1. Security of Ammunition Depots
SECURITY OF AMMUNITION DEPOTS - INTRODUCTION: (2 slides, 4 minute)
SLIDE 1 of 2: INTRODUCTION (1 min)
Effective and efficient security of conventional ammunition stockpiles is an essential element of any conventional ammunition stockpile management programme. This is because it reduces the risks of loss, theft, leakage and proliferation (collectively these are generally known as diversion).
The systematic control of ammunition stockpiles is in keeping with a philosophy of ‘due care’ and therefore States should take a proactive, rather than re-reactive, stance in ensuring that ammunition is accounted for and secured to the highest standards.
IATG 09:10 provides guidance for practical conventional ammunition stockpile management. It sets out sensible and practicable measures that will assist in preventing the theft, leakage and proliferation of conventional ammunition stockpiles.
The measures in IATG 09:10 are reasonable and achievable and will enhance any conventional ammunition stockpile management programme.
The term ‘security’ refers to the result of measures taken to prevent the theft of explosive ordnance, entry by unauthorised persons into explosive storage areas, and acts of malfeasance, such as sabotage.
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2. Why Security? Risk Assessment process
Physical security systems built in
Perimeter security
Access controlled at all times
Authorised personnel only
Trusted, security cleared staff
Accompany temporary staff
INTRODUCTION: (2 slides, 4 minute)
SLIDE 2 of 2: WHY SECURITY? (3 min)
Absolute security is theoretically impossible as no secured facility can ever be 100% impervious to a determined attack or to theft/diversion from within.
The aim of stockpile physical security should therefore be to deter theft and, if an attempt is made, to detect and thwart the effort.
There are a number of key elements to security which should be borne in mind:
Physical security systems should be derived from an effective risk assessment process
Physical security should be built into new storage facilities at the design stage
An effective perimeter security infrastructure needs to be in place
Control of access at all times
Restriction of access to authorised personnel only
Trusted and security cleared individuals only authorised to work at the site
Temporary personnel should be accompanied at all times
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3. Security Risk Assessment
Financial value of the contents in a facility
Active hazards and frequency
(eg leakages through espionage, theft or diversion)
Passive hazards and frequency
(eg floods, earthquakes, fires, etc)
Attractiveness indicators for active hazards
Vulnerability to espionage, theft or diversion
Vulnerability to sabotage or terrorist attack
SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT: (2 slides, 8 minute)
SLIDE 1 of 2: SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT (3 min)
A risk assessment should examine conventional ammunition stockpile security systems to determine:
The financial value of the facility and contents within it
Active hazards to conventional ammunition security and their frequency, (i.e. the probability of stockpile leakages through espionage, theft or diversion, or stockpile damage/destruction due to sabotage or other forms of attack).
Passive hazards and their frequency, (i.e. natural catastrophes such as floods, earthquakes, fires etc).
Attractiveness indicators for active hazards to conventional ammunition security, (based upon the content of a given facility and its susceptibility to direct or surreptitious attack).
Vulnerability to espionage, theft or diversion.
Vulnerability to sabotage or terrorist attack.
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4. Attractive to Criminal and Terrorist Organisations (ACTO)
ACTO Item
Potential Terrorist Use
MANPADS
- Attacks on civil aviation
Detonators
- Initiation of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) - Usually strictly controlled on civilian explosives market
Bulk Explosive
- Used as main charge for IEDs - More powerful than home-made or commercial explosives
Man-Portable Anti-Tank Missiles
- Attacks on VIP vehicles
Hand Grenades
- Concealable weapon that can be used in confined spaces
Small Arms Ammunition
- Close quarter assassinations
SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT: (2 slides, 8 minutes)
SLIDE 2 of 2: ATTRACTIVE TO CRIMINAL AND TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS (ACTO) (5 min)
This information, when used properly, will allow the responsible authority to establish management priorities in the most cost-effective and secure manner. Residual risk of loss, theft or diversion should then be kept to a minimum.
The risk assessment should also formally identify those ammunition items that may be classified as being Attractive to Criminals and Terrorist Organisations (ACTO). Although arguably all ammunition items may be of some use to criminals and terrorists, ACTO classified ammunition is usually that ammunition that would significantly increase terrorist capability.
The table on the screen lists those items that should be classified as ACTO, and that should be subject to more stringent security than other ammunition items.
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5. Security Plan SECURITY PLAN: (1 slide, 3 minutes)
SLIDE 1 of 1: SECURITY PLAN (3 min)
The security plan is the foundation to effective stockpile management.
A key element to drawing up a plan is to have established a set of security regulations and some Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).
The security plan is essentially based on these regulations and SOPs. These may well already be in place, or may be provided by the national technical authority.
Each stockpile location needs a written security plan.
Security plans can differ dependent on local requirements, local security organisation, and so on. That said, there should be common essential elements in each plan.
Security Plans should be tailored, appropriate and proportionate.
IATG, 09:10 (at Annex C) contains a model plan that can be adopted by stockpile management organisations.
The security plan should be updated regularly to reflect any factors that may change. It should be a flexible document easily adaptable to changing circumstances and requirements.
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6. Access Control Keys Combination Locks Entry into storage areas
ACCESS CONTROL: (4 slides, 5 minutes)
SLIDE 1 of 4: ACCESS CONTROL (1 min)
There is little point trying to protect stock with expensive security equipment, complex processes and fastidious use of personnel for patrols and guarding, if it is possible for even a child to get into an ammunition storage area and the storehouses within it.
Access control has to be a fundamental component in the security of a site.
In addition to the obvious requirement for a perimeter fence (a topic which is also covered, in depth, in IATG 09:10), the main elements of access control management are:
Management of keys
Management of combination lock codes
Management of actual entry into storage areas.
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7. Keys ACCESS CONTROL: (4 slides, 5 minutes) SLIDE 2 of 4: KEYS (2 min)
Keys to ammunition storage areas, buildings, containers and intruder detection systems (IDS) must be stored separately to other keys and are not to be left unsecured or unattended at any time.
These keys need to be accessible to only those individuals whose duties require them to have access to the conventional ammunition storage areas.
A roster of authorised personnel (custodians) should be kept by the authority responsible for ammunition security. This is so the security staff can check to confirm that someone who arrives and asks for some keys to an ESH is actually supposed to be taking the keys.
A record shall be kept each time an individual removes keys from the secure key cabinet. This is to permit faster identification of keys that have not been returned (for example through carelessness or neglect, and to maintain an 'audit trail' so that future reviews can be made of who had access to what buildings and at what times, on what days).
The number of keys shall be kept to an absolute minimum, to make management easier.
Master keys which allow access to more than one building should be prohibited as these pose a greater risk than the inappropriate use of a key to a single ESH.
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8. Combination Locks ACCESS CONTROL: (4 slides, 5 minutes)
SLIDE 3 of 4: COMBINATION LOCKS (1 min)
Combination locks are the ones that only open when the correct code number is entered, for example the mechanical combination padlocks available at airports for luggage, or the 'manifold' type dials that are often seen in the movies on bank safes.
The combinations to locks need to be dealt with in exactly the same manner as keys.
Combinations should be changed at regular intervals and when individuals change or move appointments. For example, every 6 months as routine, and when a member of staff leaves the department.
Records of combinations should be held in sealed envelopes by the security officer even if they are logged onto secure computer systems. This is so there is an accessible method of retrieving the code, particularly in the event of a power failure, or in case the security officer cannot be found. The seal of the envelope should be sufficient to prevent tampering, or at least to make it obvious that it has been tampered with. These envelopes should be checked to ensure their integrity has not been breached, for example on a daily basis.
Every combination lock guarded facility or container must have a record of access by individual, date and time prominently displayed on its door. This can be a simple as a table where anyone entering the building enters their name, signature and time in and time out.
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9. Entry into Storage Areas
ACCESS CONTROL: (4 slides, 5 minutes)
SLIDE 4 of 4: ENTRY INTO STORAGE AREAS (1 min)
Strict personnel and vehicle access control needs to be established for all areas storing conventional ammunition. These measures should usually be in the SOPs and the regulations, but perhaps tailored appropriately in the site-specific security plan.
Entry to ammunition storage areas should be authorised in writing by the authority responsible for ammunition security. In other words, only people who are expressly authorised to enter the sites may do so.
Vehicles and individuals should be subject to random inspection and search upon entry to and exit from ammunition storage areas. This may also be tied in with the contraband controls as well.
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10. Locks, Doors, Windows and Grills
LOCKS, DOORS, WINDOWS AND GRILLES: (3 slides, 3 minutes)
SLIDE 1 of 3: LOCKS (1 min)
Padlocks for the gates and explosive storehouses should be compliant with European Standard EN12320:2001, Building hardware – Padlocks and padlock fittings – Requirements and test methods. A lock which meets this standard offers an adequate level of ‘high security’ protection. It is a known standard and so is appropriate to use as a benchmark, and therefore a requirement. Obviously, old, damaged and small padlocks can be easily broken. We are trying to reduce the temptation for someone to break in to an ESH, and if they do decide to, we are trying to prevent them from actually gaining access, or otherwise making their job slower so hopefully we will be able to detect and respond to the intrusion.
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11. Locks, Doors, Windows and Grills
LOCKS, DOORS, WINDOWS AND GRILLES: (3 slides, 3 minutes)
SLIDE 2 of 3: DOORS (1 min)
Access doors (and indeed gates) need to be sufficiently robust and comply with national security standards.
As a minimum the doors should be made of solid hardwood with steel on the outside face.
Door frames should be rigidly anchored to prevent disengagement of the lock bolt by prying or jacking of the door frame.
Door and gate hinges should be located on the inside and should be of the fixed pin security type or equivalent.
More detailed information on the construction of doors to achieve various levels of security may be found in Loss Prevention Standard (LPS) This is a publication which specifies for the requirements for testing and classification of burglary resistance of building components, strong-points and security enclosures.
Access doors and gates shall be secured with high security padlocks as we just covered.
(Instructor: In case anyone asks for a reference for this standard, it is (according to IATG 09:10): Loss Prevention Standard (LPS) 1175 Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components, strong-points and security enclosures. Issue 6. Building Research Establishment (BRE) Global. 24 May2007).
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12. Locks, Doors, Windows and Grills
LOCKS, DOORS, WINDOWS AND GRILLES: (3 slides, 3 minutes)
SLIDE 3 of 3: WINDOWS AND GRILLES (1 min)
Windows and other openings to ammunition storage buildings shall be kept to a minimum and provided with appropriate locks and security bars or grilles.
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13. Staff Vetting Attributes of Staff:
Not have criminal convictions and be unlikely to possess criminal tendencies
Be trained effectively
Be likely to remain loyal, well motivated and appropriately rewarded
STAFF VETTING: (2 slides, 5 minutes)
SLIDE 1 of 2: ATTRIBUTES OF STAFF (2 min)
Physical security and ammunition inventory management systems are all vulnerable to failure if staff do not accept their responsibilities, fail to follow SOPs or become subverted.
This means that organisations must make every effort to ensure that staff are:
Selected who do not have criminal convictions and are unlikely to possess criminal tendencies
Trained effectively
Likely to remain loyal, well motivated and appropriately rewarded
Conversely, under-paid, poorly trained and unmotivated staff are more likely to be involved in activities like laziness in carrying out duties, being susceptible to bribery, failure to follow procedures. They may even be susceptible to active involvement in conventional ammunition theft and sale).
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14. Staff Vetting Elements of Vetting: Confirming an individual’s identity
Looking at associations that may cause a conflict of interest
Determining vulnerabilities in an individual’s life through which improper pressure could be applied
STAFF VETTING: (2 slides, 5 minutes)
SLIDE 1 of 2: ELEMENTS OF VETTING (3 min)
Stockpile management organisations should ensure that appropriate procedures are developed and followed for the security vetting of staff prior to employment in ammunition storage areas.
Security vetting is a process used to perform background checks on an individual’s suitability for a particular appointment. It normally consists of:
1) Confirming an individual’s identity
2) Looking at associations that may cause a conflict of interest
3) Determining vulnerabilities in an individual’s life through which improper pressure could be applied
Staff should continue to be security vetted at regular intervals throughout their employment. It should also be a condition of their contracts that they shall report any relevant changes in personal circumstances to security vetting staff.
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15. Diversion Risk DIVERSION RISK: (1 slide, 5 minute)
SLIDE 1 of 1: DIVERSION RISK (5 min)
Why do we find these security measures necessary?
Clearly, as we have seen, the very nature of ammunition presents a risk people and property, both those which are part of the explosive facility, and those which are not. At the basic level, we are trying to prevent people getting into the depot and harming themselves and others. We are also trying to prevent low-level pilfering of stock for personal use, or for low level crime for example.
There is however a much more significant risk – and that is that potentially large quantities might be stolen or otherwise diverted (either through taking them directly from the ammunition storage facility, or during transportation, and so on). The diverted stock may then find its way into the clandestine arms trade. This helps to support terrorism and creates instability at national and regional level, if not on a global scale.
We therefore need to keep our site secure for many reasons, on lots of levels. Mitigating the risk of diversion is one of the foremost reasons.
Although the clandestine arms trade may at first glance be associated with weapons, there is of course a requirement to provide ammunition for these weapons, in what may well be very significant quantities.
Small arms, light weapons, ammunition and explosives are most suited for those engaging in asymmetric warfare involving militant groups and organised crime networks.
They are not only suited for use in guerrilla conflict because of their ease of operation and concealment, but also because, thanks to their scale and availability, they remain the simplest weaponry to deliver clandestinely.
The aim of an effective security system should be to reduce the risks of diversion due to loss, theft, leakage or proliferation to an absolute minimum. There can be no such thing as 100% absolute security because of human factors, but security levels should be as close to 100% as possible. Once a diversion has been detected from a stockpile all efforts should be made to identify and disrupt the arms transfer before it reaches its intended user.
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16. Remember – we are trying to reduce risk to tolerable and ALARP
Worked Example
Start
Remember – we are trying to reduce risk to tolerable and ALARP
Definition of intended use and reasonably foreseen misuse
Risk Analysis
Hazard Identification
Risk Assessment
Risk Reduction
Risk Estimation
WORKED EXAMPLE: (1 slide, 7 minute)
SLIDE 1 of 1: WORKED EXAMPLE (7 min)
IATG 02:10 provides some guidance on risk assessment. The flow chart is from that IATG.
(Instructor: Pose the following scenario to the students)
Let us suppose you have been managing a small ammunition depot which has primarily housed pyrotechnics and a limited quantity of small arms ammunition. The site has an intact perimeter fence. There have been no reports, nor any evidence, of breaches of the fence. The site has not been a priority for a higher level of security than was there when you took over, although you have replaced some of the older/smaller padlocks. The keys are kept on a big bunch in the depot office, hanging on a notice board by your desk. Most of the buildings are in a fairly reasonable state of repair. Many are converted office buildings and so have large windows. You have raised concerns about the integrity of security at the site before but little has been done.
You are now told that it appears that there have been a spate of thefts of the trip flares and illumination devices from some of the ESH. There seems to be no evidence of forced entry to the buildings.
“What do you do?”
(Instructor: Now lead a discussion with the students to identify some solutions, using the flowchart as a basis. Remember that the solutions should be tailored, appropriate and proportionate. The first stage should be some degree of risk assessment – what might the problem/source be? Perhaps an employee who is taking these items for his own personal use? Examples of risk mitigation may well start with reviewing and overhauling the site security plan and procedures. The solution may also consider include replacing all of the padlocks with adequate ones, arranging a better key storage and management solution including a record of who has withdrawn keys, implementing a proper access control system for staff and visitors. There may well be ideas about improving the physical security such as bricking up the windows, or at least placing grilles over them. Are the doors and their locks and hinges adequate? Finally, perhaps it is appropriate to implement some staff vetting procedures. The students may also suggest things like increasing patrols around the site, random searches of staff at the site, and so on).
Risk Evaluation
Is tolerable risk achieved?
YES NO
Stop
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17. Questions? Are there any questions? (allow 5 minutes for questions)
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