1. Thomas Reid 1710-1796 Founder of the Scottish School of Common Sense Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man 1785 (Essay VIII: Of Taste)

2. Reid claims that an aesthetic judgment is NOT based on feelings or sentiments In contrast to Hume, Reid defends a rationalist approach: our judgments of beauty are founded on REASON The influence of Shaftesbury is strong on Reid’s aesthetics

3. Reid distinguishes between Instinctive Judgments of Taste and Rational Judgments of Taste Only Rational Judgments of Taste are central to aesthetic experience or appreciation

4. In a Rational Judgment of Taste to call an object ‘beautiful’ is to judge that there are properties in the object that make it worthy of giving pleasure BEAUTY does not refer to a feeling of pleasure produced in the spectator but to a PROPERTY or PROPERTIES in the object

5. ‘The common judgment of mankind sufficiently appears in the language of all nations, which uniformly ascribes excellence, grandeur, and beauty to the object, and NOT to the mind that perceived it’

6. Comparison of an Instinctive and a Rational Judgment of Taste A child takes delight in the shape and colour of a pebble, but can give no reason for his delight – This is an Instinctive Judgment of Taste An expert mechanic views a well constructed machine and sees that all the parts are well made for the end intended of the machine. As a result, he judges that it is a beautiful machine, and feels an emotion of delight consequent upon his judgment – This is a Rational Judgment of Taste

7. ‘Suppose an expert mechanic views a well constructed machine. He sees all its parts to be made of the fittest materials and the whole fitted in the most perfect manner to the end for which it is intended. He pronounces it to be a beautiful machine. He views it with the same agreeable emotion as the child viewed the pebble; but he can give a REASON for his judgment, and point out the particular perfections of the object on which the judgment is grounded.’

8. In Rational Judgments of Beauty, there are perfections in the object that we are conscious of as perceptions (by recognizing, for instance, that the parts are well adapted to the end intended of the object). Our recognition that they are perfections is the result of our reason, not of our feelings We normally experience delight consequent upon our rational judgment that the object is beautiful

9. Good Taste ‘That power of the mind by which we are capable of discovering AND relishing the beauties of nature and whatever is excellent in the fine arts is called [good] taste.’

10. Depraved Taste ‘A man who, by any disorder in his mental power or by bad habits has contracted a relish for what has no excellence, or for what is deformed or defective, has a depraved taste like one who finds an agreeable relish in ashes or cinders, than in the most wholesome food. As we must acknowledge the taste of the palate to be depraved in this case, there is the same reason for thinking the taste of the mind [aesthetic taste] to be depraved in the other. ’

11. The point of Reid’s analogy with Food In the case of tasting food, we believe that we should be led in our delight by what is most wholesome or nourishing; and in the aesthetic case, we believe that we should be led in our aesthetic delight by what has real excellence or perfection of its kind. These are judgments of reason, not of feeling

12. Further arguments for Reid’s view that beauty is a property of the object, and not a feeling or sentiment of an observer 1. A judgment of taste claims that the OBJECT is beautiful. Why should we talk in this way unless we really believe that Beauty does belong to the object and does NOT refer to the feelings of any spectator?

13. 2. We have a perfectly clear way of expressing our feelings in language, i.e. by saying ‘The object gives me an agreeable feeling’. But that is NOT what we do say in making an aesthetic judgment. Therefore there is no reason to suppose that ‘The object is beautiful’ merely expresses our feelings in perceiving the object

14. 3. If two people make an aesthetic judgment about the same object, and one of them declares that the object is beautiful and the other declares that it is not beautiful, we think of them as CONTRADICTING each other. But if the judgment ‘X is beautiful’ simply means ‘X gives me a pleasant feeling’, then ‘X is beautiful’ said by one person CANNOT contradict ‘X is not beautiful’ said by the other person. In fact, both judgments could be true!

15. 4. In discussing works of art or nature, we give reasons for our aesthetic judgments by pointing to features in the object. And we speak of justifying or failing to justify our judgments by reference to what exists in the object. Such ways of talking and acting are only appropriate to judgments about properties in the object, not to feelings of pleasure or displeasure in spectators

16. 5. How could we suppose, as we do, that some objects possess features that merit our taking pleasure in those objects unless we think that these objects possess their beauties or perfections independently of our taking pleasure in them?

17. Taken together, Reid’s arguments constitute a serious defence of a rationalist analysis of our aesthetic judgments and experience. They need to be answered by anyone who takes the opposing view that the fundamental ground for making aesthetic judgments is the feeling of pleasure or displeasure.