1. Scenarios for the Greater Horn of Africa and Great Lakes Region
Humanitarian Partnership Conference
Nairobi
15 September, 2015

2. Background
Regional Overview for the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region
Regional Humanitarian Situation and Outlook
increasingly complex, with needs higher now than ever and projected to further increase
An increasing confluence of conflict, climatic and economic shocks amidst shrinking humanitarian space and funding constraints
The Greater Horn of Africa and Great lakes Region is a region with endemic conflict and recurrent episodes of drought leading to persistent vulnerability and humanitarian need. But now we’ve surpassed the threshold in terms of effectively being able to respond to various active conflicts in the region, and 3 of these we expect to intensify. The compound impact of these crises, their cross boarder impact in a context of deeply vulnerable population and shrinking humanitarian space is an issue of concern.

3. Current conflict
Continued conflict is triggering new waves of population displacement:
Over 10 million IDPs and 2.7 million refugees in the region.
Over 456,000 people were displaced from their homes as a result of the three crises this year alone. An additional 790,000 may become refugees in the region by the end of the year.
The conflicts in Somalia, Two Areas, Darfur and Eastern DRC are set to continue and the conflicts in Burundi, South Sudan and Yemen have resulted in the majority of the newly displaced in the region with 456,709 people displaced by these three crises this year alone- or a 16% increase in the number of refugees in the region.
South Kordofan and Blue Nile States are referred to as the Two Areas

4. Regional Impact of South Sudan, Yemen and Burundi crises

5. Regional impact of Yemen Crisis
Over 55,000 people have arrived in the region
food and fuel shortages could trigger the return of some 883,000 vulnerable refugees and migrants, including 258,000 Somali refugees and some of the 80,000 Ethiopian migrants who have on average entered Yemen annually.
Some analysts fear that continued insecurity could result in a flow of weapons across the Gulf of Aden.
Yemen has experienced high levels of acute food insecurity in recent years, stemming from political crisis, a weakening economy, and conflict-related displacement and disruption to normal livelihoods.
Household purchasing power is expected to decrease in the coming months due to various factors, including increasing food prices and reduced labor opportunities. Because almost all poor households rely heavily on market purchase for food access, a deterioration in purchasing power would have implications on the quantity and quality of food access.
The rapidly deteriorating security situation will exacerbate food insecurity. Areas of particular concern for deteriorating outcomes include Sa’dah, Hajjah, Abyan, Ad Dali, Lahij, and Shabwah Governorates, as well as the city of Aden. Most areas of Yemen are expected to be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), with increasing populations in need of humanitarian assistance as the conflict continues. If conflict and market disruption continue, and humanitarian access is limited, the worst affected areas of Yemen could fall into Emergency (IPC Phase 4) over the coming months.
Context
Staple food imports account for a major share of national food availability in Yemen. Wheat imports average around 2.8 million metric tons (MT) annually, accounting for 95 percent of national wheat consumption. On average, Yemen imports approximately 3.7 million MT of cereals, and the forecast for cereal imports during the 2014/2015 marketing year is 4.1 million MT, according to FAO/GIEWS.
Agricultural production and population are concentrated in the western part of the country. Yemen’s two rainy seasons in the central highlands occur from March to May and July to August. In coastal areas, including the Western Coastal Plain where sorghum production is concentrated, the main rain season runs from May through September. With these rains, milk availability also increases between April and October. The main staple food and cash crop harvests are in June-July and October-December. Demand for labor peaks between September and January. Access to food and income is most constrained during the April-May lean season, prior to the first season harvests.
Estimates from FAO indicate average cereal production in Annual staple food production in Yemen averages about 426,000 MT of sorghum, 240,000 MT of wheat (the main staple consumed), and 83,000 MT of millet. Primary cash crops include qat, coffee, cotton, sesame, and tobacco.
Although Yemen imports more than 80 percent of its cereals, the agriculture sector provides a main source of employment for 54 percent of the population and contributed 17.5 percent of GDP in 2010, according to the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation. In the densely populated, mountainous areas of western Yemen, rural livelihoods are dominated by agricultural labor, production of staple crops, cash crops, and livestock. To the east, broad swaths of northern Yemen are arid desert and are dominated by pastoralism, with agropastoral areas located on the southern and eastern plateau.
Food insecurity in 2014
Multiple shocks since the political transition in 2011/2012 have reduced the coping capacity of poor households, particularly for those that have already been displaced by conflict in recent years, including many households in Abyan Governorate. FEWS NET analysis for late 2014 indicated that most governorates in the densely-populated west of the country were in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) acute food insecurity.
According to WFP’s 2014 Comprehensive Food Security Survey (CFSS) report, the prevalence of food insecurity was generally similar to 2011, although food security worsened in some governorates, including indications of a substantial deterioration of outcomes in Shabwah Governorate. Based on food consumption score (FCS) data from the survey, the CFSS estimated that 41 percent of the population (10.6 million people) is food insecure (“borderline” food consumption), with 19 percent (5 million people) in severe food insecurity (“poor” food consumption).
Key drivers of food insecurity in 2014 included:
Disruptions in the fuel market contributed to increased food prices, with the cereal component of the consumer price index (CPI) rising by 16 percent from January to September 2014.
Increasing conflict disrupted normal livelihoods and access to markets in some areas, including in Al Bayda, Sa’dah, Hajjah, and Al Hudaydah Governorates. An estimated 80,000 people were displaced by conflict in 2014.
The political crisis contributed to macroeconomic disruptions, including reduced private sector investment and employment opportunities.
Although overall 2014 agricultural production was average, the late start to the first rain season affected production of some crops including legumes and coffee, especially in the central highlands of Sa’ada, Al Mahwiet, Amran, Dhamar, Sana’a, Al Bayda, and Raymah Governorates.
Food insecurity in 2015
FEWS NET MOST LIKELY FOOD SECURITY OUTCOMES, APRIL THROUGH JUNE 2015
Note: This map reflects analysis conducted prior to increases in conflict in late March and April.
Source: FEWS NET
YEMEN CONFLICT MAP – MARCH 26 – APRIL
Source: ACAPS, OCHA, OCHA COD, Our Airports, GADM, Government of Yemen, FEWS NET, AEI Critical Threats Project
Public sector salaries and social spending have been disrupted, and it is unclear how or whether they will be paid in the coming months. Agricultural production and labor opportunities are likely to be limited by conflict in many areas. Food prices are expected to rise, particularly in conflict zones, which could be further exacerbated if the rial (YER) depreciates against the dollar (USD) and other currencies. These factors will lead to decreased household purchasing power. Because almost all poor households rely heavily on market purchase for food access, a deterioration in purchasing power would have implications on the quantity and quality of food access.
Most areas of Yemen are expected to be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), with increasing populations in need of humanitarian assistance as the conflict continues. Conflict-affected households with limited coping capacity may enter Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Current areas of particular concern due to ongoing conflict and poor food security indicators from the CFSS include Sa’dah, Hajjah, Abyan, Ad Dali, Lahij, and Shabwah Governorates.
Although food security indicators for Aden were better than for almost any other area in the country in the CFSS, intense conflict has led to displacement and rapidly deteriorating food security outcomes. If conflict and market disruption continue, and humanitarian access is limited, the worst affected areas of Yemen could fall into Emergency (IPC Phase 4) over the coming months.
Key factors expected to continue to drive food insecurity in 2015 include:
The security situation continues to deteriorate rapidly after continued Al Houthi advances and Saudi-led air strikes that began on March 26th (Figure 2). Significant displacement, disruption of livelihoods, and disruptions to food imports, distribution, and normal market functioning are likely.
As of January 31, 2015, the number of internally-displaced persons stood at 334,000, according to OCHA. On April 17th, a statement by UNHCR indicated that the number of civilians displaced by the recent escalation of violence is estimated between 120,000 and 150,000 people.
Although official fuel prices have remained steady in recent weeks (YER 150/liter; USD 0.70/liter), the availability of diesel and petrol for purchase at this price is increasingly limited. Information from key informants in Sana’a, Al Hudaydah, and Ta’izz have indicated that as of April 13th the cost to consumers of fuel (black market price) in each of these cities is approximately YER 1,000/liter (USD 4.64/liter). The increasing cost of fuel is expected to put upward pressure on staple food prices in most markets. Many households in Sana’a and elsewhere normally rely on mobile water tanks for basic water needs. The price of water from these mobile units in Sana’a is reported to have doubled due to the rising cost and limited availability of diesel.
Reduced oil revenues threaten the government’s ability to maintain fuel subsidies, social spending and public sector salaries. Revenue from oil exports, which accounts for 70 percent of the national budget, declined by 37 percent between 2013 and 2014, due to declining production and export capacity as well as a drop in international oil prices. Conflict has disrupted production during early In addition, several countries in the region have suspended financial support to the Yemeni government, most notably Saudi Arabia.
The Yemeni rial (YER) is likely to depreciate against the U.S. Dollar (USD) and other currencies, increasing the cost of imported food commodities. Yemen’s foreign exchange reserves declined by 31 percent between 2009 and Recent reductions in international financial support and oil revenue are likely to further reduce foreign exchange reserves in the coming months.
Conflict has reportedly disrupted both the importation of goods and the transport of those goods from ports to their terminal markets. Given these factors, in combination with the likely reduction in fuel subsidies and depreciation of the rial (YER), food prices are likely to increase in the coming months. Although FEWS NET does not have detailed current data on food prices across the country, initial reports indicate that prices for staples have risen by as much as 40 percent in some markets. The availability of staples is also limited in some markets. While FEWS NET does not have a comprehensive list of markets where supply is becoming unusually low, reports received indicate that this is happening in Aden, Ta’izz, Sa’dah, and Amran.
The Ministry of Industry and Trade reported that, as of February 23rd, stocks of food commodities totaled 866,627 MT. This is equivalent to approximately 2.5 months of cereal imports, based on FAO estimates for the current marketing year. However, ongoing conflict and limited functioning of the government will limit the distribution of existing stocks to local markets.

6. Population Displacement Overview
Countries in conflict have the largest populations of Internally displaced people, and their neighbours are hosting large refugee populations, with Ethiopia and Kenya being the largest refugee hosting countries in Africa. Refugees tend to settle in border locations where provision of basic services are stretched

7. BURUNDI
Months of electoral crisis have already caused a considerable humanitarian impact in the region and within Burundi.   
reports of limited internal displacement within Burundi, though the exact number of IDPs is unknown.
There is also a concern about the socio-economic impact of the political crisis.
The situation is likely to deteriorate.
most likely scenario for the next six months: 500,000 people affected, including 100,000 people expected to seek asylum outside Burundi, 50,000 returnees and 50,000 IDPs
In the worst case, during previous conflicts and violence, hundreds of thousands of people were killed and many more were injured. Over one million people were displaced.

8. Burundi Humanitarian Snapshot

9. South Sudan
Since the L3 Response for South Sudan was extended in May 2015, the humanitarian situation has deteriorated suddenly and significantly. A major military offensive which began in April 2015 has displaced tens of thousands of people and involved massive human rights violations, including the killing of civilians, sexual abuse, rape, abductions, torture, forced recruitment of children and the looting and destruction of civilian and humanitarian assets.
Food insecurity is worse in August 2015 than at the same time last year. Internal displacement grew by +5 per cent in the second quarter of 2015 (compared to +2% in the first quarter) and refugee outflows grew by +15 per cent (compared to +7% in the first quarter). The number of displaced people seeking refuge in Protection of Civilians sites is higher than ever.
Economic stress has markedly increased and denial of access has intensified. Information available indicates that malnutrition and mortality rates have worsened, including in States not affected by conflict.

10. Food insecurity Food insecurity and malnutrition:
Crisis and emergency food insecurity remains a concern in parts of DRC, CAR, South Sudan, Ethiopia, northeastern Kenya, parts of Karamoja in Uganda, Darfur in Sudan, IDP sites in Somalia.
An estimated 12.1 million people are currently in need of humanitarian assistance
Food insecurity persists across the Horn and we see spikes of GAM rates above the emergency thresholds.
Malnutrition rates are very high and above emergency threshold within IDPs in Somalia, parts of Djibouti, south Sudan, DRC and Ethiopia (refugees and pastoral areas) where GAM rates reaching 20% in some cases.
The LRA report indicates northern Kenya counties with above critical GAM levels of (> 15%) with situation being at very critical level (>20%) in Turkana and Mandera counties.
Source: Fewsnet

11. El Nino El Nino impact on the region:
Rain and potential flooding in Somalia, Kenya, and Southern Ethiopia, during short rainy season of October through December.
Dryer than normal conditions in Ethiopia and South Sudan which could exacerbate food security conditions.

12. Cholera epidemic
Surge in communicable diseases, particularly in overcrowded settlements - cholera has already affected thousands in DRC, Tanzania, South Sudan, Uganda and Kenya. Measles outbreak in Sudan and Katanga province in E. DRC.
Cholera has already affected thousands in South Sudan (Crude Fatality Rate = 2.9%), Kenya (1.9%), DRC (1.0%), Uganda (0.8%), Tanzania (0.7%). Measles outbreak in Sudan with 2,869 confirmed cases including 43 deaths and 4,545 suspected cases by the end of July. In Katanga province measles has killed 315 people and infected at least 20,000.

13. Humanitarian response curtailed by two key factors:
Humanitarian access is shrinking across the region. Many areas of the region are hard-to-reach or inaccessible due to a combination of insecurity (ex. South Sudan where 151 staff were relocated from Unity state in April; killing of 4 UNICEF staff in Garowe, Somalia in April), bureaucratic impediments and logistical constraints.
Humanitarian requirements continue to rise while funding remains limited– The total requirement for Great Lakes and Horn of Africa region exceeds $5 billion. As of 3 September, globally, $ 7.27 billion have been committed so far (37.9%), leaving a shortfall of $ billion.
The Somalia Response Plan in response to the Yemen crisis, launched in June 2015, remains seriously underfunded. HCR and partners have received only 5% of the $ 64 million required.
The Djibouti response plan for HCR and partners is funded at just 7% of the required US$ 26 million
South Sudan regional refugee response plan is only 15% funded
Burundi regional refugee response plan is only 25% funded. The Burundi refugee appeal was adjusted from $ 207 million to $ 306 million as the projected number of refugees was increased from 230,000 to 320,000 by the end of September.
bureaucratic impediments (ex. Restrictive legislation in Sudan, Kenya, South Sudan) and logistical constraints.

14. Global Humanitarian funding

15. Planning for compound impact
Where in the region do we expect compound impact
Existing vulnerabilities
Conflict and spread of conflict
Population displacement (internal and external)
Lack of humanitarian access
Constrained funding
Response planning
Crises are regional in nature
Analysis, planning and coordination requires regional cooperation
Response national
Bi-monthly meetings
Update scenario outlook
Implications for response
Communication and global advocacy – implications of lack of funding

16. Way forward
Support the development of national-level response and preparedness plans
Facilitate joint priority actions in the areas of advocacy, resource mobilization, and coordinated engagement in cross-border areas.
Preparedness measures taken:
FSNWG have drafted a statement highlighting the impact of El Nino in the region and the areas most likely to be impacted. National meteorological services have been tasked with breaking down the information to community level and preparing flood, enhanced rain, drought advisories as applicable. For Kenya, a review of a national El Nino contingency plan is expected.