1. Chapter 14: Oligopoly & Game Theory

2. Introduction We have looked at two ends of the spectrum: –Very competitive markets (perfect competition) –Very uncompetitive markets (monopoly) Now we are going to look somewhere in the middle (Oligopoly) We’ll look at firm’s with some market power (like a monopolist), but with strong competitors (like perfect competition)

3. Oligopoly Oligopoly refers to a market with a small number of firms (2, 3, 4, 5) whose behavior is interdependent Interdependent means that Firm A’s choices effect Firm B For example: Subway’s ad campaign (“Eat Fresh”) certainly impacts the demand for Subway, but it will also affect the demand for Quiznos, McDonald’s, Burger King, etc.) The price Pepsi charges effects not only their sales, but also Coke’s sales

4. Types of Oligopoly There are a variety of different types of oligopoly In oligopoly, the firms can make identical (homogeneous) products or differentiated products How can products be differentiated? –Physical qualities (this cereal has a better taste) –Sales locations (you can only get this online) –Services (this bank charges $2 to see a teller) –Image (advertising)

5. Models of Oligopoly Most of the widely-used models of oligopoly are too quantitative to describe here HOWEVER, the key element to consider is the fact that the strong interdependence among firms results in strategic behavior “How much should I advertise if my rival…?” “If I cut my price, I know my rival will…” A useful way to handle this strategic behavior is through the use of GAME THEORY

6. Game Theory Game Theory is a method we can use to analyze the decision-making process for these strategic firms Each “game’” has (a) players, (b) strategies, and (c) payoffs Players – these will be the firms Strategies – the choices the players have (what price should I charge, should I enter the market) Payoffs – what the player receives for playing the game (profits)

7. Example: Prisoner’s Dilemma Two thieves, Dave and Wes, are arrested as suspects in a murder The police believes they are guilty, but can’t prove it without a confession The two suspects are interrogated in separate rooms and given the same speech: –“If you confess and testify against your buddy, we’ll let you go free” –“If your buddy turns you in, we’ll ask for the maximum sentence” If neither confess, then there won’t be enough evidence to convict them and they’ll only go to jail for a minor offense (drug possession, underage drinking, etc.) If both confess, they’ll both go to jail for the crime but they won’t do the maximum

8. The Payoff Matrix We will represent this game in a matrix form (like a table) In the matrix, we have all of the following information: –Each player (Dave and Wes) –Each strategy available (Confess, Remain Silent) –The payoff for each possible combination (the amount of time in jail) We will use game theory to try and anticipate/predict the optimal choices for both players

9. 5 5 0 10 0 1 1 Confess Silent DAVE Confess Silent WESWES Payoff Matrix How do we read this matrix/table? Dave’s strategies and payoffs are represented in BLUE Wes’ strategies and payoffs are represented in GREEN FOR EXAMPLE: If Dave confesses and Wes stays silent, then the payoffs are… Dave goes free (no jail time) and Wes serves 10 years in prison

10. Equilibrium Now that we understand each players’ choices (strategies), we need to figure out what is the optimal choice for each player to make To help us determine the optimal strategies, we will look for the NASH EQUILIBRIUM…

11. Nash Equilibrium Nash Equilibrium – The strategies or actions in which each firm does the best it can given its’ competitors’ actions The key is that the Nash Equilibrium gives us the best strategy given what the other’s are doing This implies that you have no incentive to change your behavior because you are doing the best thing you can, given what everyone else is doing The explanation in the movie is wrong…

12. 5 5 0 10 0 1 1 Confess Silent DAVE Confess Silent WESWES If Dave confesses, what is Wes’ best response? Wes goes to jail for 10 years if he stays silent, but he only goes to jail for 5 years if he confesses, too So, “confess” is Wes’ best response What is Dave stays silent? What is Wes’ best response now? Wes goes to jail for a year if he stays silent, but he goes free if he confesses So, “confess” is Wes’ best response For either of Dave’s choices, Wes’ best response is to CONFESS Using the same logic for Dave’s best responses, we can find the Nash Equilibrium…

13. 5 5 0 10 0 1 1 Confess Silent DAVE Confess Silent WESWES The Nash Equilibrium occurs where both people’s best responses overlap… The Nash Equilibrium is that both players should “Confess” and receive 5 years in prison “But Adam, couldn’t they BOTH be BETTER OFF if they both stayed SILENT?” “Yes, they could BUT both players would have an incentive to change their strategy. If I knew you were going to stay Silent, I’d be better off Confessing (and vice versa).” So, the NASH EQUILIBRIUM point is the only stable (sustainable) outcome

14. Price-Setting Game: Coke vs. Pepsi Let’s examine a potential situation where Coke and Pepsi simultaneously choose what price to charge To make this simple, suppose each firm can choose whether to charge a high price or a low price If they charge the same price, they split sales in the market and earn equal profit If one firm charges a lower price (“undercutting”), that lower price firm earns more profit than the high priced firm

15. $500 $1000 $200 $1000 $700 Low Price High Price Low Price High Price Pepsi Coke Pepsi’s perspective: If Coke charges the low price, Pepsi earns $500 charging the low price but only $200 by charging the high price  better off by charging the low price. If Coke charges the high price, Pepsi earns $1,000 by charging the low price and $700 charging the high price  earn more by charging the low price. Coke faces the same incentives Each seller will charge the low price, regardless of what the other does  each earns $500 a day Price-Setting Payoff Matrix Just like the Prisoner’s dilemma, both firms would be BETTER OFF if they both charged the HIGH PRICE, but that strategy is not sustainable

16. Extending the Game… We’ve looked at just two choices up until this point (Confess/Stay Silent OR High Price/Low Price) The same technique for finding the Nash Equilibrium applies to situations where there are more than two moves Consider the following example about Coke and Pepsi choosing how much to spend on advertising TopHat question…

17. Other Examples… The concept of a Nash Equilibrium can be used in other situations…even when there is no payoff matrix to examine As an example, let’s think of two firms choosing where to build their stores Example: Let’s think of two coffee shops (Starbucks and Espresso Joe’s) trying to decide where along Route 96 to build their new coffee shops We will think of modeling Route 96 as a Line

18. Linear Model Route 96 will be modeled as a LINE Starbucks and Espresso Joe’s must decide where along the line to set up their shop In the linear model, there are consumers all along the line Consumers purchase from the store that is closest to them The point, therefore, is to choose the optimal location so that the most consumers visit your store

19. Linear Model Broad St.Fortress Blvd. How does this model work? The consumers purchase from the store that is closest to them For example, suppose Starbucks and Espresso Joe’s are located here… StarbucksEspresso Joe’s Consumers that buy from Joe’sConsumers that buy from Starbucks

20. Nash Equilibrium In order to find the Nash Equilibrium, we need to determine each firm’s BEST RESPONSE (just as we did when looking at a payoff matrix) Broad St.Fortress Blvd. Espresso Joe’s If Espresso Joe’s is located at the location above, where would Starbucks want to locate? Remember that they want to get the most customers as possible. Starbucks would want to locate as close to Joe’s as possible (so that they are the closest store for all of the people out towards Fortress Blvd.) Starbucks

21. Nash Equilibrium Broad St.Fortress Blvd. Espresso Joe’sStarbucks The Nash Equilibrium strategy is for both firms to locate NEXT TO EACH OTHER in the middle of the line => they each get half of the customers This choice is the only STABLE strategy (there is no incentive for either firm to “move”) No firm can gain more customers by switching their location

22. Minimum Differentiation This idea that firms want to locate close to each other is something that we see all the time… –Gas stations are usually at an intersection with other gas stations –One block in Charlottesville has three coffee shops but there isn’t another one for over a mile –Coke and Pepsi make their colas almost identical (locating close to their rival) The Nash Equilibrium helps us determine what the optimal strategies are, given what our rivals are going to do

23. Multi-period (Sequential) Games In multi-period games, there is a timing element –One firm chooses their price, then the other firms set their price –Your firm is trying to decide which pricing strategy to adopt to keep out future (potential) rivals –The Stackelberg model was an example of a sequential game In the simultaneous-move game (static), we used the normal form representation For sequential games, we will use an extensive form representation (tree diagram)

24. Player 1 Player 2 UP DOWN UP DOWN (10, 15)(5, 5)(0, 0)(6, 20)

25. Solution Technique To solve for the Nash equilibrium strategies in sequential games, we use backward induction –We solve the game from the end to the beginning How? Start at the final stage of the game and figure out what the firm would do if the game was at the point After considering all the final choices, move up to the preceding stage of the game and figure what that firm would do knowing how the other firm would behave in the final stage of the game

26. Player 1 Player 2 UP DOWN UP DOWN (10, 15)(5, 5)(0, 0)(6, 20)

27. Nash Equilibrium The Nash equilibrium in this game is for Player 1 to choose UP and then Player 2 to choose UP Playing these strategies gives Player 1 a pay-off of $10 and Player 2 a pay-off of $20 Now try one on your own… Firm A is a pharmaceutical company thinking about developing a new cancer drug Firm B is a generic drug manufacturer that may (or may not) clone Firm 1’s drug

28. Firm A Firm B Introduce Drug Don’t Introduce Drug Clone Don’t Clone (0, 0) (100, 0)(-5, 20)

29. Oligopoly vs. Perfect Competition As we did with monopoly, it is useful to measure oligopoly against perfect competition Unfortunately, we haven’t used equations or graphs to characterize oligopoly, so the comparison isn’t quite as easy…but we can still make some predictions based on what we do know Let’s look at price and profits

30. Oligopoly vs. Perfect Competition Either because (a) there are fewer firms or (b) firms often have some sort of market power, prices under oligopoly tend to be higher than perfect competition Higher prices also imply less less output Because there are barriers to entry in oligopoly which keep out potential competitors, there is the possibility of positive long run profits Oligopoly is usually “better” for consumers than monopoly, however

31. The last words on market structure and consumer welfare… As markets become more competitive, the consumer usually benefits through lower prices and increased output