1. Against E-Voting Ryan Egan, Amber Jones, Alyssa Sankin, Page Stephens, Amber Straight, Philip Sugg, and Diana Troisi Direct recording electronic (DRE) voting terminals as currently used are NOT better than current hand ballot alternatives

2. DEFINITION "A direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machine records votes by means of a ballot display provided with mechanical or electro- optical components that can be activated by the voter; that processes data by means of a computer program; and that records voting data and ballot images in memory components. It produces a tabulation of the voting data stored in a removable memory component and as printed copy. The system may also provide a means for transmitting individual ballots or vote totals to a central location for consolidating and reporting results from precincts at the central location." "A direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machine records votes by means of a ballot display provided with mechanical or electro- optical components that can be activated by the voter; that processes data by means of a computer program; and that records voting data and ballot images in memory components. It produces a tabulation of the voting data stored in a removable memory component and as printed copy. The system may also provide a means for transmitting individual ballots or vote totals to a central location for consolidating and reporting results from precincts at the central location." (www.wikipedia.org) (www.wikipedia.org)www.wikipedia.org

3. Security Issues General Problems Include: General Problems Include: Unauthorized privilege escalationUnauthorized privilege escalation Incorrect use of cryptographyIncorrect use of cryptography Vulnerabilities to network threatsVulnerabilities to network threats Poor software development processesPoor software development processes (continued on next slide)

4. Specific Problems Found From Diebold Analysis Include: Specific Problems Found From Diebold Analysis Include: Lack of Smartcard CryptographyLack of Smartcard Cryptography Problems With CodeProblems With Code Protected Counter is Stored in “Simple, Mutable File”Protected Counter is Stored in “Simple, Mutable File”

5. Verifiability and Financing Problems Examining Bugs Problems Examining Bugs Technical Problems With E-voting Machines Technical Problems With E-voting Machines Voter Discouraging Voter Discouraging Cost of E-Voting Cost of E-Voting

6. Usability Electronic Voting Machines Lose Ballots Electronic Voting Machines Lose Ballots Electronic Election Equipment Inexplicably Adds Ballots Electronic Election Equipment Inexplicably Adds Ballots Votes Jump to the Opponent on the Screen Votes Jump to the Opponent on the Screen DREs Break Down During the Election DREs Break Down During the Election Increased Problems from Human Error in Electronic Elections Increased Problems from Human Error in Electronic Elections (continued on next slide)

7. Increased Problems from Human Error in Electronic Elections Increased Problems from Human Error in Electronic Elections Electrical Outages and Inadequate Battery Charges Electrical Outages and Inadequate Battery Charges Power Surges or Static Electricity Discharges Power Surges or Static Electricity Discharges Fortune's Worst Technology of 2003: Paperless Voting Fortune's Worst Technology of 2003: Paperless Voting

8. Vendor Reliability Election Directors Rely on Vendor Technicians During Elections Election Directors Rely on Vendor Technicians During Elections Vendor technicians even reprogram ballots directly from the county's equipment. Vendor technicians even reprogram ballots directly from the county's equipment. Vendor technicians test and prepare the equipment for the elections. Vendor technicians test and prepare the equipment for the elections. (continued on next slide)

9. Vendor technicians provide technical supervision during an election. Vendor technicians provide technical supervision during an election. Vendors release election results to the media. Vendors release election results to the media. Vendor technicians retrieve data from memory cards. Vendor technicians retrieve data from memory cards. Vendor technicians investigate when election equipment breaks down. Vendor technicians investigate when election equipment breaks down.

10. 5 Myths and Realities About DRE Systems Myth #1: The DRE systems are simple to use. Myth #1: The DRE systems are simple to use. Reality: Separate instructions mailed to voters are filled with technical jargon and contradictory instructions. Reality: Separate instructions mailed to voters are filled with technical jargon and contradictory instructions. Touch-screens are susceptible to misalignment or poor sensitivityTouch-screens are susceptible to misalignment or poor sensitivity

11. Myth #2: The DRE systems offer a fully transparent, fair ballot. Myth #2: The DRE systems offer a fully transparent, fair ballot. Reality: Studies done in multiple states have revealed irregularities, inconsistencies, and blatant biases that undermine the transparency of the ballot. Reality: Studies done in multiple states have revealed irregularities, inconsistencies, and blatant biases that undermine the transparency of the ballot.

12. Myth #3: The DRE system is the only efficient way to provide for handicapped users. Myth #3: The DRE system is the only efficient way to provide for handicapped users. Reality: DRE concessions for the handicapped often do not effectively address the multitude of problems. Wheelchairs didn’t even fit between the legs of certain DRE voting booths. Audio interfaces are of poor quality, lengthy, unclear, and often do not address the problems of the blind (“push the yellow button”). Reality: DRE concessions for the handicapped often do not effectively address the multitude of problems. Wheelchairs didn’t even fit between the legs of certain DRE voting booths. Audio interfaces are of poor quality, lengthy, unclear, and often do not address the problems of the blind (“push the yellow button”).

13. Myth #4: DREs are cheaper Myth #4: DREs are cheaper Reality: From software and hardware creation to testing to maintenance to waste disposal (batteries, screens), the costs can be two to three times higher than other current voting options Reality: From software and hardware creation to testing to maintenance to waste disposal (batteries, screens), the costs can be two to three times higher than other current voting options

14. Myth #5: The DRE systems are easy to maintain on-site. Myth #5: The DRE systems are easy to maintain on-site. Reality: Because election officials know practically nothing of the new software (trade secrets, private development of software), vendor representatives and hardware/software specialists must ensure the voting technology works at precincts. Trained specialists are hard to find in certain areas, and it costs a lot of money to hire enough specialists for every precinct. Reality: Because election officials know practically nothing of the new software (trade secrets, private development of software), vendor representatives and hardware/software specialists must ensure the voting technology works at precincts. Trained specialists are hard to find in certain areas, and it costs a lot of money to hire enough specialists for every precinct. Unlike their traditional counterparts, e-voting systems also require substantial testing in the days and weeks before the election to ensure that they are working properly. Each additional level of training, support, and testing adds a new financial burden to the state government administering the election—all this for a system that’s supposed to be simpler.Unlike their traditional counterparts, e-voting systems also require substantial testing in the days and weeks before the election to ensure that they are working properly. Each additional level of training, support, and testing adds a new financial burden to the state government administering the election—all this for a system that’s supposed to be simpler.

15. CONCLUSION Due to issues of security, verifiability, financing, usability, and reliability, DRE systems are a deficient method of acquiring voting results.

16. Important Links http://www.cs.umd.edu/~bederson/voting / http://www.cs.umd.edu/~bederson/voting / http://www.cs.umd.edu/~bederson/voting / http://www.cs.umd.edu/~bederson/voting / http://www.wqusability.com/articles/votin g-background2000.html http://www.wqusability.com/articles/votin g-background2000.html http://www.wqusability.com/articles/votin g-background2000.html http://www.wqusability.com/articles/votin g-background2000.html http://www.j- dom.org/h/n/WRITING/evoting/ALL/50// http://www.j- dom.org/h/n/WRITING/evoting/ALL/50// http://www.j- dom.org/h/n/WRITING/evoting/ALL/50// http://www.j- dom.org/h/n/WRITING/evoting/ALL/50// http://avirubin.com/vote/ http://avirubin.com/vote/ http://avirubin.com/vote/ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EVoting http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EVoting http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EVoting http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2 004/11/the_problem_wit.html http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2 004/11/the_problem_wit.html http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2 004/11/the_problem_wit.html http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2 004/11/the_problem_wit.html http://www.votersunite.org/MB2.pdf http://www.votersunite.org/MB2.pdf http://www.votersunite.org/MB2.pdf