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Membership Capacity issues: if some actors can prevent others from bad behavior, membership limited to capable Limit membership if enforcement problems.

Published byAbraham Dorsey Modified over 9 years ago

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Presentation on theme: "Membership Capacity issues: if some actors can prevent others from bad behavior, membership limited to capable Limit membership if enforcement problems."— Presentation transcript:

1 Membership Capacity issues: if some actors can prevent others from bad behavior, membership limited to capable Limit membership if enforcement problems and uncertainty about preferences Inclusive membership if distribution problems or symmetric problems

2 Primary rule system Ambitiousness – Vague/specific – Depth of cooperation Basic type of rules – Proscriptions/prescriptions – Incentive issues – Capacity issues Scope: broad/narrow Common vs. differentiated obligations

3 Information system Strength of information system – Strong: collaboration, up/down, normative, and low inherent transparency – Weak: coordination, high inherent transparency Type of information system – Centralized? – Self-reporting / monitoring / verification – Enforcement school vs. management school: what is “behavioral model” and how is info to be used

4 Response system Response strategies – Altering consequences Deterrence: increase expected costs of violation Remuneration: increase expected benefits of compliance – Altering opportunities Generative: create new opportunities to comply Preclusive: remove opportunities to violate – Altering perceptions Cognitive: provide new information that changes perception of best choice Normative: re-educate regarding values Reciprocity of response: diffuse / specific Strictness of response: violation tolerance Sources of “institutional crises” Enforcement school vs. management school: what is “behavioral model” and how does response play

5 Hypotheses re: Problem Structure / Institutional Design Conflict/cooperation: if relevant actors prefer outcomes of conflict more than viable alternatives: NO institution Capacities 1: if capacity for BAD behavior depends on others: REGULATORY institution which LIMITS membership to capable states and COMMON obligations to ban behaviors that would allow others to engage in bad behavior Capacities 2: if some actors lack CAPACITY for GOOD behavior: PROGRAMMATIC institution which EXPANDS membership and DIFFERENTIATED obligations (donors/recipients) and RESPONSE of capacity enhancements (not rewards/sanctions)

6 Incentives 1: – Coordination: REGULATORY institution with COMMON obligations and NO response system – Up/Downstream: REGULATORY institution with DIFFERENTIATED obligations and LINKAGE response system – Collaboration: REGULATORY institution with COMMON obligations and RETALIATORY (“reversion”) response system Incentives 2: if strong incentives to cheat: clearly specified INSPECTION and RESPONSE rules (likely for collaboration & upstream/downstream but NOT coordination) Hypotheses re: Problem Structure / Institutional Design

7 Information: if little INFORMATION about consequences of behavior: PROGRAMMATIC or PROCEDURAL institution with weak information / response systems Norms: if effort by some to instill NORMS in others: GENERATIVE institution has WEAK information/response system (or sanctions if strong pre-institutional norm against behavior) Hypotheses re: Problem Structure / Institutional Design

8 Violation Tolerance: Inherent Transparency: if easy to know what other actors have done: WEAK INSPECTION procedures Response Incentives: – Strong concern about violations: STRONG and SPECIFIC inspection and response system (or easy withdrawal) – Low concern about violations: WEAK INSPECTION and RESPONSE procedures Hypotheses re: Problem Structure / Institutional Design

9 Security Basic problem: independent decisions lead to increasing costs yet greater risks of/in war If no agreement, arms race continues Key features: collaboration problem, no incapacity (or, in NPT, incapacity helps), no transparency, violation intolerant, strong response incentives

10 Security: Predictions based on Problem Structure Institutional type: reg, proc, prog, gen Membership Primary rules – Common or differentiated – Specificity Information system: self/monitor/verify Response system

11 Problem Structure, Institutional Design, & Security Non-Proliferation Treaty Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty Q1: Conflict/deadlockCooperation possible Q2: Number of actorsMany: open membershipTwo: closed membership Q3: CapacityDiffer: differentiated obligationsSame: common obligations Q4: IncentivesUp/downstream: linkageCollaboration: regulatory institution Q5: InformationProblem understood Q6: ValuesLittle conflict/not important Q7: Inherent transparency No: strong inspection Q8: Response incentives Low: strong inspection/response Strong: linkage as response Low: strong inspection/response Strong: withdrawal

12 Arms Control Treaties Biological Weapons Convention – Membership (Article XIV) – open to all states – Primary Rule System (Article I, II, III) – Information System (Article VII) - rudimentary – Response System (Article VII) – rudimentary INF Treaty – Membership – US and USSR only – Primary Rule System – Elimination ProtocolElimination Protocol – Information System – Inspections ProtocolInspections Protocol – Response System – Withdrawal (Article XV)Withdrawal (Article XV)

13 Trade Basic problem: free trade zone requires – Common market: Equalize and lower tariffs within – Customs union: Equalize tariffs without If no agreement, protectionist pressures lead to increasing tariffs on import-competing goods and reciprocal tariffs from others Key features: collaboration problem, no incapacity, inherent transparency, violation tolerant, strong response incentives

14 Trade: Predictions based on Problem Structure Institutional type: reg, proc, prog, gen Membership Primary rules – Common or differentiated – Specificity Information system: self/monitor/verify Response system

15 Problem Structure, Institutional Design, & Trade GATT/ WTOMercosur Q1: Conflict/deadlockCooperation possible Q2: Number of actorsMany: open membershipTwo: closed membership Q3: CapacitySame: common obligations Q4: IncentivesCollaboration: regulatory institution Q5: InformationProblem understood (not impt) Q6: ValuesNot important Q7: Inherent transparency Yes: weak inspection Q8: Response incentives High: weak inspection/response Strong: reciprocity as response Low: strong inspection/response Strong: reciprocity as response

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