1. Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse
Presentation by William J. Frey

2. Agenda Case Narrative Case Chronology Relevant Facts
Reenactment of walkway collapse
Code of Ethics Issues

3. Case Narrative
On July 17, 1981, the second and fourth story walkways of the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel collapsed killing 114 people and seriously injuring an additional 200.
Cause:
“A deviation in the design in the way the rods connected the lower skywalk to the upper and the upper to the ceiling of the atrium was clearly described and zeroed in on as the ultimate cause of the accident.” Petroski: 86

4. Relevant Facts (from Pfatteicher, 64)
Project put on fast track
Construction begun before design was completely finished
Walkway design details were left “unspecified”
Gillum could not directly supervise plans as his firm grew
In this case, the responsibility fell on Duncan
But Gillum still sealed the plans after the designing was finished

5. Relevant Facts Warning Signs (from Petroski)
The Atrium ceiling collapsed during construction; but a study carried out by an independent engineering firm found nothing wrong with the skywalk
Workers carrying loaded wheel barrows across the skywalk complained about excess vibration and swaying
Faulty connection recognized six times
“Duncan assured each inquirer that replacing the single, long hanger rods with double, offset rods would not compromise the safety of the walkways.” (Pfatteicher, 64)

6. Aftermath
Petroski
“After twenty months of investigation, the U.S. attorney and the Jackson County, Missouri, prosecutor announced jointly that they had found no evidence that either a federal or state crime was committed…” (TAMU Instructor Manual)
However in an investigation carried out by the attorney general of Missouri…
Duncan, Gillum, and GCE International Inc. were found guilty of “gross negligence, misconduct and unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering.” (TAMU Instructor Manual)

7. Responsibility in Engineering
Herbert Fingarette, in Criminal Insanity, identifies legal responsibility as “response to essential relevance”
Moral responsibility can be formulated as moral response to essential moral relevance.
Cognitive skills: The ability to view a situation and identify those aspects that have moral relevance
Volitional skills: The ability to formulate or design actions that are morally responsive to the moral relevance in a situation

8. Relevance involves the skill of seeing these models fleshed out in reality…B C W A 5 6 B W 1 3 1 3 C W 2 4 2 4
Case 1
Case 2

9. as this…
Initial Design
Proposed Modification
4th Floor
2nd Floor
Long rods threaded over entire length
Shorter rods threaded only near connections
And allows that one can imagine the enactment of the proposed modification as…

10. …ultimately as the risk of this…

11. Moral Responsibility has different levels
Minimum level
What is morally obligatory
Identify the minimum necessary to avoid blame and locate action above this minimum
As the senior engineer, Gillum sealed the plans
Was he responsible for approving the change that led to the fall of the walkway?
Could part of this responsibility be delegated to the engineer on the scene, namely, Duncan?
How should state licensing boards and engineering professional societies assign blame and punish in cases like these?

12. Other levels of responsibility
Above and beyond minimum responsibilities are…
Those morally permissible but not morally obligatory
Going beyond one’s role responsibilities
Proactively taking measures to identify and prevent harm or failure
Using one’s engineering skills to promote values such as environmentally sustainable engineering, social justice, and community solidarity
Questions for Hyatt
What would a good engineer have done in Gillum’s or Duncan’s place after the collapse of the atrium roof?
How would an exemplary engineer have responded to the six warnings given to Duncan?
How would an exemplary engineer have acted to prevent “gaps” arising from the responsibilities of the designers and the responsibilities of the constructors?

13. Chronology (Adopted from TAMU Instructor Manual Chronology)
Date
Event
Early 1976
Crown Center Redevelopment Corporation begins project to build Hyatt Regency Hotel
July 1976
Gillum-Colaco, Inc. selected as consulting structural engineer
Project enters schematic design stage
Summer 1977
GCE works with PBNDML architect to decide upon basic design
Late 1977
Bid set of structural drawings and specifications
Early 1978
Project prepared under regional building codes

14. Chronology Date Event April 4, 1978
Contract finalized between GCE and PBNDML
Spring 1978
Construction begins
August 28, 1978
Project specifications issued for construction based on AISC standards (American Institute of Steel Construction)
December 1978
Eldridge Construction Company , general contractor, finalizes subcontract with Havens Steel Company. “Havens agrees to fabricate and erect the atrium steel for the Hyatt project.”
February 1979
“Havens makes design change from a single to a double hanger rod box beam connection….” Havens claims GCE approved. GCE denies approving this.
Oct 14, 1979
Atrium roof collapse
November 1979
Seiden-Page investigates collapse and carries out “a thorough design check” of all elements of atrium roof. Assures owners of overall safety of newly designed roof.

15. Chronology Date Event July 1980 Construction of hotel completed
2nd and 4th story walkways collapse killing 114 and injuring 200.
February 3, 1984
“Missouri Board of Architects, Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors files complaint against Daniel M. Duncan, Jack D. Gillum and GCE International Inc., charging gross negligence, incompetence, misconduct and unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering in connection with their performance of engineering services in the design and construction of the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri.”
November 1984
“Duncan, Gillum, and GCE International Inc. found guilty of gross negligence, misconduct and unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering. Subsequently, Duncan and Gillum lost their licenses to practice engineering in the State of Missouri, and GCE had its certificate of authority as an engineering firm revoked. American Society of Civil Engineering (ASCE) adopts report that states structural engineers have full responsibility for design projects. Duncan and Gillum now practicing engineers in states other than Missouri.”

16. Physical Surroundings People, Groups, and Roles Procedures
Walkway Design
Physical Surroundings
People, Groups, and Roles
Procedures
Laws, Codes, Statutes
Information and Information Structures
Abstract model of mechanical design
Atrium with 60 foot high ceiling.
Hotel Owner
Architect
Design Engineer and firm
Construction Manager and firm
Professional Societies in engineering and architecture
Hotel Design Process (fast track and not adding specifications)
Licensed engineer seals plans
State licensing board investigates accident and role of engineers
Engineering Codes
Contract , Civil and
Criminal Law
Regulatory authority delegated to Professional Society
Post accident investigation
US attorney investigation
Experience with past designs (recalling and learning from past failures)
Three Walkways suspended from Roof
State engineering licensing boards
Communicating and approving design changes
Engineering Codes: who sets them and who enforces them
Trial by Missouri attorney general
Create ethereal walkway while obeying principles of mechanical design
Large space below walkways on first floor
Engineers approving design
Investigating firm
Insurance firms investigate accident to determine who pays victims
Black Box: account of case in textbooks

17. Resources
Hyatt Regency Kansas City Walkway Collapse" Online Ethics Center for Engineering 11/24/2010 National Academy of Engineering Accessed: Thursday, December 16, 2010 <
Henry Petroski (1985). To Engineer is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design. St. Martin’s Press:
The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse
Department of Philosophy and Department of Mechanical Engineering Texas A&M University NSF Grant Number DIR
Photos by Dr. Lee Lowry, Jr. at TAMU
Pfatteicher, S (2000). “The Hyatt Horror”: Failure and Responsibility in American Engineering”