1. SecPAL Presented by Daniel Pechulis CS5204 – Operating Systems1

2. SecPAL CS5204 – Operating Systems Overview What and why SecPAL Specifics Logic Examples Implementation Example 2

3. SecPAL CS5204 – Operating Systems Introduction SecPAL – Security Policy Assertion Language Designed by Microsoft Research Declarative authorization language Designed for distributed systems Simplicity, expressiveness, and efficiency 3

4. SecPAL CS5204 – Operating Systems Distributed Systems 4

5. SecPAL CS5204 – Operating Systems Distributed Systems Frequent ad hoc collaborations  No centralized entity to grant authorization No pre-established trust  No certificates or guarantees Separated authorization policies  Different rules, different needs 5

6. SecPAL CS5204 – Operating Systems Existing Solutions XrML – eXtensible Rights Markup Language XACML – eXtensible Access Control Markup Language SPKI/SDCI – Simple Public Key Infrastructure / Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure Not widely adopted, possibly due to poor usability 6

7. SecPAL CS5204 – Operating Systems Design Considerations Expressiveness  Delegation of authority – essential in distributed system  Domain specific constraints – promote flexibility  Negation – useful, but must be controlled Clear, readable syntax  XML – too verbose, poor usability  Logic – difficult to follow 7

8. SecPAL CS5204 – Operating Systems Design Considerations Succinct, unambiguous semantics  Existing solutions do not always terminate or decide  SecPAL – 3 deduction rules for assertions  Managed negation Effective decision procedures  Proven decidable and tractable in polynomial time through translation to constrained Datalog Extensibility  Can be extended without breaking current functionality 8

9. SecPAL CS5204 – Operating Systems Language Details Assertions  Basic format: ‘ A says fact if fact 1,…,fact n, c ’ A is the issuer fact 1,…,fact n are the conditional facts c is the constraint  Digitally signed by a Security Token Server and sent as tokens Constraints  Can be applied to variables, constants, or built-in functions  Domain includes equality, numerical inequalities, path constraints, and regular expressions 9

10. SecPAL CS5204 – Operating Systems Language Details (con’t) Semantics  3 basic rules cond – ‘say’ keyword can say – denotes delegation, ceding control to another entity for the decision can act as – asserts that all rules applying to one entity also apply to another 10

11. SecPAL CS5204 – Operating Systems Grid Example Simple grid system  Interaction between administrative domains with individual policies  Attribute based authorization and delegation Scenario: User Alice wants to perform data mining on cluster  Cluster must fetch file from file server  No trust relationship between Alice and Cluster, or Cluster and File Server 11

12. SecPAL CS5204 – Operating Systems Grid Example (Step 1) Alice requests execution of command: dbgrep /project/data  ‘STS says Alice is a researcher ’ STS is a trusted security server Identity token issued to validate Alice’s identity  ‘FileServer says Alice can read /project’ FileServer asserts Alice the right to read specified folder  ‘Alice says Cluster can read /project/data if currentTime() <= 07/09/2006’ Alice delegates to Cluster the right to read the file until the specified date 12

13. SecPAL CS5204 – Operating Systems Grid Example (Step 2) Cluster must authenticate and validate the incoming request Suppose the following local Cluster assertions  ‘Cluster says STS can say 0 x is a researcher ’ Cluster defers to STS to determine who is a researcher STS identified Alice as a researcher earlier step  ‘Cluster says x can execute dbgrep if x is a researcher ’ Cluster grants the right to execute dbgrep if requester is a certified researcher 13

14. SecPAL CS5204 – Operating Systems Grid Example (Step 3) FileServer verifies action and proceeds Suppose the following local FileServer assertion  ‘FileServer says x can say ∞ y can read file if x can read dir, file contains dir, markedConfidential( file ) ≠ Yes’ x = Alice, y = Cluster say ∞ allows for re-delegation, say 0 does not 14

15. SecPAL CS5204 – Operating Systems Grid Example (Step 4) Cluster would now send the task to its computation nodes for execution  Each Node could receive a delegation assertion from Cluster (remember say ∞ )  Or, ‘FileServer says Node can act as Cluster’ ‘can act as’ gives every Cluster right to Node 15

16. SecPAL CS5204 – Operating Systems GridFTP.NET Multiple access types  Attribute based  Role based  “Role-deny” based  Impersonation based  Delegation based  Capability based Entities  Data owner  Resource provider  Virtual Organization (VO)  Data requester 16

17. SecPAL CS5204 – Operating Systems GridFTP.NET Implementation 17

18. SecPAL CS5204 – Operating Systems GridFTP.NET Results Successfully implemented most requirements  All use cases satisfied  Some requirements require further study Minimal performance hit (vs gridmap)  10M file – 4.2%  100M file – 1.0% 18

19. SecPAL CS5204 – Operating Systems19 Questions?

20. SecPAL CS5204 – Operating Systems References M. Becker, C. Fournet, A. Gordon, “SecPAL: Design and Semantics of a Decentralized Authorization Language,” Cambridge, UK, 2006. Microsoft Research. B. Dillaway, “A Unified Approach to Trust, Delegation, and Authorization in Large- Scale Grids,” Redmond, WA, 2006. Microsoft Corporation. M. Humphery, S. Park, J. Feng, N. Beekwilder, G. Wasson, J. Hogg, B. LaMacchia, B. Dillaway, “Fine-Grained Access Control for GridFTP using SecPAL,” 8th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Grid Computing (Grid 2007), Austin, TX, Sept 19-21, 2007. 20