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Director, Safety & Technical, ACI World

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1 Director, Safety & Technical, ACI World
David Gamper Director, Safety & Technical, ACI World Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems and other airfield and airspace technology issues

2 CONTENT I was asked to speak firstly on RPAS and drones.
Secondly, I want to address some other technology issues, for example: PBN and new flexible aircraft arrival/departure routes Runway Incursion prevention systems Runway excursion prevention Arresting systems Runway Friction –Operational measurement and reporting on contaminated surfaces

3 Understanding RPAS Size (very small to very large) Range Capability
Control “good” and “bad” Remotely piloted aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles or drones come in many shapes and sizes. At one end of the spectrum, there are the military aircraft, with weapon carrying capability, in use by the military for several decades. These are highly controlled and regulated, and have secured communications links The second category are the mid-size – from around 25kg to 150kg, used for commercial purposes. Then the smaller recreational aircraft, cheap to buy and operate and widely available. These have a short range (2km), are generally classified as under 25kg and can often be operated from smart phones or portable devices.

4 ICAO RPAS Symposium was held in Montreal in March 2015
ICAO and RPAS ICAO RPAS Symposium was held in Montreal in March 2015 ICAO RPAS Study Group (now Panel) has produced RPAS Manual (Doc 10019), covering integration of RPAS into unsegregated airspace, and heavier RPAS that need a runway If RPAS operate from aerodromes, the RPAS Manual (chapter 15 -Use of Aerodromes) says that States need to evaluate the applicability of Annex 14 specifications to RPAS operations. ACI and IATA expressed concern about small lightweight RPAS/drones such as “quadcopters” flown too close to aircraft landing or taking off from airports - ACI, IATA and IFALPA will issue a Safety Alert Symposium was held in Montreal in March 2015 Main purpose was to discuss integration of RPAS into unsegregated airspace, and heavier RPAS that need an airport runway Former ICAO Study Group (now RPAS Panel) produced a Manual (Doc 10019) on RPAS Trying to resolve issues with Command and Control, and Detect and Avoid If RPAS operate from aerodromes, this Manual (chapter 15 -Use of Aerodromes) says that States need to evaluate the applicability of Annex 14 specifications to RPAS operations. ACI and IATA expressed concern at HLSC : small lightweight RPAS such as quadcopters flown too close to aircraft landing or taking off from airports.

5 RPAS Benefits No pilot on board Can enter dangerous environments Can stay in the air for long periods Can operate in zero visibility Low cost Small UAVS require no licensing, training or certification AIRPORTS: Host of potential uses – including for inspection of the airfield, perimeter fence and approach lighting Already in use for a couple of years at certain airports Requires segregation The very nature of unmanned aircraft means that they bring a whole host of opportunities. They are ideally suited to long periods of repetitive flight, can enter areas that are unsafe for manned aircraft and require much smaller investment than other aircraft. Just some examples of the opportunities that unmanned aircraft bring include - Inspection, Surveying, Security Surveillance, Maintenance Border patrol, law enforcement, providing supplies and aid Delivery of goods, Management of crops, Firefighting, Search and rescue, Photography or video Some of these are applicable to airports So remotely piloted or unmanned aircraft can be a great opportunity.

6 RPAS - Safety and Security Risks
Interference with aircraft (accidental or deliberate) Surveillance of sensitive / restricted areas Strike on ground target However, with their increasing use and availability, there is a corresponding increase in reports of drones operating dangerously close to airports and aircraft. Looking at it from an aviation security perspective, we have to think about what might be considered an act of unlawful interference, or an act of terrorism. Small recreational drones flying in the vicinity of an airfield, and interfering with airport operations, are of significant concern, but more from a safety perspective than a security one. There are numerous examples of airports temporarily suspending services, and aircraft reporting near misses, and it is certainly something we are working on, alongside IFALPA and IATA. However, these incidents are unlikely to be with intent to harm civil aviation, so are dealt with as a safety issue. There is the slight possibility that a small drone might be deliberately flown into a commercial airliner, but this would be unlikely to cause the significant damage that would achieve the aims of a terrorist attack. We might then consider the possibility of a ground strike. Again, with a small recreational drone, it is unlikely that the payload would be sufficient to do major damage, although there has been some discussion of weapons mounted on smaller aircraft. There is a risk from surveillance of security sensitive areas – but this likely falls into the category of national security. Surveillance of airport facilities is unlikely to yield any information that is not already publicly available. At the other end of the spectrum, the large, military drones are highly regulated, can be detected on radar and their controls are secured, so these are discounted in terms of threats to civil aviation. Looking at the mid-size unmanned aircraft, of the type that are used for commercial purposes such as crop spraying, search and rescue or firefighting, there may be more of a significant concern. Businesses are pushing very hard for Governments to determine appropriate regulation and licensing for this type of aircraft, and the availability of machines is outpacing the regulation. It is possible that a mid-sized drone could do significant damage to an aircraft, or, more likely, to a crowded place on the ground.

7 RPAS - Other Safety and Security issues
Cyber security, jamming or spoofing Pilot interference Cross-border flying Anonymity Availability There are a number of issues. Most commercial drones operate using unsecured communication links. This makes them vulnerable to cyber attack, through jamming of their signal, or spoofing the signal to redirect the drone to another location. Even if a drone is licensed, and the pilot trained, there is no reinforced cockpit door preventing interference with a base station, which may leave the controller vulnerable to interference. Licensing and controls may not be consistent across borders; with drones able to fly long range, states may not be able to control drones entering their airspace The very nature of unmanned aircraft means that there is little deterrent to attack An finally availability. Pretty much anything can be purchased on the internet and on the black market. Commercial drones are not yet legally allowed in the United States but there have already been may instances of their use. It will be difficult to license and control the market, and track the ownership of drones in all states.

8 RPAS - Summary Challenges Benefits Licensing Detection / prosecution
Consistency of regulation Benefits Commercial Humanitarian Security So some of the challenges will be how to mitigate safety and security threats. We already see regulation in Australia, Canada, France, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States and of course EASA. Because the market is developing so fast, there are inconsistencies in the regulations, for example for airspace access, for pilot certification, for airworthiness certification and for operating restrictions. For recreational drones we also see some common sense rules – no flying above 500 feet, or within 5 miles of an airfield. Enforcement is clearly a challenge. The issue of detection and prosecution will also remain a challenge – and we will have to see how questions of jurisdiction and prosecution are dealt with. So in conclusion – there are some significant concerns, but also some major benefits to be gained. We could see airports actually making use of drones for operational safety, maintenance and perimeter protection. IF we can harmonise effective and enforceable regulation and ensure that the use of drones is controlled, the benefits may well outweigh the challenges.

9 New Technologies & Technical Solutions
Performance Based Navigation (PBN) Runway End Safety Areas (RESA) Engineered Materials Arresting System (EMAS) Airfield Surveillance Aircraft situational awareness and moving maps

10 Performance Based Navigation and Airport Operators
BENEFITS Environment Reduced emissions Capacity Reduced delays Safety Especially for runway ends not served by precision navigation aids 10

11 PBN Issues Noise exposure Permission to grow
Land use planning around airports can create new problems New approach and departure routes need to be planned with the airport operator and surrounding communities 11

12 Reducing Community Noise Exposure and Helping Airports to help their Communities
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13 Early and Frequent Community Dialogue is Key
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14 Impediments to Performance Based Navigation
Aircraft equipage: many older aircraft not equipped for PBN Lack of PBN procedures at airports PBN capable aircraft may have to fit in with non-PBN capable aircraft on same flight tracks Pilot demand for radar vectoring for quickest arrival time Congested airspace makes aircraft arrival time management difficult 14

15 Overcoming the impediments
Increase capacity with new approach and departure routes Reorganize traffic/ Creative Vision Overlay PBN and non-PBN procedures 15

16 PBN at the International Level
ICAO leadership role Publication of standards and framework documents Creative vision Industry collaboration 16

17 Global Runway Safety Action Items
Airport Certification and Inspection Airport Safety Management Systems Runway Safety Teams Rescue and Fire Fighting ICAO-compliant lighting, markings and signs Focus areas: Runway Excursions Runway Incursions Bird Strikes FOD

18 Autonomous Runway Incursion Warning System
Developed in the USA under the name RWSL (Runway Status Lights) Currently used in two other states – Japan and France Comprises Runway Entrance Lights and Takeoff and Hold Lights ACI views as system for airports with particular runway incursion problems Most likely not needed at airports with A-SMGCS and Stop Bars

19 Runway Status Lights (USA)

20 Enhanced Taxiway Markings
Previous Markings Enhanced Markings

21 New Runway holding position markings
Markings to be doubled in width (with 10 year delay before becoming compulsory) Simple way to improve visibility Goes with the enhanced centreline markings already introduced

22 Runway Friction: Global Reporting Format
State Letter consultation period just closed Method of assessing contaminants = runway condition code Not just snow, ice and slush – also standing water over 3 mm deep Will require change to reporting system Training - for all users Probable introduction 2018

23 Other new airfield technologies
Automatic FOD detection (using laser and/or visual detection) – in use for some years at some large airports Arresting Systems (EMAS) - augments the RESA where needed – many installations, mostly in the USA, where 1000 feet (300 m) length of RSA is mandatory Bird detection by specialized radar (still in the research stage) Improved surface surveillance (radar and transponder)

24 Successful EMAS Capture
Yeager Airport (CRW), Charleston, WV, January 19, 2010

25 Wildlife Hazard Mitigation
Have a Wildlife Hazard Management Plan, based on an up to date species risk assessment Have appropriate control methods and procedures In future, avian radar may help locate and understand bird movements and even be used operationally Reducing Wildlife Strike Risk to Aircraft

26 Low Cost Surface Surveillance
Airport map display Video camera display

27 GPS Vehicle Transponders

28 Systems on board aircraft to combat incursions and excursions
Incursions - Moving map applications Wrong runway detection Excursions – “overrun protection”

29 Available Equipage – moving maps
Positional Awareness via Airport Moving Map (Airbus OANS in-service example) Runway Proximity ICAO Regional Runway Safety Seminar 29

30 Future Equipage Studies – moving maps
Airport Moving Map with Taxi Route, Traffic, Runway Status Indications and Traffic Conflict Alerting (Boeing concept example) ICAO Regional Runway Safety Seminar 30 30

31 ICAO Regional Runway Safety Seminar
Available Equipage (excursion prevention) – Honeywell SmartlandingTM SmartlandingTM is a software upgrade of the Honeywell E-GPWS: Monitoring A/C speed and position vs. runway threshold Providing visual/aural annunciations to enhance crew awareness of unstabilized approach Based on tuning defined by Honeywell (speed, glideslope) or set by airlines (long landing distance) SmartlandingTM main monitorings: « TOO FAST » alert, « TOO HIGH » alert, « UNSTABLE » alert, « LONG LANDING » alert. (Speak to slide). TSO approval granted in Boeing is incorporating elements of SmartLanding technology into their Stable Approach Monitor “SAM”. As considered as a “non interferent” function, FAA does not request: Demonstration of SmartlandingTM tuning relevance Specific training Specific SOP in line with exisiting operators ones TSO approval granted in 2009 ICAO Regional Runway Safety Seminar 31 31

32 PFD and HUD (if installed)
Available Equipage – Airbus ROPS ROPS is a low cost software upgrade of existing avionics computers: Continuous real time performance computation of predicted and remaining realistic operational landing distance Compare it/them in real time with runway end Trigger, only when necessary, clear alerts with simple SOP Guarantee and demonstrate both reliability and not excessive margins Ensure consistency with FAA TALPA rule and computation philosophy Avoid any additional tuning by airline In obvious complement of the necessary need to fly stable approach PFD and HUD (if installed) (Below 500 ft) Audio (Below 200 ft) Crew Actions ND line symbols (if AMM installed) ROW (WET) IF WET: RWY TOO SHORT (amber) None Go-Around if runway is wet / damp or more slippery WET (amber) DRY (magenta) (DRY) RWY TOO SHORT (red) "RWY TOO SHORT !" Go-Around WET (red) DRY (red) ROP MAX BRAKING MAX REVERSE “BRAKE… MAX BRAKING MAX BRAKING” "MAX REVERSE" "KEEP MAX REVERSE" MAX braking (Auto/Pilot) MAX REV (Pilots) Red STOP bar Red path HAND OFF TO AIRBUS (IF NEEDED) PRESENTER. (Speak to slide.) ICAO Regional Runway Safety Seminar 32


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