1. Pretty Good BGP: Improving BGP by Cautiously Adopting Routes Josh Karlin, Stephanie Forrest, Jennifer Rexford IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols 2006

2. Outline What are current BGP security issues? What is PGBGP trying to solve? How does PGBGP solve it? How good is PGBGP? How bad is PGBGP? Shall we use it?

3. What are current BGP security issues? BGP4 (RFC1771) –Inter-domain routing, internet core –Link state protocol, distributed system Vulnerabilities –No encryption: eavesdropping –No timestamp: replaying –No signature: man-in-the-middle

4. What are current BGP security issues? Examples

5. What is PGBGP trying to solve? General requirements of a good solution –BGP is widely deployed: don’t modify the protocol –Route’s resource is stretched thin: don’t consume too much resource –ISPs are conservative: incremental deployable –ISPs are greedy: show good results!

6. What is PGBGP trying to solve? Prefix hijack –Shorter AS_PATH (man-in-the-middle) –MOAS (multiple origin AS)

7. How does PGBGP solve it? Basic idea –Suspicious  Cautious –Use historical prefix-origin records –Damping suspicious prefix-origin announcement for 24 hours –Human investigation –Good for prefix/sub-prefix hijacks

8. How does PGBGP solve it? Algorithm  History period – h hours  clean  Suspicious period – s hours  quarantined  Move h forward  remove staleness, get freshness Parameters sensitivity  h = 10 days : short  FP, long  repeat slips  s = 24 hours : human response time

9. How does PGBGP solve it? Prefix Hijacks: conflict w/ unknown origins Sub-prefix hijacks: Conflict w/ known origins [Q1]?

10. How does PGBGP solve it? Mitigation –Avoid suspicious routes: lower preference Sub-prefix: quarantine, choose neighbor not having the suspicious routes (not really helpful) Never seen prefix / super-prefix will be adopted –Convergence consideration Obey relationship-based policy Dampened as if not announced

11. How good is PGBGP? Simulation –18,943 ASes, average 4 links per AS-AS –Simulator w/ policy-based routing –Deployment strategries: random -- p core+random -- 16 (15 degree+) + p –500 attacks per setup –Parameters: h = 3, s = 1 –Day 1, O; Day 2 O’

12. How good is PGBGP?

17. Conclusion: pretty good –Core + random deployment, 90%+ effective –Incrementally deployable –Out-of-core computation possible –Centralized computation possible –Overhead is small, real time possible –Extension: IAR (internet alert registry)

18. How bad is PGBGP? Limitations: –FP: Origin change, multi-homed –DoS + no other choice –lucky slips –Man-in-the-middle (put itself in AS_PATH) Conclusion: not to bad

19. Shall we use it? Critiques for the paper –FP delay propagation: 24+24+24+24+24 –Model human correction rate with prob. p1, FP rate p2 … –Some analysis is not thorough (e.g. Fig 3) –Undeployed ASes at risk (good & bad) –Distributed/Co-operated version Conclusion: try if you like

20. Shall we use it?

21. Questions Ask me: kuh205@lehigh.edu Email Josh Karlin: karlinjf@cs.unm.edu Interested in security research? chuah@cse.lehigh.edu