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Published byGerald Whitehead Modified over 9 years ago
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Equilibrium transitions in stochastic evolutionary games Dresden, ECCS’07 Jacek Miękisz Institute of Applied Mathematics University of Warsaw
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Population dynamics time A and B are two possible behaviors, fenotypes or strategies of each individual
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Matching of individuals everybody interacts with everybody random pairing of individuals space –structured populations
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Simple model of evolution Selection individuals interact in pairs – play games receive payoffs = # of offspring Fenotypes are inherited Offspring may mutate
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Main Goals Equilibrium selection in case of multiple Nash equilibria Dependence of the long-run behavior of population on --- its size --- mutation level
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Stochastic dynamics of finite unstructured populations n - # of individuals z t - # of individuals playing A at time t Ω = {0,…,n} - state space selection z t+1 > z t if „average payoff” of A > „average payoff” of B mutation each individual may mutate and switch to the other strategy with a probability ε
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Markov chain with n+1 states and a unique stationary state μ ε n
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Previous results Playing against the field, Kandori-Mailath-Rob 1993 (A,A) and (B,B) are Nash equilibria A is an efficient strategy B is a risk-dominant strategy A B A a b B c d a>c, d>b, a>d, a+b<c+d
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Random matching of players, Robson - Vega Redondo, 1996 p t # of crosspairings
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Our results, JM J. Theor. Biol, 2005 Theorem (random matching model)
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Spatial games with local interactions deterministic dynamics of the best-response rule i
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Stochastic dynamics a) perturbed best response with the probability 1-ε, a player chooses the best response with the probability ε a player makes a mistake b) log-linear rule or Boltzmann updating
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Example without A B is stochastically stable A is a dominated strategy with A C is ensemble stable at intermediate noise levels in log-linear dynamics
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ε α C B A B C A 0 0.1 1 B 0.1 2+α 1.1 C 1.1 1.1 2 where α > 0
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Open Problem Construct a spatial game with a unique stationary state μ ε Λ which has the following property
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Real Open Problem Construct a one-dimensional cellular automaton model with a unique stationary state μ ε Λ such that when you take the infinite lattice limit you get two measures.
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