1. 1 Signature Protocol for Peer-to- peer Massively Multiplayer Online Games Speaker: Shu-Fen Chiou ( 邱淑芬 )

2. 2 Introduction- MMOGs Massively multiplayer online games (MMOGs) Server player1player2player3 ‧‧ ‧ player1player2player3 ‧‧ ‧ Client-server server Server-cluster

3. 3 Introduction- MMOGs In client-server and server-cluster Server maintains game states. Users send event to server. Server sends information to users. Server player1player2player3 ‧‧ ‧ time round

4. 4 Introduction-P2P virtual environment Game state is maintained by peers in P2P environments. Some players may gain advantages unfairly. B A C CA A B C

5. 5 Protocols NEO (New-Event Ordering) protocol (GauthierDickey et al., 2004) SEA (Secure Event Agreement) protocol (Corman et al., 2006) EASES (Efficient And Secure Event Signature) protocol (Chan et al., 2008)

6. 6 Requirements Security Prevent cheats Fixed-delay Cheat (NEO, SEA) Timestamp Cheat (NEO, SEA) Suppressed Update Cheat (NEO, SEA) Inconsistency Cheat (SEA) Collusion Cheat (NEO, SEA)

7. 7 Requirements Replay attack (SEA) Spoofing attack (SEA) Unforgeability (EASES) Verifiability (EASES) Communication All connect communication Performance Low computation (NEO, SEA, EASES) B A C

8. 8 NEO (New-Event Ordering) protocol A B C Round 1: M 1 A =E(S A (U 1 A, t)) Round 2: M 2 A =E(S A (U 2 A, t)), K A 1, S A (V A 1 ), V A 1 = 1,1,1 M r A =E(S A (U r A )), K A r-1, S A (V A r-1 ) r: The rth round E(): Encrypt key S A : A ’ s signature U r A : Update message K A r-1 : previous round ’ s key V A r-1 : previous round ’ s vote vector

9. 9 Attacks for NEO protocol Corman et al. claim the NEO has three attacks: Replay attack Spoofing attack A B C Round 1: M 1 A =E(S A (U 1 A, t)) Round 2: M 2 A =E(S A (U 2 A, t)), K A 1, S A (V A 1 ), V A 1 = 1,1,1 Round 3: M 3 A=E(S A (U 3 A, t)), K A 2, S A (V A 2 ), V A 2 = 1,1,1 Attacker: M 3 A=E(S A (U 2 A, t)), K A 2, S A (V A 2 ), V A 2 = 0,0,0

10. 10 SEA (Secure Event Agreement) protocol A B C Commit r A =H(U r A, n r, SessID, ID A ) M r A =S A (Commit r A, U A r-1, Vh r-1 A, n r-1, r) r: The rth round H(): Encrypt hash function U r A : Update message n r : A nouce SessID: Session ID ID A : A ’ s ID S A : A’s signature Vh r-1 A : vote vector with hash function Round 1: Commit 1 A =H(U 1 A, n 1, N 1, ID A ) M 1 A =S A (Commit 1 A, 1) Round 2: Commit 2 A=H(U 2 A, n 2, N2, ID A ) M 2 A =S A (Commit 2 A, U 1 A, Vh 1 A, N 1, 2)

11. 11 EASES – Initialization phase Use a random number as the master key MK i Generate one-time signature keys EX: K A 10 =H(MK A ) K A 9 =H(K A 10 ) K A 8 =H(K A 9 ) K A 7 =H(K A 8 ) ‧ K A 2 =H(K A 3 ) K A 1 =H(K A 2 ) K A 0 =H(K A 1 ) △ A =S sk (K A 0 )

12. 12 EASES – Signing phase EX: M A 1 = H(K A 1 |U A 1 ), △ A, K A 0 M A 2 = H(K A 2 |U A 2 ), K A 1, U A 1 M A 3 = H(K A 3 |U A 3 ), K A 2, U A 2 ‧ M A 9 = H(K A 9 |U A 9 ), U A 8, K A 8 M A 10 = H(K A 10 |U A 10 ), U A 9, K A 9 M i 1 = H(K i 1 |U i 1 ), △ i, K i 0 M i n = H(K i n |U i n ), U i n-1, K i n-1 first round subsequent round A B C

13. 13 EASES – Verification phase In first round Decrypts △ i =S sk (K i 0 ), with player i ’ s public- key and Verifies In subsequent round K i n-2 =H(K i n-1 ) ? M i n-1 =H(K i n-1 |U i n-1 ) ? B uses A’s pk to decrypt △ A verity K A 0 legitimate? AB M A 1 = H(K A 1 |U A 1 ), △ A, K A 0 M A 2 = H(K A 2 |U A 2 ), K A 1, U A 1 1 st 2 nd B computes Hash(K A 1 )=K A 0 Hash(K A 1 |U A 1 ) = M A 1 not tamper?

14. 14 EASES – Re-initialization phase 11 th : B computes Hash(K A 10 |U A 10 |NewK A 0 ) = M A 10, authenticate NewK A 0 ? 12 th : B computes Hash(MK A ) = K A 10 ? M newA 1 =H(NewK A 1 |U A 12 ), △ NewA, NewK A 0 M newA 2 =H(NewK A 2 |U A 13 ), U A 12, NewK A 1 M newA 3 =H(NewK A 3 |U A 14 ), U A 13, NewK A 2 ‧ IN n round, re-generated new one-time signature NewK i 0, NewK i 1, ‧ ‧ ‧ ‧ ‧ NewK i m 10 th : M A 10 =H(K A 10 |U A 10 |NewK A 0 ), U A 9, K A 9 A B 12 th : MK A 11 th : M A 11 =H(NewK A 1 |U A 11 ), U A 10, K A 10, NewK A 0 New rounds

15. 15 EASES – Late joining M A 1 = H(K A 1 |U A 1 ), △ A, K A 0 M A 2 = H(K A 2 |U A 2 ), K A 1, U A 1 AB 1 st 2 nd C Join in 2 nd △ A =S sk (K A 0 ), K A 0, K A 1 M A 2 = H(K A 2 |U A 2 ) Authenticate Key 3rd M A 3 = H(K A 3 |U A 3 ), K A 2, U A 2

16. 16 Dynamic EASES – Signing phase 1 st : S sk (H(U A 1 |K A 1 ) 2 nd : S sk (H(U A 2 |K A 2 |K A 1 )) 3 rd : H(U A 3 |K A 3 |K A 2 )), K A 1, U A 1 4 th : H(U A 4 |K A 4 |K A 3 )), K A 2, U A 2 ‧ n th : H(U A n |K A n |K A n-1 ), K A n-2, U A n-2 Like EASES-based authentication Don ’ t prepare generation hash-chain keys

17. 17 Dynamic EASES – Verification phase In 1 st & 2 nd, B verifies the signatures In 3 rd, authenticity H(U A 1 |K A 1 ) In subsequent, authenticity H(U A n-2 |K A n- 2 |K A n-3 ) AB 1 st : S sk (H(U A 1 |K A 1 )) & 2 nd : S sk (H(U A 2 |K A 2 |K A 1 ))1 st & 2 nd : decrypts and stores 3 rd : H(U A 3 |K A 3 |K A 2 )), K A 1, U A 1 4 th : H(U A 4 |K A 4 |K A 3 )), K A 2, U A 2 Subsequent round: verifies the message of (n-2) round In n round

18. 18 Comparison

19. 19 Comment – Signing phase EX: M A 1 = H(K A 1 |U A 1 |t), △ A, K A 0, ID A M A 2 = H(K A 2 |U A 2 |t), K A 1, U A 1 M A 3 = H(K A 3 |U A 3 |t), K A 2, U A 2 ‧ M A 9 = H(K A 9 |U A 9 |t), U A 8, K A 8 M A 10 = H(K A 10 |U A 10 |t), U A 9, K A 9 Add timestamp t, and user ’ s id M i 1 = H(K i 1 |U i 1 |t), △ i, K i 0, ID i M i n = H(K i n |U i n |t), U i n-1, K i n-1, first round subsequent round A B C

20. 20 Communication method Broadcast communication AB G D C E F

21. 21 Reference C. Dickey, D. Zappala, V. Lo, J. Marr, Low latency and cheat- proof event ordering for peer-to-peer games, in: Proceedings of the ACM International Workshop on Network and Operating System Support for Digital Audio and Video (NOSSDAV), Kinsale, County Cork, Ireland, 2004, pp. 134 – 139. A. Corman, S. Douglas, P. Schachte, V. Teague, A secure event agreement (SEA) protocol for peer-to-peer games, in: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, 2006. M. C. Chan, S. Y. Hu, and J. R. Jiang, An efficient and secure event signature (EASES) protocol for peer-to-peer massively multiplayer online games, Computer Networks, vol. 52, pp. 1838 – 1845, 2008.