1. Structure of parliament

2. Origins of parliament Kings always had to consult with leading, powerful nobles Kings always had to consult with leading, powerful nobles During the reign of William I this meeting was known as the Great Council – the king would consult on important issues with his nobles and bishops During the reign of William I this meeting was known as the Great Council – the king would consult on important issues with his nobles and bishops The word parliament comes from ‘parler’, to talk, i.e. a talking shop. The word parliament comes from ‘parler’, to talk, i.e. a talking shop. The role of parliament at this time was mainly to supply money to the king The role of parliament at this time was mainly to supply money to the king

4. Growth of parliament’s power In the seventeenth century parliament established its supremacy over the king as a result of the English civil war 1642-49 and the Glorious Revolution 1688-9. In the seventeenth century parliament established its supremacy over the king as a result of the English civil war 1642-49 and the Glorious Revolution 1688-9. In the eighteenth century the kings became even less powerful as the power of the Prime Minister e.g. Walpole increased. (The P.M. and other ministers were part of parliament). In the eighteenth century the kings became even less powerful as the power of the Prime Minister e.g. Walpole increased. (The P.M. and other ministers were part of parliament). In the nineteenth century democracy (the vote being exercised by large numbers) and the resulting development of mass political parties took the away the residual power of the king and created the modern parliamentary democracy.

5. Legislatures Legislation / Representation / Oversight of executive / Recruitment Legislation / Representation / Oversight of executive / Recruitment

6. Reforming the Legislature: The Commons and the Lords

7. Bicameralism vs Unicameralism Unicameralism – single legislative chamber Unicameralism – single legislative chamber Strength of legislature vis-à-vis executive depends on nature of party system Strength of legislature vis-à-vis executive depends on nature of party system Bicameralism – two legislative chambers Bicameralism – two legislative chambers Weak vs strong bicameralism Weak vs strong bicameralism Strong: 2 chambers have equal power (symmetrical) Strong: 2 chambers have equal power (symmetrical) Weak: lower chamber dominant (asymmetrical) Weak: lower chamber dominant (asymmetrical) 2 chambers can be (s)elected on different basis 2 chambers can be (s)elected on different basis Strong bicameralism in federal states Strong bicameralism in federal states Weak bicameralism or unicameralism in unitary states Weak bicameralism or unicameralism in unitary states The stronger the bicameralism, the stronger the legislature vis- à-vis executive in parliamentary systems The stronger the bicameralism, the stronger the legislature vis- à-vis executive in parliamentary systems

8. House of Lords & Executive (1) Lords once more powerful than Commons Lords once more powerful than Commons Representation of different social classes Representation of different social classes Composition: mainly hereditary peers (& Law Lords, bishops) Composition: mainly hereditary peers (& Law Lords, bishops) Once had unlimited power to veto legislation Once had unlimited power to veto legislation Parliament Act 1911 – weakened Lords Parliament Act 1911 – weakened Lords Bill could become law without Lords’ consent after 2 years, money bills after 1 month; aspired to remove hereditaries Bill could become law without Lords’ consent after 2 years, money bills after 1 month; aspired to remove hereditaries Parliament Act 1949 – 2 yrs delay cut to 1 year Parliament Act 1949 – 2 yrs delay cut to 1 year Attlee Govt worried Lords would block radical policies Attlee Govt worried Lords would block radical policies Salisbury Convention emerged Salisbury Convention emerged UK: weak bicameralism UK: weak bicameralism

9. Uses of the Parliament Acts 1. Welsh Church Act 1914 Disestablished Welsh part of Church of England Disestablished Welsh part of Church of England 2. Home Rule Act 1914 Home Rule for Ireland (never implemented) Home Rule for Ireland (never implemented) 3. Parliament Act 1949 Amended Parliament Act 1911 Amended Parliament Act 1911 4. War Crimes Act 1991 Enabled UK to prosecute Nazi war criminals for activities outside UK Enabled UK to prosecute Nazi war criminals for activities outside UK Only time Parliament Acts used by a Conservative Govt Only time Parliament Acts used by a Conservative Govt 5. European Parliamentary Elections Act 1999 Changed voting system for Euro elections Changed voting system for Euro elections 6. Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000 Lowered age of consent for homosexuals from 18 to 16 Lowered age of consent for homosexuals from 18 to 16 7. Hunting Act 2004 Banned fox-hunting and hare coursing Banned fox-hunting and hare coursing

10. House of Lords & Executive (2) 1958 – Life Peerages Act 1958 – Life Peerages Act Enable prominent experts/public figures to enter Lords Enable prominent experts/public figures to enter Lords Appointed by PM Appointed by PM Title dies with holder Title dies with holder 1968 – Wilson: stop hereditary voting: defeated 1968 – Wilson: stop hereditary voting: defeated Powers and functions Powers and functions Legislation Legislation Deliberation Deliberation Scrutiny – important committees Scrutiny – important committees Previously Supreme Court of Appeal (Law Lords) Previously Supreme Court of Appeal (Law Lords) Constitutional Reform Act 2005 created new Supreme Court –opened in October 2009 Constitutional Reform Act 2005 created new Supreme Court –opened in October 2009

11. New Labour – Reforming the Lords Hereditary peers – conservative block on New Labour’s aspirations Hereditary peers – conservative block on New Labour’s aspirations Two-stage reforms – (1) remove hereditaries; (2) construct newly-composed chamber Two-stage reforms – (1) remove hereditaries; (2) construct newly-composed chamber Tories opposed removing hereditaries Tories opposed removing hereditaries ‘Cranbourne compromise’ – keep 92 hereditaries ‘Cranbourne compromise’ – keep 92 hereditaries Interim House – politically rebalanced: no party had majority Interim House – politically rebalanced: no party had majority Govt established Royal Commission to look into Stage 2 – composition, functions, powers Govt established Royal Commission to look into Stage 2 – composition, functions, powers

12. Composition of House of Lords 2009 Life Peers Hereditaries Lords Spiritual TOTAL Labour2104-214 Conservative14848-196 Liberal Dems 665-71 Crossbenchers16932-201 Bishops--2626 Others152-17 TOTAL6089126725

13. Stage 2 – Still Incomplete Royal Commission (Wakeham) 2000 Royal Commission (Wakeham) 2000 550 members: 67, 87 or 195 elected 550 members: 67, 87 or 195 elected White Paper, consultation, joint-committee White Paper, consultation, joint-committee 2003: Lords voted for 100% appointment; Commons rejected all proposals! 2003: Lords voted for 100% appointment; Commons rejected all proposals! Dept of Const Affairs Sept 2003 – all-appointed Dept of Const Affairs Sept 2003 – all-appointed White Paper 2007 White Paper 2007 Remove hereditaries Remove hereditaries Part-appointed, part-elected: 15-year terms, 1/3 elected every five years by regional list PR Part-appointed, part-elected: 15-year terms, 1/3 elected every five years by regional list PR March 2007: Commons voted for 100% elected; Lords voted for 100% appointed! March 2007: Commons voted for 100% elected; Lords voted for 100% appointed!

14. Future of the Lords (1) Debate: composition > powers Debate: composition > powers Power underlies debate: election  greater legitimacy Power underlies debate: election  greater legitimacy Interim Lords flexing muscles Interim Lords flexing muscles Salisbury Convention obsolete? Salisbury Convention obsolete? PM – too much patronage power? PM – too much patronage power? Is an elected chamber a good thing? Is an elected chamber a good thing? Replicate party system in Lords Replicate party system in Lords Unsuitable for scrutiny role? Unsuitable for scrutiny role?

15. Future of the Lords (2) What is the purpose of a second chamber in a non-federal state? What is the purpose of a second chamber in a non-federal state? Function > election? Function > election? Democracy less important because Lords doesn’t choose, maintain or remove Govt & not involved in finance? Democracy less important because Lords doesn’t choose, maintain or remove Govt & not involved in finance? Dual democratic legitimacies? Dual democratic legitimacies? Deadlock vs rubberstamp? Deadlock vs rubberstamp? Does present Lords show election unnecessary for upper chamber to check Govt and have legitimacy? Does present Lords show election unnecessary for upper chamber to check Govt and have legitimacy?

16. What are the main arguments for and against Lords Reform?

17. Parliamentary Scrutiny Broader question: how effective are parliamentary checks on the executive? Broader question: how effective are parliamentary checks on the executive? Debates on Lords reform: praise for Lords’ scrutinising role Debates on Lords reform: praise for Lords’ scrutinising role Strengthen Commons select committees? Strengthen Commons select committees? But major barrier to parliamentary scrutiny = whipping system and party loyalty But major barrier to parliamentary scrutiny = whipping system and party loyalty Some evidence of greater willingness of backbench MPs to rebel against Govt Some evidence of greater willingness of backbench MPs to rebel against Govt

18. Electoral Reform for Commons Parliament weak because 2-party system Parliament weak because 2-party system … which derives from FPTP electoral system … which derives from FPTP electoral system PR  Coalition Govts PR  Coalition Govts Scotland/Wales Scotland/Wales Executive more answerable to legislature Executive more answerable to legislature Problem for reformers: Labour & Tories not (usually) interested in PR – prefer single-party majority Govts Problem for reformers: Labour & Tories not (usually) interested in PR – prefer single-party majority Govts

19. Seat-Vote Differentials in UK General Elections, 1964-2005 Note: Vertical axis measures (% seats won) minus (% votes won). Figures above zero indicate ‘unearned’ seats in parliament; figures below zero indicate ‘deprivation’ of seats; zero indicates perfect proportionality.

20. Jenkins Report 1998 Labour manifesto 1997 – electoral reform Labour manifesto 1997 – electoral reform Terms of Reference of Jenkins Committee Terms of Reference of Jenkins Committee 1. Keep constituency link 2. Strong Govt 3. Broad proportionality 4. Extend voter choice Recommended AV+ Recommended AV+ Voters have 2 votes Voters have 2 votes AV in constituencies – MPs win 50% + 1 votes AV in constituencies – MPs win 50% + 1 votes Top-up MPs elected on regional lists (list PR element) Top-up MPs elected on regional lists (list PR element) Top-up MPs = 15-20% (bit more proportional than FPTP) Top-up MPs = 15-20% (bit more proportional than FPTP) Illegitimate? – Lab-Lib Dem stitch-up? Illegitimate? – Lab-Lib Dem stitch-up? Never implemented Never implemented

21. Conclusion Major check on executive would be electoral reform – referendum promised in Labour’s next manifesto Major check on executive would be electoral reform – referendum promised in Labour’s next manifesto Lords reform is secondary by comparison… Lords reform is secondary by comparison… … but still important … but still important UK’s bicameralism strong in 1900, weak in 1980s, but somewhat stronger in 2009 – Lords enjoys greater legitimacy today UK’s bicameralism strong in 1900, weak in 1980s, but somewhat stronger in 2009 – Lords enjoys greater legitimacy today