Western Europe –fragmentation: de Gaulle –Harmel Report –Brandt and Ostpolitik Eastern bloc –fragmentation: China, Romania –desire for trade/technology –fall of Khrushchev

4. Nuclear Balance Dawn of ‘Mutual Assured Destruction’ ‘Triad’ of weapons: –Aircraft –Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) –Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) Threats to the balance: –Anti-Ballistic Missile –Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle

5. Détente Delayed, 1964-68 Limited East-West agreement –Glassboro’ mini-summit –Non-Proliferation Treaty –Proposed Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Barriers to progress –Vietnam –Czechoslovakia: ‘Prague Spring’ –No Johnson-Brezhnev summit

6. Nixon’s Approach Inaugural speech: ‘an era of negotiations’ End Vietnam war: Nixon Doctrine But détente only on conditions: –Concrete agreements not just a change in atmosphere –Soviets to show restraint –‘Linkage’

7. ‘Linkage’ in practice US view: if Soviets want strategic arms talks and trade, they must not exploit conflicts in the Third World Series of crises in 1970-71: –Chile: election of Allende –Cienfuegos –Jordanian civil war –Indo-Pakistan War

8. ‘Triangular Diplomacy’ Sino-Soviet ‘split’ Chinese fear USSR more than US –Border clashes of 1969 Nixon ready for ‘opening’ to China –Trade barriers relaxed –‘Ping-Pong diplomacy’ –China enters UN US plays off China and USSR

9. 1972: two summits Beijing Summit, February 1972 –Nixon and Mao –Shanghai Communique Moscow Summit, May 1972 –Nixon and Brezhnev –went ahead despite crisis in Vietnam –several agreements: trade, space, etc. –‘Basic Principles’

10. SALT I: highpoint of Moscow Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty –Two ABM ‘fields’ and 200 missiles each ‘Interim Agreement on Offensive Missiles’ –ICBMs: 1054 US, 1618 Soviet –SLBMs: 656 US, 740 Soviet –Bombers: 455 US, 140 Soviet –To last five years: SALT II to follow

11. Moscow: success or failure? The successes: –Well-choreographed –Numerous agreements –SALT a significant nuclear arms deal The limits: –Soviets never accepted ‘linkage’ –Unclear what ‘basic principles’ meant –SALT failed to control MIRVs –‘unequal ceilings’ in SALT