1. Chapter 7 Physicians as Providers of Health Care

2. A. Market Structure of Physician Practices The market for physician services is best characterized as monopolistically competitive, although there are examples of monopoly (cartels). This market is one in which physician practices are not perfect substitutes for each other, but in which there is competition in most communities. Thus, we can think of physician practices as being characterized by downward sloping demand curves.

3. A. Market Structure of Physician Practices Figure 7.1: A Monopolistically Competitive Physician Firm

4. B. Behavior of Physician Practices (Firms) The market for physician services is known to be one in which price discrimination is employed. Does price discrimination result from altruism or does it result from rational economic motivation, e.g. an attempt to profit maximize? Historically, there was much anecdotal evidence that physicians were motivated by altruism and would accept whatever people could pay. We can explain this by noting that physicians’ utility function may take the form of: U = f (I, L, A) where I = income, L = leisure and A = altruism.

5. B. Behavior of Physician Practices (Firms) Price discrimination may also result from an economically motivated strategy to maximize profits. Economically motivated price discrimination can occur where: (a) markets can be segmented by price elasticity of demand (b) products or services cannot be resold. Both of these conditions apply in the market place for physicians’ services.

6. B. Behavior of Physician Practices (Firms) Profit-Maximizing Price Discrimination: Use the general rule of setting marginal cost (MC) equal to marginal revenue (MR) in each sub-market. To understand how this leads to profit-maximizing price discrimination, we must understand the relationship between marginal revenue (MR), price elasticity of demand (η) and price (P): MR = P (1 + 1/η) To maximize profits, the firm sets the marginal cost equal to the marginal revenue in each sub-market: MC = MR 1 = MR 2 MC = P 1 (1 + 1/η 1 ) = P 2 (1 + 1/η 2 )

7. B. Behavior of Physician Practices (Firms) Figure 7.2: Two-Way Price Discrimination

8. B. Behavior of Physician Practices (Firms) Cost-Shifting Cost shifting occurs when firms charge higher prices to one group of consumers in order to offset lower payments from others. Many people think that physicians (and hospitals) do this in order to compensate for charity care lower payments from Medicare, Medicaid, or managed care third-party payers. Cost-shifting is only profitable if firms are not already charging the profit maximizing price to the unconstrained part of the market, e.g. charging a price < p* in the following diagram.

9. B. Behavior of Physician Practices (Firms) Figure 7.3: Limits to Cost Shifting

10. C. Alternative Model of Physician Practices A model proposed by Thomas McGuire (2000) treats physicians as quantity setters rather than price setters. It has a great deal of plausibility in an age of managed care, and when Medicare and Medicaid set rates of reimbursement. It treats consumers (patients) as having marginal benefit rather than demand functions for services purchased. Total benefit is a function of quantity of service received, B(x), where x is the unit of service. If price of a unit of service = p, Net benefit is: NB(x) = B(x) – p(x).

11. C. Alternative Model of Physician Practices In this model patients do have choices among physicians. In order to remain with the same physician practice, a patient must receive a minimum level of net benefit, NB 0. A physician can satisfy this condition while providing varying amounts of service since some care is perceived as having positive value while other care is perceived as having negative value. Figure 7.4 illustrates this.

12. C. Alternative Model of Physician Practices Figure 7.4: The McGuire Model Based on McGuire, T.G., “Physician Agency” in Handbook of Health Economics, Vol. 1A, A.K. Culyer and J.P. Newhouse, eds., (Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2000) Fig 3, p. 480

13. D. Physicians as Agents Because of asymmetric information, in which physicians’ specialized knowledge gives them an advantage in diagnosing and recommending treatment, patients delegate authority to physicians to make decisions about their health care. This creates the potential for principal/agent problems. Physicians can either be perfect or imperfect agents. If they behave as perfect agents, they act in the patient’s best interest in recommending treatment. In the case of imperfect agency, physicians substitute their own self-interest.

14. D. Physicians as Agents Physicians who are perfect agents will tend to recommend the same treatment, regardless of the way in which they are reimbursed. Imperfect agency will manifest itself differently depending upon whether physicians are reimbursed on a fee-for service basis, salaried, or paid on a capitation basis.

15. D. Physicians as Agents Imperfect Agency in a Fee-for-Service Regime may take the form of “Physician Induced Demand” (PID). This can be illustrated, using Figure 7.4, as providing the quantity of service, (x* - x 0 ) when it is deemed by the physician to be medically unnecessary. Figure 7.4 also allows for the possibility that a physician is acting as a perfect agent in prescribing x* amount of treatment, since his/her superior information may cause the physician to understand the advantage of treatment which the patient may prefer to avoid.

16. D. Physicians as Agents Imperfect Agency, when physicians are either salaried or paid on a capitation basis, is likely to be manifested in skimping rather than providing unnecessary treatment. Imperfect Agency is likely to enter into a physician’s utility function as a negative term since it directly conflicts with professional ethics. The disutility associated with inducing demand is a limiting factor. (Robert Evans). It can be argued that skimping on care would also involve disutility. Moreover, the need to satisfy patients’ NB 0 limits imperfect agency.

17. E. Malpractice and Defensive Medicine The main aim of medical malpractice law is to reduce medical mistakes resulting from carelessness or incompetence. However, it also leads to increases in cost of medical care due to (a) the high cost of malpractice insurance (b) the practice of defensive medicine –This is fear-of-liability-induced changes in medical practice. It may be hard to distinguish in practice from physician-induced demand, which is motivated by enhancing physician income. Both are easier to do when patients have generous health insurance or are not cost-conscious.