1. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to the UK David Coleman, University of Oxford david.coleman@socres.ox.ac.ukavid.coleman@socres.ox.ac.uk http://www.apsoc.ox.ac.uk/oxpop

2. Major topics Recent immigration situation and trend. Effects upon total and working age population size and household numbers. Effects upon population age-structure Immigration as demographic salvation? Effects upon population composition.

3. Current UK migration situation Some (two-way) migration normal in advanced societies. Work - related migration for highly skilled since 1920, not controversial until recent expansion. Net inflow 2002 153,000; foreign +245k, UK -91k. Net inflow since late 1990s historically high.. Most net immigration not work related. New policy: easier entry for labour and non-labour migration, expansion of low-skill work entry. Two revisions of ONS migration estimates since 2001 census complicate the story. Not to mention three revisions of GAD population projections since 2001 census.

4. Net Immigration to UK 1963 – 2003 (1000s). spliced series. Source: data from ONS.

6. Net migration to UK by citizenship

7. Work permit migration from outside EU (gross inflow) (some labour migration categories not included)

8. Net migration for purposes of work, UK 1991-2002 (thousands). Source: International Passenger Survey data from ONS

9. Spouse migration to the UK 1973 - 2001 (gross inflow).

11. Growth of male South Asian ethnic minority populations of marriageable age, and entry-clearance applications for wives/fiancees 1981-2001.

12. Asylum claims in UK, including dependants 1983-2003 (thousands). Source of data: Home Office.

13. Migration drives population growth. United Kingdom, 2002-2031. Thousands. Source: GAD 2004. 2002-based projections.

15. UK population - no decline imminent

16. Population projections, Sweden, 2004 - 2050, (millions); standard and zero-migration. Source: Statistics Sweden

17. Projected effect of immigration on US population growth 1999 - 2100. Source: US Bureau of the Census.

18. Projection of UK population aged 15-64

19. Entry to working age population

20. Effects of different migration assumptions on household formation, 1996 - 2021. Assumes each extra 40k immigration yields 450k households by 2021.

21. The case for more immigration - positive and negative, theoretical and empirical Demographic benefits - workforce, ageing. Essential for economic growth. Entrepreneurial benefits. Fiscal benefits. Fill skills shortages, keeps NHS going, IT needs. Perform ‘dirty jobs’. ‘London / UK would collapse without them’. Cultural, social benefits of ‘diversity’. All with no damage to ‘native’ interests.

22. Three related demographic problems behind argument for more immigrants. End of growth of population, possible decline End of growth and possible decline in labour force and of young labour force entrants; failure of economic growth. Population ageing leads to crises in pensions and old-age care.

23. Immigration can solve all that: Immigration cannot be stopped anyway. Will sustain or expand population size. Rejuvenated and expand workforce. Rectify ageing population while saving natives from trouble of reproduction. Everyone gets what they want and lives happily ever after.

24. Immigration as demographic salvation? Do we need to be saved? Why should ‘no decline’ targets be met (UN 2000)? Is zero growth or decline axiomatically undesirable? UK has relatively benign workforce, population projections. Immigration can keep population, or workforce size, approximately constant. But that can require very large inflows; and adjustment difficult. Immigration can only 'solve' population ageing with large and infinitely increasing population increases. Given sub-replacement fertility, migration to maintain constant size must eventually replace original population with immigrant population. Does a society ‘save’ itself that way?

26. Population ageing: an unavoidable destiny Population ageing here to stay – an irrevocable feature of mature society. Birth and death rates for a younger population gone for good. With constant vital rates, population age- structure will eventually stabilize. Longer life means even older populations, but changes meaning of ‘old age’.

27. Potential Support Ratio, UK 1980-2100 GAD PP 1998-based. Population Trends 103

28. No limits to migration? Immigration and the PSR Population Trends 103

31. Immigrants and their descendants in the British labour market Lower workforce participation rates Higher unemployment A similar story elsewhere in Europe

32. Workforce participation and unemployment by birthplace, UK 2000

34. Why migration trends may continue upwards. Government policy to expand migration e.g. increase work permits: aim 200,000, actual 129,000 in 2002. New channels for migration Open doors to Eastern Europe Amnesties (see Demography 2003) Growth of marriage migration with growth of ethnic minority populations, if arranged marriage persists. UK reputation for ease of entry /overstaying. Long timetable for register, identity cards (if any). But asylum may be trending downwards..

37. ‘Unattributable Demographic Change’: The New ONS Miracle Ingredient! or ‘Honey, I shrunk the migration estimates’. Amaze your audiences! Lose 290,000 people per decade! Shrink your migration estimates overnight! Banish that annoying population growth! Remove those awkward inconsistencies! Keep the 2001 Census (nearly) infallible! http://www.statistics.gov.uk/about/methodology_by_theme/revisions_to_population_estimates/implications.asp

38. Another (semi) official view (Home Office RDS Occasional Paper no 67).

39. Immigration and changes in population composition: UK and abroad. Some countries make official projections of population by immigrant / foreign / ethnic minority origin (US, Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands etc.) None official in UK since 1979 Despite higher (average) immigrant fertility, immigration level is the more important variable in all cases.

40. Total Fertility Rates by Ethnic Group, UK, 1965-2001, from LFS (own-child)

45. Ethnic change in the USA, projected 1999 - 2100

46. US 1999 - 2100: projected proportion of immigrant-origin minorities only

47. Percent of population foreign, Netherlands 2003 – 2050; medium variant and zero- migration projections. Source: Statistics Netherlands.

49. Projected growth of population of foreign origin 2000-2050, selected countries, as % of total

50. Sample trial projection, ethnic composition trends, England and Wales 2001- 2051 (millions)

51. Trial projection of UK non-white population to 2051 (1000s) mortality constant EW 1998, TFR declining from 2.14 - 1.90

52. Growth of foreign-origin population in Denmark, three projections, showing projected consequences of recent restrictions (green line). Source: Statistics Denmark

54. Conclusions Positive immigration effect on working age population (less effective on actual workforce). UK population, numbers of working age not declining even without migration. Instead, renewed population and household growth medium term problem, mostly immigration-driven. ‘Replacement’ migration for working-age population difficult, for age-structure impossible. Current migration projections seem conservative. Continuation even of current level will promote substantial and progressive ethnic transformation.