1. Fuzzy Identity Based Encryption Brent Waters Current Research with Amit Sahai

2. Brent WatersCryptographic Protocols for Memex2 An Emergency Medical Appointment Record visit, test results, etc. Encryption No portable device requirement (can’t carry RSA public key)

3. Brent WatersCryptographic Protocols for Memex3 Use Identity Based Encryption (IBE) My key is “Aaron Smith”  Public Key is an identifier string (e.g.“aaron@princeton.edu”)  Use global public parameters  Master secret holder(s) can give out private keys to an individual that authenticates themselves  Boneh and Franklin ‘01

4. Brent WatersCryptographic Protocols for Memex4 Problems with Standard IBE  What should the identities be? Names are not unique Don’t necessarily want to tie to SS#, Driver’s License…  First time users Don’t have identities yet  Certifying oneself to authority can be troublesome Need documentation, etc.

5. Brent WatersCryptographic Protocols for Memex5 Biometric as an Identity  Biometric stays with human  Should be unique (depends on quality of biometric)  Have identity before registration  Certification is natural

6. Brent WatersCryptographic Protocols for Memex6 Biometric as an Identity  Biometric measure changes a little each time Environment Difference in Sensors Small change in trait  Cannot use a biometric as an identity in current IBE schemes

7. Brent WatersCryptographic Protocols for Memex7 Fuzzy Identity Based Encryption A secret key for ID can decrypt a ciphertext encrypted with ID’ iff Hamming Distance(ID,ID’)  d M Private Key for ID Encrypted with ID’

8. Brent WatersCryptographic Protocols for Memex8 Fuzzy Identity Based Encryption A secret key for ID can decrypt a ciphertext encrypted with ID’ iff Hamming Distance(ID,ID’)  d Private Key for ID Encrypted with ID’

9. Brent WatersCryptographic Protocols for Memex9 Final points  The biometric input is a public key, not a secret  Work is available on e-print and www.cs.princeton.edu/~bwaters/publications