1. National Series Lecture 1 Introduction Tajikistan Bradford Disarmament Research Centre Division of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK Picture Image Transparent Globe by digitalart - from: http://www.freedigitalphotos.net/

2. Outline 1.Where we are in the early 21 st century 2.Outline of the following lectures a)What we should know (learning outcome) b)What we can do (policy contribution) Picture Image: Golden World In Hands by jscreationzs- from: http://www.freedigitalphotos.net/

3. What is “Life Science”? “Any field of science that is leading to or has the potential to lead to an enhanced understanding of living organisms, especially human life.” E.g. Biology, proteomics, genetic engineering, nanotechnology, aerosol technology, chemistry and mathematics (National Research Council, 2006: 27) Applied in: Public health, Medicine, Agriculture, Energy, Environment and National security studies

4. Biotechnology: An integral part of national strategy in the 21 st Century A growing market in Biotechnology: the pharmaceutical market (National Research Council, 2006: 85) Similar results in number of researchers and the amount of private investment for R&D in the life sciences Rapid growth in the Asia-Pacific region (Ernst&Young 2011, Frost&Sullivan 2010)

5. Tajikistan: Science Outlook The Tajik Base of the Academy of Sciences of USSR was established in Janu­ary 1933. Its first director became the academician, Prof. S.F. Oldenburg (1863- 1935). The Base united depart­ments of geology, botany, zoology and parasitology, soil research, and hu­manities. Nowadays the Academy of Sciences of Republic of Tajikistan has 21 research institutes, including the Pamir Branch of AS RT, which comprises 2 in­stitutes. There are two provincial research centres: Khatlon Scientific/Research Centre in southern Tajikistan and Khujand Scientific/Research Centre in northern Tajikistan. The scientific establishments of the Academy of Sciences of Republic of Tajikistan are incorporated in three Divisions: –The Division of Physical-Math­ematical, Chemical, and Geological Sci­ences, –The Division of Biological and Medical, –The Division of Social Sciences. IAP (2012)

6. Tajikistan: Science Outlook Institutions for the life sciences in higher education (not exclusive) Khorugh State University Tajik State Medical University University of Central Asia Note: Approximately 20 more universities were identified in Tajikistan, but the biology, medicine and health related programmes could not be evidenced by this project.

7. Why do we care? Should this be an issue for us? The dual-use nature of science and technology: –“Every major technology — metallurgy, explosives, internal combustion, aviation, electronics, nuclear energy — has been intensively exploited, not only for peaceful purposes but also for hostile ones.” –“…Must this also happen with biotechnology, certain to be a dominant technology of the twenty-first century?” Matthew Meselson: Professor of Molecular Biology at Harvard University (Meselson, 2000: 16) HostilePeaceful

8. Meselson’s Forecast in 2000 Ability “Our ability to modify fundamental life processes continues its rapid advance” “We will be able not only to devise additional ways to destroy life but will also become able to manipulate it” Dilemma “…[This has a] Vast potential for beneficial application and could have inimical consequences for the course of civilization.”

9. Meselson’s Forecast in 2000 “At present, we appear to be approaching a crossroads —a time that will test whether biotechnology…” It will come to be intensively exploited for hostile purposes, or Our species will find the collective wisdom to take a different course.

10. Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) 1972 Article I “Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: 1. Microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.” This applies for not only states but also non-state actors

11. Science and Security: Dual-Use The need for a broader conceptualisation of dual-use Biological agents and toxins can be used for hostile purposes without weaponization and technology is typically diffused globally for peaceful purposes Hostile use can take the form of criminal acts or terrorist acts (non- state level) in parallel to military application (state level), The BTWC prohibits the misuse of the life sciences by both states and non-state actors Dual-use: broader concept PeacefulNon-peaceful Dual-use: traditional concept MilitaryCivilian

12. Tajikistan with international regimes WMD “Tajikistan does not currently produce or possess nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and is a party to relevant nonproliferation treaties and organizations.” BTWC Accession (27 June 2005) “Despite the connection between some AP [Anti Plague] facilities and the Soviet biological weapons program, there is no evidence that Tajikistan's AP station worked on any aspects of the Soviet biological weapons program.” “Tajikistan joined the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in 2003…to keep scientists well-employed, and to improve biosafety and biosecurity while furthering science.” CWC Signature (14 January 1993);Ratification (11 January 1995) “Although Tajikistan has the capability to produce chemical and toxic substances for industrial purposes, Dushanbe has not produced chemical weapons and will not do so in the future”. (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2012)

13. National Series: Lecture Outline 2. Biosecurity Threats 3. The Web of Prevention 4. National Measures 5. Responsibility of Scientists Picture Image: Transparent Globe by digitalart - from: http://www.freedigitalphotos.net/

14. ‘No single focal point’ of threats –Potential actors, material and information, which can be related to dual- use issues, exist at international, regional, national, local and individual levels. Unpredictable future of the life sciences Reviewing threats (Lecture 2) Manmade threats: warfare, crime and terrorism Safety/accidental risks at laboratories Natural outbreaks of infectious disease

15. To address natural outbreaks of infectious disease Public health preparedness and response planning To address safety/accidental risks Laboratory regulations to safely manage dangerous pathogens and toxins, to prevent an accidental release into the environment and unauthorized access To address manmade threats Strong international arms control agreements with effective national implementation Internationally coordinated export controls Intelligence Biodefense To address the unpredictable future of the life sciences Oversight: Review of security-sensitive science and technology developments Responsible conduct in research through education The Web of Prevention (WoP) (Lecture 3)

16. Web of prevention Public health measures Laboratory measures International prohibition regime Export control IntelligenceBiodefense Oversight and review of Sci-Tech Responsible conduct Natural threats Safety risks Governance of science Manmade threats

17. National implementation (Lecture 4) To National Context

18. National implementation (Lecture 4) 1 International agreements 2 Signature and ratification by states 3 National measures in states Legislation, regulation, order or other forms of governance

19. Worldwide engagement of life scientists with the WoP will: Effectively strengthen biosecurity measures by requiring the engagement of practicing scientists Prevent unnecessary restriction of scientific freedoms Education of, and capacity building among, scientists on biosecurity issues is necessary for successful security Uninformed scientists = no effective science policy inputs to the WoP Engagement of informed life scientists about biosecurity issues is key to successful security The need for responsible conduct in research (Lecture 5)

20. Biosecurity: definitive issues The term “biosecurity” has been conceptualised differently across various scientific and professional disciplines Areas: The term has been used in ecology, agriculture, food supply, arms control and public health contexts, with different meanings and conceptualisations Policy processes: these overlap with interdisciplinary areas such as biosafety, counter-terrorism, agricultural biosecurity and biodiversity Linguistic: In addition to these conceptual complications, “biosecurity” has also experienced linguistic complications (Fidler and Gostin 2007, Sunshine Project 2003, Barletta 2002)

21. National Series: WoP = Biosecurity Education = Biosecurity Competency

22. References The references cited in this lecture are viewable in the Notes section of this presentation.