1. European Antitrust Enforcement 1957-2000: An Analysis of Court of Appeal Rulings EC Competition Enforcement Data, Amsterdam April 11, 2008 Andrea Guenster Martin Carree Maarten Pieter Schinkel

2. 2 Agenda European Antitrust Policy European Court of Justice History of the European Court of Justice The Sentences of the European Court of Justice An inferential Analysis of European Court of Justice’s Sentences Limitations and Outlook

3. 3 European Antitrust Policy Literature Review Posner (1970, 2001) Gallo et al. (1985, 1986, 2000, 2001) Harding et al. (2005) Legal landmark case books, e.g. Vogelaar (2004), Ritter et al. (2005) De Burca and Weilers (2001) Article 81 and 82 Data (392 Not joined, 207 joined, 1964-00) Webpage European Court of Justice Stemming from 129 DG Competition cases of a total of 473 Grundig-Consten (1964) and Central Parts/JCB (2000) Arranged according to opening date Infringements, Exemptions and Negative Clearances

4. 4 European Court of Justice Court established eleven years before Commission in European Coal and Steal Treaty 1951 (Paris) “… ensure that the interpretation and application of the Treaty is observed.” (Article 164 EC Treaty): sentences, orders and opinions Expiration of Treaty in 2002, but not constitutional Court Civil Law Triangle of Council, Parliament and Commission and advices national Courts From interpretation establishing landmark case reference system to economic theory foundation Landmark Cases result into Notices, Regulations and Guidelines Pronuptia Case DGIV/30.937, Commission Reg. 4087/88/EEC of 28 December 1988 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to categories of franchise agreements BMW DGIV/14.650, Regulation on Franchising Commission Reg. 123/85/EEC of 12 December 1984 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements

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9. 9 Liable/Cost IncurredApplicantCommissionTotal Applicant 159.22123.01282.22 Commission 64.7928.9893.77 Total 224.01151.99376.00

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12. 12 Table 2 Multinomial Logit on the Sentence, (n=188) Partially AnnulledCoefficientStandard ErrorMean Duration-0.0210.01442.633 Parties0.0510.0438.739 Horizontal-0.0840.5900.593 Dominance-0.1600.8400.117 Applicant-0.196***0.0713.016 Number of Intervener for Applicant0.4180.4560.165 Number of Intervener for Defendant0.392*0.2330.489 Recitals0.009***0.002123.404 Fine0.131***0.0476.766 Judges-0.2190.3512.890 Andriessen (01/81-01/85)-0.4220.7880.101 Sutherland (01/85-01/89)-1.4461.2650.144 Brittan (01/89-01/93)0.5511.2930.186 van Miert (01/93-09/99)-1.442*0.8610.293 Constant-1.3750.908…

13. 13 Table 2 Multinomial Logit on the Sentence, (n=188) (continued) AnnulledCoefficientStandard ErrorMean Duration-0.0380.02742.633 Parties-0.0890.0708.739 Horizontal0.4220.9090.593 Dominance1.1070.9630.117 Applicant0.0830.0723.016 Number of Intervener for Applicant0.9570.6450.165 Number of Intervener for Defendant-0.0490.3430.489 Recitals0.0010.004123.404 Fine-0.0230.0606.766 Judges1.150***0.3502.890 Andriessen (01/81-01/85)-4.044**1.9640.101 Sutherland (01/85-01/89)-4.578***1.6750.144 Brittan (01/89-01/93)-6.201***2.2110.186 van Mie t (01/93-09/99)-2.694**1.2240.293 Constant-1.0620.923… Upheld is the base level. The R² is 36%. Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.

14. 14 Table 3 Regression on Fine Reduction (n=188) CoefficientStandard ErrorMean Duration0.004**0.00242.633 Parties0.008*0.0058.739 Horizontal-0.0970.0830.593 Dominance-0.1650.1050.117 Applicant-0.0040.0053.016 Number of Intervener for Applicant0.0040.0600.165 Number of Intervener for Defendant0.0160.0280.489 Recitals-0.001***0.000123.404 Fine-0.0010.0096.766 Judges-0.121***0.0342.890 Andriessen (01/81-01/85)-0.0460.1160.101 Sutherland (01/85-01/89)0.529***0.1400.144 Brittan (01/89-01/93)0.434***0.1460.186 van Miert(01/93-09/99)0.332***0.1000.293 Constant-0.2070.127… The R² is 20%. Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.

15. 15 Table 4 Regression on Cost Sharing (n=188) Cost SharingCoefficientStandard ErrorMean Duration-0.003**0.00242.633 Parties-0.0060.0058.739 Horizontal0.0130.0740.593 Dominance0.0710.0930.117 Applicant0.0060.0053.016 Number of Intervener for Applicant0.082*0.0440.165 Number of Intervener for Defendant-0.0350.0230.489 Recitals0.000*0.000123.404 Fine0.0040.0056.766 Judges0.074**0.0322.890 Andriessen (01/81-01/85)-0.1490.1020.101 Sutherland (01/85-01/89)-0.241*0.1360.144 Brittan (01/89-01/93)-0.270**0.1390.186 van Miert(01/93-09/99)-0.229**0.0990.293 Constant0.274***0.093… The R² is 18%. Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. The cost sharing ranges between -2 (all costs paid by the Commission and +2 (all costs paid by the applicants)

16. 16 Conclusion Shows tendencies and changes in composition Historical changes in legal, procedural settings and economic interpretation From interpretation establishing landmark case reference system to economic theory foundation Rule of reason versus per se rules How successful are appeal proceedings?