1. The Effect of Anti-Circumvention Provisions on Security Jon Callas & Bruce Schneier

2. The Effect of Anti-Circumvention Provisions on Security Jon Callas & Bruce Schneier

3. Introduction The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) Anti-Circumvention Exception Provisions and Defenses These exceptions still leave a large problem

4. Models of Security Design Two basic models –The “Closed” Model –The “Open” Model

5. “Closed” Security Design The traditional way to do security Design done in a closed group Often has external review Reputable people claim it is the only way to get good security

6. “Closed” Security Design Advantages –No Committee-itis –It’s harder to break a closed design –Targeted designs –Security through obscurity

7. “Closed” Security Design Disadvantages –Team blindness –It’s easier to yield to temptation –Easier to design the wrong thing –Security through obscurity

8. “Open” Security Design The newer way to do security, perhaps 30 years old Design done in public journals, mailing lists, or simply through available specs and designs Actually a principle of minimal secrets

9. “Open” Security Design Advantages –More eyes find problems faster –There are fewer surprises

10. “Open” Security Design Disadvantages –Some problems can’t be solved without obscurity –How do you keep openness from being design-by-committee –You have fewer advantages over your opponent

11. “Open” Security Design Open design is not open source Historically, all OSes were open-design Source-available, listing available, etc. are other options.

12. It’s Not Either/Or Mixing open and closed elements of a design can give you better security than either alone. Open designs give armor Closed designs give camouflage

13. Modern Civilian Cryptology Perhaps the greatest success of open design Question: Can secure systems be built if only keys are secret? Answer: Yes.

14. Protecting Intellectual Property Protecting IP with technology is hard It may be impossible –An irony here is that the cryptographers are the ones who are unhappy, the customers seem to like it just fine. If it’s impossible, then legal protections are the only available

15. Backing up -- How Did We Get Here? IP exists to benefit society The goal of IP laws is that societal benefit It’s understandable that IP owners want more protection It’s understandable that “society” is skeptical of their desires and claims

16. IP Threats “Digital technology is the universal solvent of intellectual property rights” –Tom Parmenter Digital copies are easy to make and easy to distribute, bandwidth willing How do the artists get paid? –technological fixes don’t exist, and aren’t proven

17. IP Skepticism IP owners have a history of wanting much, giving little, and being benefited by changes they claimed would crush them. –Videotapes –Audio Recordings –Clone computer peripherals –Parodies

18. Anti-Circumvention The DMCA makes it a felony to circumvent “a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title” Note that this does not affect things that can’t be copyrighted Penalties include fines and prison

19. Anti-Circumvention Exceptions Encryption Research Computer Repair Reverse-engineering Security Testing

20. So What’s the Problem? Exemptions are defenses, not limitations –You can still end up in court Exemptions are torturous –They require notification, asking permission, etc.

21. The Larger Issue An imbalance between the rights and and responsibilities of makers and breakers –There penalties for bad research –There is protection for bad security A lack of definition –“Effective” is never defined

22. Does This Protect Snake-Oil? Case in point: the DVD break –Reverse-Engineered by a minor –Cryptanalytic break of 18 mins compute time Why is this “effective”? –Sure, kids are smart –If it can be broken by a minor, it’s not effective

23. One Possible Fix Liabilities for bad security –Punish creating systems that can be broken –Damages are probably enough –Few of us really want this, though

24. The Larger Issue Making and breaking is a dance If breaking is punished, makers are lax If breaking is punished there is no incentive for quality

25. Gresham’s Law of Security? There are advantages for a customer to use the least effective security –The real crooks may break the strong stuff –The weak stuff is cheaper –Extra opportunities for policing –More cases means more publicity

26. Fixing the Problem It’s actually easy –Tie circumvention to infringement –Circumventing and infringing is an aggravated form of infringement –Leave the research alone This restores the balance –Permits IP holders to have extra penalties –Creates an incentive for good security

27. Questions?